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Harold Wilson once opined that ‘a week is a long 
time in politics’. This much overused phrase is apt for 
describing the events that have followed in the wake 
of  the momentous Referendum vote for the United 
Kingdom to leave the European Union. Wilson was the 
Prime Minister who originally introduced plebiscitary 
decision-making to Britain in an attempt to bring unity 
to his fractious government. The contentious issue was, 
then as now, UK relations with its continental partners. 
Despite the electorate voting decisively to stay in the 
then European Economic Community in 1975 the 
question over British membership was not resolved. 
The closeness of  the 2016 result and its implications 
will ensure the issue continues to dominate debate for 
the foreseeable future. 
British exit from the European Union, so-called 
‘Brexit’, will have profound consequences. The 
Referendum delivered a 52% to 48% victory to the 
Leave campaign but this result masks serious division 
within the UK. Scotland voted 62% to Remain and 
there are now plans to hold another referendum on 
independence to protect the country’s EU member-
ship. Although its constitutional status within the 
UK is less in doubt there are also implications for 
Northern Ireland, where 56% backed Remain, given it 
shares a border with the European Union. In contrast, 
England and Wales both supported Leave by a slightly 
larger margin than the UK as a whole. But even here 
the campaign has been blamed for stoking resent-
ments and, in the tragic case of  the late MP Jo Cox, 
violence of  the most heinous kind. There is also major 
uncertainty about the state of  the British economy 
and the degree to which it can cope with the potential 
consequences of  Brexit, whenever the latter process 
formally begins.
Aside from the economic situation Britain also 
faces political uncertainty following the resignation of  
David Cameron and the failure of  Boris Johnson, his 
nemesis, to succeed him as Prime Minister. This after 
a highly unusual campaign in which both of  these 
Conservatives, effectively the respective leaders of  
the rival Remain and Leave camps, only declared how 
they would vote in the Referendum months before the 
country had to decide. Although more united before 
the vote, the opposition Labour Party has since been 
plunged into turmoil by an attempt to overthrow 
Jeremy Corbyn. 
Despite the consistently close polls, the verdict 
delivered on 23rd June still came as a shock to many 
experts. Three weeks before this historic vote former 
Education minister and Leave campaigner Michael 
Gove argued ‘people in this country have had enough 
of  experts’. But now, more than ever, expert and public 
alike need to try and make sense of  what has happened 
and could now unfold.
This report is a modest attempt to pursue 
this goal. The aim of  this publication is to capture 
immediate thoughts, reflections and early research 
insights of  leading scholars in media and politics in the 
UK; and in this way contribute to public understanding 
of  the 2016 EU Referendum whilst it is still fresh in 
the memory and help shape the path ahead. Here, we 
are particularly interested in what ways different forms 
of  media, journalism and political communication 
contributed to people’s engagement with the democrat-
ic process during the Referendum – and crucially the 
relationship between media, citizens, and politicians.
There are eight sections to the report. The opening 
Context section lays the foundations of  the historical 
debate over UK-European relations including more 
recent controversies surrounding immigration and sover-
eignty, often played out through the news media.  
The Politics section focuses on the contemporary 
debate and begins to unpack some of  the key political 
themes of  the Referendum campaign such as the 
rhetoric of  excess, the role of  facts, falsehoods and 
political infighting. Whilst the Referendum was in many 
ways an exercise in democracy as people power, serious 
questions are raised by contributors about how dem-
ocratic the campaign actually was given the campaign 
strategies of  the respective Leave and Remain sides.
These campaign themes reverberate through-
out this report and are given detailed attention in the 
Campaign and Political Communication and Social 
Media sections. Here, we can also consider this Ref-
erendum campaign in the context of  ongoing debates 
around contemporary campaigning through billboards, 
social media, popular culture and televised debates.  
In this fiercely contested and divisive campaign, 
what role did the news media play? In the News and 
Journalism sections, we offer empirical, theoretical and 
at times, polemical perspectives on this question. Whilst 
press coverage might have been quite predictable, a 
number of  authors question the more problematic 
notion of  broadcast impartiality and its role in presenting 
the issues to the public. A public, it should be noted, that 
professed widespread dissatisfaction with the quality of  
information they received during the campaign. 
The fallout from Brexit has been truly tumultu-
ous for both the main UK political parties and their 
leadership. In the penultimate section we therefore 
turn attention to the Parties and evaluate the sig-
nificance of  the campaign for the major UK wide 
contenders for power. 
The final section focusses on Voters, including 
identity, emotion, Britishness, young people, gender and 
social class. This sheer diversity of  perspectives tells us 
that there is no single explanation for why UK voters 
chose to vote leave on 23rd June 2016. 
Published within ten days of  the Referendum, 
these contributions are short and accessible. Authors 
provide authoritative analysis of  the campaign, 
including research findings or new theoretical insights; 
to bring readers original ways of  understanding the 
Referendum. Contributions also bring a rich range of  
disciplinary influences, from political science to cultural 
studies, journalism studies to psychology. We hope this 
makes for a vibrant, informative and engaging read.
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Despite some similarities, the Referendum 
campaigns of  1975 and 2016 were as different as 
proverbial chalk and cheese. The differences shed a 
penetrating light on how the UK political communi-
cation process has evolved over the last four decades 
- not much of  it for the better! 
But first, the similarities. Turnout was high on 
both occasions – 65% in 1975, even though a vote to 
stay in the EEC was a foregone conclusion through-
out. Both major parties were divided on the issues, 
especially Labour in 1975; hence the formation of  
cross-party umbrella organisations to do battle with 
each other. In advance of  the campaign proper, the 
terms of  Britain’s membership were successfully 
re-negotiated with the EEC by the Labour gov-
ernment, enabling it to support the pro-European 
position. Much of  the argument turned on economic 
prospects (but somewhat more disaggregated than 
in 2016, looking more specifically at implications for 
jobs, prices, balance of  trade, agriculture, etc.) and 
restoration of  the country’s democratic sovereignty.
What were the main differences between the 1975 
and 2016 campaigns?
Whereas in 1975 face-to-face confrontations 
were in short supply (just a few in the last campaign 
week), in 2016 there were debates galore all over the 
television schedules, often organised around pointedly 
challenging questions from members of  studio 
audiences. This reflected the less respectful and more 
populist tenor of  2016’s opinion climate as well as 
broadcasters’ recognition of  the popular appeal and 
civic value of  leader debates in the 2010 and 2015 
General Election campaigns.
But what about the leading actors and their modes 
of  discourse? The differences on these crucial matters 
were stark.
For one thing, there was a huge difference in the 
perceived integrity of  the principal spokespersons 
in the two campaigns. There could be no reason to 
doubt that in 1975 Roy Jenkins, Ted Heath, Shirley 
Williams, Tony Benn, Michael Foot, Peter Shore and 
Enoch Powell genuinely believed in the cases they were 
making. Fast forward to 2016, when after a record 
peppered with policy flip-flops, David Cameron had 
become something of  a damaged rhetorical good; 
doubts hovered over Boris Johnson’s real reasons to 
enthuse over Brexit; rivals continually accused each 
other of  deliberately misleading the public, corroding 
people’s trust, and down-right lying; and the public 
voice could be characterised as `They try to pull wool 
over our eyes’, `All we hear is propaganda’, and `They 
only say what they think we want to hear’.
There was also a huge difference in how the 
European Community/Union was represented in the 
two campaigns. In 1975 the broadcasters pulled out all 
the cognitive stops in order to inform viewer/voters 
about the EEC, its institutions and their powers. Just 
two examples of  many such efforts: ITN presented a 
series of  18 short films, totaling 72 minutes of  viewing 
time, in which different features of  Common Market 
workings were explained. World in Action went on 
a `Voyage of  Discovery’ throughout Europe (3,000 
miles in all) `In Search of  the Common Market’. 
The same cognitive commitment shaped British 
broadcasters’ approach to coverage of  the first direct 
elections to the European Parliament in 1979. Out 
of  26 editors and reporters I interviewed at that time, 
23 said they regarded it as their responsibility to give 
voters essential background information about the 
European Community. In fact, such items appeared 
regularly in BBC1’s nine o’clock news and in the Today 
programme. But in 2016 no such effort was mounted. 
Voters were therefore being asked to decide whether 
to stay in or leave an institution about which they could 
know very little. It was as if  the public service troika 
had lost one of  its three wheels, running on entertain-
ment and information but not on education!
A media-system difference in the two periods 
will have been a source of  another referendum 
coverage difference. Whereas the 1975 coverage was 
spread across campaign political broadcasts (four for 
each side), some half-hour morning press confer-
ences, items in the news bulletins, and commentary, 
analysis and discussion in the four main weekly 
current affairs programmes, in 2016 the balance had 
shifted, television news having become a prime target 
of  the campaigners (preferably to top the running 
orders) and a prime source of  voter awareness. This 
meant that protagonists’ claims were filtered far 
more predominantly and strictly in 2016 than in 1975 
by conventional news values – especially those of  
conflict, drama, concreteness and personalisation. 
This is related to a more fundamental – and more 
fundamentally worrying – political communication 
system difference between the two periods. In 2016, 
politicians on both sides of  the fence closely followed 
the rules of  a quite firmly entrenched game. To play it 
well, this would require a pre-designated core theme, 
which could be unfolded in successive attention-grab-
bing variants, be encapsulated in short sound-bites (an 
unknown term in 1975), be closely coordinated from 
on high, and be voiced by spokespersons trained to 
stay on message. There is a sharp contrast between 
the Leave campaign’s proclaimed faith in the British 
people’s potential to achieve all sorts of  greatness 
and its operative assumption that most people can 
take in only one or two simple, repeated ideas. More 
troubling, however, is how the broadcasters tethered 
their coverage to the campaigners’ ploys. Of  course, 
they reported each side’s challenges of  their opponents’ 
claims, and in interviews and debate moderation, 
vigorously pursued the inadequacies of  those claims. 
But bound so tightly to them, they never moved the 
argument on. And so they utterly failed to prepare 
the electorate in advance for the momentous depth 
and breadth of  uncertain change, which only after the 
Leave fact are they depicting now!
EEC/EU campaigning in long-term perspective 
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From Super-Market to Orwellian Super-State: 
the origins and growth of newspaper scepticism
The influence of  print media has been a theme of  the 
debate post-Brexit. Explaining ‘How Vote Leave won 
the EU Referendum’, Sebastian Payne of  The Financial 
Times attributed some responsibility for the outcome 
to the avowedly partisan press coverage: ‘The role 
of  the media in this campaign must also be taken 
into account. For almost a quarter of  a century, Fleet 
Street has been fomenting Eurosceptic sentiment. 
The media operation from Stronger In was unable to 
compete with the populist message orchestrated by 
tabloid newspapers such as The Sun’.
Among those most keen to leave the EU were 
Sun, Mail and Express readers. These groups are even 
more Eurosceptic in outlook than three demograph-
ics1 -the over sixties, less formally educated, and those 
belonging to social classes C2DE- whose support for 
Brexit has been highlighted as a key reason behind the 
Leave victory. There is, however, some considerable 
overlap between all the aforementioned categories 
of  voter. This interplay of  different demographic 
factors helps explain why readers of  the Mirror, the 
only pro-EU popular newspaper, also appear to have 
supported Leave, albeit by a closer margin. However 
more analysis is clearly needed to account for the 
dramatic Referendum result. 
In suggesting press reporting may have had some 
bearing on the Referendum outcome, Payne also ac-
knowledged newspaper opposition to European inte-
gration is a longstanding phenomenon. Initially when 
(Western) European integration was first discussed 
it was the left leaning Herald (which later became The 
Sun) that raised doubts about the potential impact on 
its core working-class readership. Among the right-
wing press the Express voiced opposition to proposed 
British membership of  the EEC in the 1960s before 
later abandoning this stance prior to the Referendum 
the following decade. Announcing a resounding June 
1975 pro-EEC vote that all major national news-
papers had supported, the title’s front-page ‘SU-
PER-MARKET’ headline said it all. 
Although there were periodic criticisms of  the 
EEC over budgetary and other matters, the debate 
over UK membership was not as intense as it would 
later become. Eurosceptic journalists associated with 
a largely minority cause included right-winger George 
Gale and the Communist Morning Star. This changed 
following the passing of  the Single European Act 
in the 1980s. Paradoxically, given its significance as a 
defining moment, the legislation did not attract the 
level of  press scrutiny that subsequent moves towards 
greater European integration would. 
Three weeks before Margaret Thatcher’s 1990 
downfall, partly over Europe, The Sun had brought the 
issue to the fore by proclaiming ‘Up Yours Delors!’. 
This memorable denunciation of  the Commission 
President ensured both he and his integrationist agenda 
became decidedly more newsworthy. The subsequent 
hiatus caused by Britain’s September 1992 exit from the 
ERM (for which David Cameron, then an aide to the 
Chancellor, had a ringside seat) only intensified debate 
with The Sun proclaiming ‘The European dream is in 
tatters’. The best-selling daily paper denounced what it 
saw as the Maastricht Treaty’s plan for a ‘United States 
of  Europe...run from Brussels’ deciding policies on 
tax, immigration and the economy with recourse to 
a Central Bank. Among the popular press, the Mirror 
found itself  isolated in arguing for ‘ever closer unity in 
(a) Europe’ that had acted as a force for stability in the 
post-war era.
After Thatcher’s more emollient successor John 
Major had forced the passage of  Maastricht through a 
fractious parliament, newspapers became a key forum 
for raising criticisms of  European integration. The 
then Brussels based Telegraph correspondent Boris 
Johnson was one of  those journalists who became 
most associated with propagating what the Commis-
sion denounced as baseless ‘Euro-myths’ designed to 
undermine its credibility. Nonetheless many tenden-
tious stories about ‘Euro-crats’ seeking to standardise 
condom sizes or ban bananas that were too bendy 
stoked ridicule of  ‘interference from Brussels’. 
Following the Commission’s controversial 1996 ban 
on exports of  British beef, the debate became increas-
ingly rancorous. The Sun once again provided some of  
the most polemical copy: ‘We want to see free trade 
between friendly nations, a genuine Common Market, 
not an Orwellian superstate…’. Predictably it was the 
Mirror who came to the defence: ‘Britain needs EU… 
If  we ever cut ourselves loose from our partners 
across the Channel, we would become an isolated 
irrelevant island’. 
In 1997 The Times helped to try and ensure, as 
it put it, ‘Europe is the one big issue’ in that year’s 
election. The same editorial asked readers to vote 
for candidates ‘who will make the Commons more 
sceptical’ rather than a party. Intriguingly this even 
meant endorsement of  Jeremy Corbyn, a critic of  the 
EU, despite his acknowledged ‘support for Irish Re-
publicanism’. A year after Labour’s subsequent victory 
Murdoch’s other daily, The Sun, labelled Tony Blair the 
‘Most Dangerous Man in Britain’ and warned him not 
to commit the UK to joining the Euro. Although this 
never happened, the pace of  European integration 
led to other intensive debates. Having been origi-
nally elected Conservative leader on a Eurosceptic 
platform, David Cameron found himself  increasingly 
drawn into an issue that continued to bedevil his party 
in government and that would ultimately destroy 
his premiership. During the 2015 election Cameron 
had been warned of  the consequences of  holding 
a referendum by the pro-EU, Labour supporting 
Mirror. At the time the Prime Minister could not have 
imagined that the same newspaper would be his only 
popular daily press ally in what would become the last 
fateful and defining campaign of  his career.
1. I am grateful to Will Jennings for alerting me to 
this information.
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Understanding the role of the mass media in the 
EU Referendum
On June 23rd Britain voted to leave the European 
Union triggering what the Guardian’s assistant editor 
Michael White described as the ‘greatest political crisis’ 
since the Second World War. At the time of  writing 
most economists are predicting a severe downturn that 
could be worse than that which followed the Great 
Financial Crisis of  2008. What role did the media play 
in influencing public opinion and how significant was 
it to the final result? In this article I want to argue that 
it is important to distinguish between the short term 
role of  the media in the campaign and the long term 
cumulative influence of  the media. Ultimately the 
impact of  the media in the referendum is a product of  
the interaction of  these two effects. 
The Campaign
The mass media played two key roles during the 
campaign. First, it was the site where representatives 
of  the two sides attempted to win the battle for public 
opinion. Leave campaigners employed a classic KISS 
(Keep it simple stupid) strategy. They concentrated 
on a simple message - ‘Take Back Control’ which 
was repeated at every opportunity. The message was 
effective because it was both easily understood by 
different social groups and open to multiple interpre-
tations. As the PR specialist Greg Delaney noted ‘it 
resonated across the extraordinary Leave patchwork of  
parliamentary fundamentalists, elderly nostalgics and 
quasi racists as well as large sections of  the discontent-
ed working poor. In a world where very few people 
other than the very rich feel they have much control 
over their lives, it promised an alternative future.’ 
The Leave campaign also invested heavily in targeted 
messages delivered via social media. Mirroring the 
successful social media strategy employed by the 
Conservatives in the 2015 General Election, the Leave 
campaign designed a variety of  messages delivered to 
specific audiences. In contrast the Remain campaign 
lacked a clear, simple narrative on the benefits of  EU 
membership that could resonate at both a rational and 
emotional level with different audiences. A key reason 
for this was that Labour and the Conservatives were 
running largely parallel campaigns with conflicting 
messages on key issues such as immigration and the 
economic consequences of  Brexit. This inability to 
coordinate core messages also prevented advertis-
ing agencies from producing an effective campaign. 
Despite the official cross-party ‘Stronger In’ team 
hiring top agencies such as Saatchi and Saatchi and 
WPP, infighting prevented the most hard hitting 
messages being deployed. 
Second, the media played an agenda setting 
role during the campaign by focusing on particular 
politicians and issues. As research from Loughborough 
University in this edited collection shows, the news 
media largely reported the campaign as a ‘Tory story’ 
and there was more coverage of  Leave arguments.
The longer term impact of  media narratives 
Although most commentary tends to focus on the 
impact of  the campaign the more powerful effects 
of  the media are actually via long term processes of  
political socialisation, where voters are exposed to 
messages many times. Here it is important to consider 
how both the EU and the key issues linked to evalua-
tions of  the EU - particularly immigration - have been 
reported over many years.
Research on how the EU has been reported in the 
press has been unequivocal. Outside the Independent, 
Guardian and Mirror press reporting has been relent-
lessly hostile to the EU. From meddling ‘pointy head 
Eurocrats’ squandering our membership fees to the 
European project the press has employed a shifting 
selection of  negative themes. However, research shows 
that broadcast media has failed to offer a counter-
point. Broadcast reporting has tended to dominated 
by summits, disputes between the EU and UK or 
domestic political conflict. This has meant that when 
the EU is reported it tends to be framed as being in a 
conflictual rather than collaborative relationship with 
the UK. Furthermore, since most broadcast reporting 
is dominated by the main two parties - and Euros-
ceptic Tories have been more vocal than Europhile 
Labour MPs – audiences have been more exposed to 
arguments against the EU than those in favour.
Immigration reporting particularly in the tabloid 
press has tended to be extremely negative, with a 
steady stream of  stories about immigrants ‘sponging’ 
off  the welfare state, ‘bleeding’ the NHS dry and 
being involved in criminality. These negative themes 
can become linked to other issues in the minds of  
the public. In my own research on public reactions to 
the 2008 Financial Crisis, many respondents thought 
the public deficit had been created by immigration. 
One told me “Don’t let them in because, I’ve nothing 
against them or anything like that but they’re just taking 
all the money. They’re taking all the money and they’re 
bleeding it dry.” In this way immigration can act as a 
lightening rod catching discontent on a range of  issues 
and then transferring these to perceptions of  issues 
that are linked like the EU.
Therefore in understanding how the media influ-
enced the referendum result it is important to recognise 
that before the campaign even began the large parts of  
the public had been primed by the media to be Euro-
sceptic. During the campaign the Leave campaign was 
able to build on this through appeals that highlighted 
long-established themes around sovereignty and immi-
gration. In contrast the Remain campaign was unable 
to build a positive case for Europe partly because those 
narratives had not been comprehensively established 
in the past by media and politicians. Therefore, even if  
Remain had consistently put forward arguments about 
the social and cultural and benefits of  EU membership 
they would have not resonated effectively because they 
lacked social currency. In this way the media played a 
powerful long and short term role in influencing the 
result of  the referendum.
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On the 10 May 1967 the House of  Commons 
voted by 487 to 26 in support of  a second British 
application for EEC membership. It was one of  
the largest majorities the House had ever seen. 10 
years after the Treaty of  Rome, the British political 
class had collectively swung behind membership 
as the solution to post-imperial decline. Many 
were reluctant converts; the Labour cabinet was 
divided. Voting for membership included Tony 
Benn and Enoch Powell, who went on to lead the 
No campaign in the 1975 referendum. In 1967 
the arguments in support of  membership proved 
overwhelming. Labour’s Foreign Secretary, George 
Brown, spoke of  ‘the reconciliation of  deeply felt 
antagonisms’. He pointed to the decline of  Com-
monwealth trade, alongside the new economic 
opportunities in Europe. Alternatives to full mem-
bership were dismissed, ‘we would be passengers on 
the train; but the driving would be done by someone 
else.’ On sovereignty the then Chancellor, James 
Callaghan, bluntly pointed out that ‘to a very large 
extent nations are not free at the moment to take 
their own decisions’. In short, British power in the 
world depended on British power in Europe. Signif-
icantly, the US had been a long time supporters of  
British membership.  
Party political divisions notwithstanding, Britain 
finally entered the Community in 1973 on the back 
of  a governing consensus. A nexus of  European-
ised political interests had been constituted that 
included party political leaders, Whitehall, financial 
and corporate capital and the majority of  the press. 
The 67% who voted in favour of  membership in 
the 1975 referendum overwhelming endorsed the 
British establishment position. Moreover what was 
notable was the consistency of  the Yes vote. From 
urban to rural, North to South majorities in the 60s 
and 70s were common across England and Wales. 
While Scotland and Northern Ireland were outliers, 
they still recorded majorities for the Yes side. In 
some shape or form, the 1975 referendum reflected 
the will of  the people who concluded that their 
collective interests aligned with what the British 
political establishment was telling them. They were 
not wrong and the experience of  membership has 
reinforced their validity. 
Many predicted that the British economy would 
struggle to compete in a Common Market. In fact, 
the economy quickly benefited from membership, 
and has seen higher GDP per capita growth than 
Germany, France or Italy since. The warnings that 
the City would lose out by the UK not being in the 
Eurozone proved erroneous, as London estab-
lished itself  as the global hub of  Euro trading and 
the financial gateway to the EU. On security, the 
enlargement of  the EU to the former communist 
countries has renewed its post-war purpose of  
bringing peace to the continent. Consequently hard 
working and educated young people entered the UK, 
providing a significant economic boost. Support 
for enlargement has been a central plank of  British 
government European policy. Moreover the UK has 
managed its role in the EU without sacrificing its 
relationship with the wider world and found the EU 
remarkably accommodating to British exception-
alism, facilitating a range of  opt outs. Visions of  a 
European superstate have proved consistently wide 
of  the mark, as the EU’s supranational institutions, 
the Commission and the Parliament, accept agendas 
set down by the member-states. Intergovernmental-
ism rules as much now as it ever did. 
This all points to a UK augmented in power 
and prosperity by its membership of  the EU. But 
none of  this matters anymore. The idea of  mem-
bership as a collective good for the British people, 
established in the 60s and 70s, has been erased by 
Brexit. It is not just that the referendum reflected 
divisions within UK society, but the Europe was 
used to reinforce and essentialise those divisions and 
to create new ones. It was a populist instrument with 
a populist outcome, which also has its antecedents 
in the 1970s. In the wake of  the loss of  the 1970 
election, the Labour left saw Europe as a useful 
populist motif  around which to mobilise the British 
working class against the British establishment. 
Similarly, the crisis of  Thatcherism at the end of  the 
1980s saw a populist Euroscepticism rise from its 
ashes to destroy the Major government and give the 
right a new article of  faith. The more disillusioned 
people became with mainstream politics, the more 
populist Euroscepticism embedded itself  in the 
political culture. Farage and the tabloid press led the 
way, and with the referendum a post-rational politics 
of  indignant, self-righteous moralism went viral. 
Brexiters may talk about taking back control 
for the British people, of  making Britain great 
again but they have embedded a form of  politics 
that is anathema to constructing a national political 
community. We no longer have the politics to 
establish what a British collective good is; the EU 
today, Scotland and the welfare state tomorrow. 
Brexit is achieving precisely what the Eurosceptics 
have accused the EU of  doing, bringing about the 
end of  the United Kingdom. 
Brexit: the destruction of a collective good
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In a referendum campaign, typically the impetus 
is with the status quo. Unless the situation sur-
rounding the issue is highly negative then on the 
balance of  probabilities voters will stick with what 
they are familiar with rather than what they are 
unsure of. This finding has been consistent for 
referendums across advanced democracies. For 
those referendum campaigns arguing for change, 
their imperative was not just to convince voters 
that the status quo is a bad thing but additionally 
that the alternative they propose is better. 
What makes the Brexit referendum outcome 
fascinating is that voters had such a negative 
position toward the status quo of  EU member-
ship that they rejected it without a singular or clear 
alternative being presented to them. This leads 
us to two immediate conclusions; firstly, that 
opposition to the existing UK political system and 
EU membership ran deep; and secondly, that the 
Brexit side did not expect to win as they did not 
draft up detailed plans for a post-Brexit Britain. 
The second conclusion can be contrasted to the 
plans of  the SNP for what a post-independence 
Scotland would look like. Their proposal ‘Scot-
land’s Future’ was critiqued in great detail by the 
media, pro-Union politicians and independent 
experts. This had the result that nuanced policy 
arguments such as a currency union and the 
future of  North Sea Oil becoming key issues of  
debate that swayed many voters to stick with the 
UK. The fact that this did not happen is repre-
sentative of  the first conclusion, the depth of  
negative sentiment toward the existing political 
order in Westminster and Brussels. 
The table opposite lists out the four main Leave 
campaign groups next to the main alternative 
proposals they put forward for EU membership. 
As can be seen there was wide variance between 
the proposals. All advocated for some form of  
associated membership of  the EU based on 
other examples – Norway, Switzerland, Albania 
etc – with a specific focus on a trade agreement 
and access to the Single Market. In essence 
this argument was somewhat superfluous. The 
campaign boiled down not an alternative to 
UK membership of  the EU, but more to what 
specific EU policies would be removed from a 
new UK-EU relationship. With public under-
standing of  the EU at the lowest in the EU, the 
electorate were more focused on immigration, the 
UK financial contribution to the EU budget, and 
the democratic deficit in EU governance. As for 
alternatives the focus was on a ‘globalized’ UK 
that went ‘out into the world’ to trade with fast 
growing states beyond the sclerotic Eurozone. 
This reveals a significant gap in the alterna-
tive proposals of  the Brexit campaigners. They 
focused on articulating the specific EU policies 
they opposed and made arguments for greater 
focus on non-EU trade, but omitted an analysis 
of  what would happen in the middle, namely what 
form would the new UK-EU relationship take. 
All of  these ‘movements’ were lead by a 
mixture of  MPs, MEPs, political activists, and 
civil society members. This proved to be both a 
strength, and a weakness for the Leave campaign 
- a strength in that it gave them a wide base of  
support across social, party, and geographic 
cleavages; but a weakness in that it made formu-
lating an alternative plan to replace the UK-EU 
membership impossible to agree on. Leave cam-
paigners were clear on what they disliked about 
the EU, were in unison about future participation 
in the Single Market as part of  a wider global 
trade strategy for the economy, but were negligent 
in articulating how this goal would be achieved. 
It would appear that their trenchant criticism of  
the EU, left them bereft of  any practical con-
sideration of  how European integration worked 
in reality, and thus how they could secure the 
immediate future of  a post-Brexit UK.
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The decision in 2004 by Tony Blair’s New Labour 
government to allow unfettered access to the UK 
for citizens of  the 8 central and east European 
EU newcomers has had monumentally important 
implications. Most other member states imposed 
transitional restrictions of  up to 7 years. If  Britain 
had done so too then it’s probably safe to say that 
the scale of  movement to Britain would have been 
tiny in comparison with actual numbers and Britain 
would still be in the EU. 
If  about one thing, the 2016 referendum was 
about immigration, but British immigration politics 
are broken. While strained at times, it once was that 
a two party Con-Lab consensus established in the 
1960s removed the issue from wider public debate. 
This consensus has long since been stretched way 
beyond breaking point fuelled not least by the 
steep growth in migration from other EU members 
after 2004. 
Propping up this political consensus were 
powerful pro-labour migration voices. The 
well-organised beneficiaries of  increased immi-
gration such as business interests were not shy to 
express their view that a liberal approach to labour 
migration was a good thing. EU free movement 
sustained a flexible, liberalised UK labour market. 
These pro-migration voices might have been 
influential but there was growing public opposition 
to increased immigration. While voices from the 
business community will be to the fore arguing for 
the centrality of  the EU single market to any future 
vision of  Brexit, such views run counter to a more 
hostile public mood revealed by the referendum 
campaign and vote. 
While once not seen as a topic for polite dis-
cussion, immigration has become a near obsessive 
focus for public debate. A famous 2005 general 
election Conservative campaign poster made what 
was seen at the time as the contentious contention 
that: ‘it’s not racist to impose limits on immigra-
tion’. The biter was bitten as public scepticism 
about immigration was mainlined into British 
politics via UKIP with hugely important effects 
on both Conservative and, even more important-
ly, Labour support. Once derided by Cameron as 
cranks, fruitcakes and closet racists, UKIP capital-
ised on opposition to ‘uncontrolled immigration’. 
Brexit is a powerfully negative verdict on 
David Cameron government’s immigration policy. 
While some may see Cameron’s January 2013 
speech at the London offices of  Bloomberg calling 
for a referendum as a defining moment, perhaps 
more damaging was his decision 3 years earlier to 
‘cap’ net in the tens – rather than hundreds - of  
thousands. At no point in the subsequent 6 years 
did the government get anywhere near this target. 
Four weeks before the referendum vote, the Office 
for National Statistics presented a gift to the Leave 
campaign when announcing that 630,000 people 
moved to the UK in 2015 of  which 270,000 came 
form other EU member states. Net migration in 
2015 was 333,000. 
Cameron’s government had specified a target 
that it couldn’t attain, not least because of  EU free 
movement. Worse still, every 6 months when the 
immigration statistics were published the public 
was reminded of  this failure. Ex-Cameron advisor 
Steve Hilton said in the run-up the referendum 
vote that Cameron was told that the target was 
unattainable while Britain was in the EU. For 
Leave, it was the gift that kept on giving. Cameron’s 
once vaunted re-negotiation of  February 2016 
with its limits on access to welfare benefits for EU 
migrants was an utter campaign irrelevance. 
The future of  Britain outside the EU will nec-
essarily be defined by attempts to fix these broken 
immigration politics. Yet, the Brexiteers themselves 
are riven by a basic divide between liberal and 
nationalist strands with very different world views 
shaping their outlooks on immigration. 
Liberal Brexit centres on a continued com-
mitment in some as yet unspecified form to free 
movement of  goods, services, capital and, dare to 
say it, people. On June 27th, Boris Johnson articulat-
ed his cake approach to public policy – pro having 
it and pro eating it – when he articulated an open 
and engaged vision of  Britain’s future relations with 
the EU centred on single market access but unen-
cumbered by EU laws and with an Australian-style 
points system for new immigrants. A vision swiftly 
dismissed as a pipedream by EU diplomats. 
Free movement of  people is anathema to 
Brexit’s nationalist wing with Nigel Farage as its 
champion. For nationalists, ‘uncontrolled immi-
gration’ must be halted. In March 2015, Farage 
suggested that he’d prefer to see net migration of  
around 30,000 people a year. 
Immigration is a major faultline dividing liberal 
and nationalist versions of  Brexit. The tortuous ne-
gotiations of  the route to exit will be about details. 
Liberal Brexiteers favour the economic benefits of  
European integration without the burden of  EU 
laws. Maintaining a commitment to free movement 
is likely to enrage the nationalist wing of  the Brexit 
campaign keen to show any backsliding as a further 
sell out by the political elite. 
Raising expectations about immigration 
control and then carrying on regardless with free 
movement could not only fail to repair the broken 
politics of  immigration but further widen the gap 
between the people and their political leaders. 
The referendum and Britain’s broken 
immigration politics
Prof Andrew Geddes 
Professor of Politics at the 
University of Sheffield. 
For the period 2014-19 he 
holds an ‘Advanced Grant’ 
awarded by the European 
Research Council for a 
project on the drivers 
of global migration 
governance.
Email: a.geddes@sheffield.ac.uk
19
The great miscalculation: David Cameron’s 
renegotiation and the EU Referendum campaign
Dr Andrew Glencross
Senior Lecturer in 
International Politics at 
the University of Stirling 
and a Senior Fellow of the 
Foreign Policy Research 
Institute.
Email: andrew.glencross
@stir.ac.uk 
Twitter: @a_glencross
It was supposed to be the springboard for a 
smooth and successful referendum campaign. 
In reality, David Cameron’s EU renegotiation 
was a great miscalculation that helped pave the 
way for voters to reject EU membership. Most 
significantly, the much-anticipated deal failed to 
sway members of  his own Cabinet, while also 
highlighting the EU’s inflexibility on the free 
movement of  people principle. Rather than create 
the momentum for a comfortable victory, the 
renegotiation storyline petered out as the official 
pro-EU campaign got stuck repeating messages 
about economic doom after Brexit.
There was a strategic calculation behind using 
the referendum announcement to pursue a new 
deal – to great fanfare – with other EU leaders. 
In 1975, Harold Wilson won the referendum on 
remaining in the European Economic Community 
(EEC) on the back of  a successful, if  largely 
cosmetic, renegotiation. Prior to what the then 
Labour government called “Britain’s New Deal in 
Europe” opinion polls indicated there was in fact 
a majority to leave the EEC. The winning message 
in 1975 emphasized the advantages Wilson had 
succeeded in obtaining.
The other auspicious feature of  a renegoti-
ation this time round is that polls showed a clear 
preference among voters to stay in a reformed EU. 
All Cameron seemingly had to do was talk tough 
with EU leaders and come out with a piece of  
paper to wave to a thankful electorate. However, 
neither the reality nor the symbolism of  the Prime 
Minister’s eventual deal did him any favours.
What came out of  the February European 
Council where EU leaders debated UK demands 
was a set of  conclusions running to 36 pages. 
Buried amongst its dense legalese was a com-
mitment to protect countries not using the Euro 
from contributing to Eurozone bailouts and a 
reference stating that the UK was not legally 
bound by the “ever closer union principle”. The 
Leave camp swatted these changes aside as simply 
not binding until there was actual treaty change. 
Once campaigning began in earnest, the 
EU debate bifurcated between the government’s 
dogged economic argument about the risk of  
Brexit and the anti-EU camp’s relentless politi-
cization of  immigration. This left no place for a 
discussion of  the legal niceties of  the conclusions 
from the February summit. When the renego-
tiation did feature, albeit peripherally, it was 
damaging on both a symbolic and a practical level.
The nitty-gritty of  the in-work benefits 
arrangement (a phasing in of  tax credits over four 
years for new EU migrants) was hardly something 
that could mobilize the masses. The Prime Minister 
gamely translated this into the slogan “no more 
something for nothing”. But this showed a fun-
damental misreading of  the public mood. For it 
is the number of  new migrants not their access to 
benefits that exercised anti-EU voters. 
Hence the renegotiation played into the 
Leave camp’s hand by confirming the weakness 
of  the government’s position over immigration 
within the EU. Indeed, Iain Duncan Smith made 
hay out of  this after his resignation by portray-
ing negotiations with the EU as being under the 
tutelage of  German Chancellor Angela Merkel. 
His comments yielded the inevitable newspaper 
caricature of  Merkel as Cameron’s puppetmaster 
in The Sun. 
The problem here for the Remain camp went 
beyond the awkward symbolism of  being bossed 
around by Germany. Coming back from Brussels 
with very little to show on the hyper-sensitive 
immigration issue underlined the EU’s com-
mitment to a single market that includes labour 
mobility. In response to voters’ fears that, pro-EU 
figures such as Yvette Cooper and Theresa May 
announced in the last days of  campaigning that 
there could be new discussions on migrant quotas 
after a vote to remain. The Scottish National 
Party steadfastly refused to join this particular 
debate as it specifically sought to stay aloof  from 
the Cameron deal. In this was the renegotiation 
also failed to unite cross-party support amongst 
the Remain camp. 
Ultimately, Cameron blundered by promising 
so much and delivering little when it came to 
the UK’s position within the EU. The February 
agreement codified the UK’s special status as 
never before, which from an EU perspective was 
quite an achievement. But it came at the cost of  
self-marginalization in Brussels and did nothing to 
appease EU antipathy amongst UK voters. Such 
a precedent augurs badly for the negotiations on 
the UK formally withdrawing from the EU.
Politics
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Arguments were centre-stage for the entire Ref-
erendum campaign. Its rhetorical purpose could 
not have been clearer: to supply good reasons for 
voting either to leave the EU or to remain. With a 
simple choice made by a single constituency, party 
loyalty or local concerns were not overt factors. 
The Leave campaign was tasked with promoting 
grounds to transform the status quo; the Remain 
camp had to supply sufficient doubt against such a 
change. Nor were their arguments especially new: 
they had been rehearsed for years and were largely 
familiar to the public. 
Yet for all its simplicity of  purpose, the Ref-
erendum’s rhetoric was divisive and, on occasion, 
rather uncivil. The length of  the campaign meant 
the same arguments were repeated ad nauseam and 
efforts to censure each other’s fallacies, exaggera-
tions, inaccuracies, unfair advantages, or personal 
attacks inevitably came to the fore. Personalities 
and deeply held feelings would be as important (if  
not more so) than rational arguments as either side 
fought to ridicule the other’s claims and ensure their 
own advantage. Ultimately, argumentative appeals 
were directed not at forging common understanding 
or reconciliation but at forcing a decision on an issue 
of  enduring ambivalence. In such circumstances, the 
contest often came down to either side amplifying 
the intolerable excesses of  the other’s arguments. 
The challenge for the Leave campaign was 
to promote a substantial alteration in the UK’s 
economic and political status without conceding the 
possibility of  instability or disadvantage in interna-
tional standing. Exit from the EU, it argued, would 
permit Britons enhanced autonomy over policy, 
freedom from arbitrary political interference, and 
greater control of  economic resources. The diffi-
culty in this argument lay in its speculative nature: 
much depended on the outcome of  future trade 
negotiations whose success could not be guaranteed. 
Nor could Leave decide which model of  non-EU 
existence it would prefer (Norwegian, Icelandic or 
Swiss models?). In the end, the strength of  Leave’s 
argument lay in the purported self-evidence of  its 
premise -- that the EU restricted the UK’s capacity 
to succeed on its own. The apparent excesses of  the 
EU were therefore stressed. Membership reduced 
national sovereignty, imposed disproportionate legal 
controls, was run by unelected bureaucrats, and 
disregarded national borders to permit vast numbers 
of  immigrants to enter Britain to take jobs and enjoy 
welfare benefits. 
This demonisation of  the EU lent itself  to a 
negative pathos, often in conspiratorial arguments 
that captured some supporters but alienated others. 
The different personalities associated with the 
campaign each had their own take on this appeal 
to emotions. Michael Gove employed the analogy 
of  a kidnapping, where the innocent UK was held 
hostage in the back of  a car. Boris Johnson used 
the well-worn trope of  Nazism to describe the 
geopolitical ambitions of  the EU. Nigel Farage, on 
the other hand, offered the more vulgar gesture 
in alluding to the prospect of  sexually predatory 
migrants. One way or another the EU was rhetori-
cally associated with a dangerous excess; departure 
was thereby presented as the restoration of  a mythic 
integrity (captured by the UKIP slogan: ‘We want 
our country back’). 
Remain, on the other hand, was burdened with 
defending a status quo to which few felt enormous 
attachment. Its arguments concerned primarily the 
economic utility of  continued membership: the 
benefits of  the single market; the rights, freedoms 
and international status that ensued; and the 
distinctive ‘opt outs’ that assured British inde-
pendence. For Remain, EU membership enhanced 
(not diminished) sovereignty and supported (not 
restricted) autonomy; any disadvantages were mere 
inconveniences. Its case lacked the excitement 
of  challenging the prevailing order and offered 
no ambitious vision of  further improvements to 
the EU. Much of  the Remain position relied on 
dull ‘factual’ evidence of  expert opinion: from 
the Treasury, the Bank of  England, economists, 
business leaders, as well as US President Obama. 
The argument (denounced as ‘project fear’) rested 
on an appeal to cautious, sensible pragmatism and 
the public’s aversion to risk. 
The greatest risk, argued Remain, came from 
Leave’s reckless excess in opposing so-called ‘ruling 
elites’, distorting truths, and mobilising unpleasant 
sentiments against immigrants. Leave proponents, it 
claimed, were prepared to lie about how much was 
contributed to the EU, how ordinary people would 
benefit from leaving it, and how the UK could 
recover from the shocking effects of  withdrawal 
on jobs and house prices. For Remain, departure 
would provoke a veritable economic Apocalypse. 
Moreover, Leave’s advocates were less than sincere 
in their ambitions for the UK given, for instance, 
Farage’s ‘dog whistle’ appeals to prejudice or 
Johnson’s political ambitions. For Remain, Leave’s 
arguments were risky delusions promoted by un-
trustworthy characters. 
The rhetoric of  the referendum was rarely 
inventive or inspirational. There were strong 
arguments on either side but often the debate felt 
exaggerated and shrill. Focused on the excesses of  
others, neither side won the argument decisively.
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Myth versus fact: are we living in a post-factual 
democracy?
Referenda function as legitimate instruments of  
democracy if  (1) voters are informed about the 
issues at stake in their vote, (2) they vote on the 
basis of  these issues once informed and, finally, (3) 
they turn out to vote in sufficient numbers. With 
over 72% turnout in the EU referendum, we might 
conclude that the last of  these criteria was met. 
However, we still need to reflect on whether the first 
two criteria were met for one of  the near constant 
cries as Referendum day neared was that the scare-
mongering must cease, voters need facts as each 
side was accused of  misusing statistics. In addition, 
two further points are also worth bearing in mind 
with respect to these criteria. First, past research on 
referenda voting has demonstrated that when voters 
are faced with uncertainty they tend to opt for the 
status quo. Second, a number of  EU referenda held 
over the past 10 years in other member states have 
been used to punish current governments rather 
than to express preferences about the process of  
European integration (Hobolt & Brouard, 2010). 
The campaign was not devoid of  data and 
evidence regarding the impact of  continued mem-
bership or an exit on the economy, immigration, 
services such as the NHS and the balance of  EU vs. 
national powers. But data and evidence are different 
from factual claims. There were many types of  
claims made by the Leave and Remain camps during 
the campaign. First, there were arguments that 
reflected fundamental values and revealed differenc-
es in visions for the UK. These were about regaining 
sovereignty or maintaining a shared destiny and 
security within Europe. A second type of  claim 
rested on dystopian visions of  remaining (unbridled 
immigration for the Leave side) or leaving 
(economic devastation by the Remain side). These 
visions of  the future are based on modelling and 
assumptions about future trends – media reporting 
on these predictions was sometimes lacking in that 
the assumptions were not detailed, the source of  the 
prediction not identified or the claims dismissed as 
too complex rather than an attempt made to explain 
to voters. The assumptions and sources can give 
important clues as to the slant or possible bias in 
the figures. The media tended to treat these claims 
as equally credible regardless of  how questionable 
assumptions or consensus predictions about the 
impact on the economy by the IFS and economists. 
However, there is a third, and potentially more 
malicious, if  misused, category of  claims. These are 
factual claims about current conditions. 
In this latter category, one of  the most well 
recognised ‘facts’ in the campaign was that the UK 
sends £350 million to the EU each week. In a reply 
to MP Norman Lamb’s query about the figure, the 
UK Statistics Authority indicated that the use of  
the £350 million figure along with the suggestion 
this money could be spent elsewhere was ‘poten-
tially misleading’. There were a number of  websites 
providing fact checking of  claims made by each 
side. Fullfact.org published lengthy explanations 
on the UK’s EU membership fee and immigration. 
Even though still a net contributor, FullFact shows 
the true cost of  membership after rebates and EU 
contributions to the UK and explains that the costs 
and benefits of  membership should be distinguished 
from the membership fee. Andrew Dilnot, the UK’s 
Statistics Authority, was so concerned about the 
misuse of  this figure that he issued an additional 
statement on 27 May writing that the continued use 
of  the figure is “misleading and undermines trust in 
official statistics.”
Why would voters opt to ignore these correc-
tions to misleading information? Psychologically, 
there are many heuristics or biases that lead to 
selective engagement with information and outright 
resistance of  facts that may run counter to one’s 
beliefs. The ‘motivated reasoning’ paradigm and a 
confirmation bias suggests that citizens will tend 
to resist information that is inconsistent with prior 
beliefs and values and seek out information that 
confirms them (Kunda, 1990). Therefore, we might 
assume that those who were supporters of  the 
Leave campaign and who wished to redirect funds 
from EU membership to social services in the UK 
avoided processing the corrections to the mislead-
ing figure. Indeed, resisting fact checked claims 
may have happened across a range of  issues where 
statements were found to be misleading such as on 
the impact of  immigration. In a survey conducted 
by ICM Unlimited, we asked 449 respondents in an 
online panel whether they had heard the claim “The 
UK contributes £350 million a week to the EU” and 
over 75% reported that they had heard the claim 
many times. Of  those who had heard the claim, half  
had heard or read materials to suggest the claim was 
false. However, despite hearing that the claim was 
false there was resistance to processing the claim 
as factually incorrect. Amongst Leave supporters 
who had heard the claim was false almost 50% rated 
the claim as strongly or mostly believable. On the 
other hand, amongst Remain supporters only 11% 
rated the claim as strongly or mostly believable. 
Given biases in the processing of  information in 
any referendum situation it may be difficult to sway 
voters with facts. Clearly, it seems, voters were not 
motivated by accuracy – and perhaps they were 
not encouraged to be so by a media that treated all 
claims as equivalent.
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Destroying and building democracy, a German view
In Germany, referenda are anti-constitutional and 
for a reason: they were the Nazi’s favourite means 
of  breaking international treaties and preparing war. 
Among the more known referenda were the ones on 
the annexation of  Austria and Germany’s exit of  the 
League of  Nations, both sanctioned with more than 
90% of  the eligible voters. Based on the experience 
of  the Third Reich, Germany’s federal constitution 
has a number of  safeguards to avoid exactly the 
situation that has arisen in Great Britain after the 
referendum: a major crisis of  democracy and the 
country’s parliamentary institutions. 
Not only do referenda not exist but any change 
to the constitution (as an exit from the EU would 
demand) requires a two third majority of  both par-
liamentary chambers, the Federal Assembly and the 
Federal Council. Members to the Federal Assembly 
are elected through a mixed system of  proportion-
al voting (one cross for the party) and ‘list voting’ 
where voters choose their candidates from a list. 
Voters can therefore split their votes, for instance in 
order to favour a local MP who they think is doing 
well even if  s/he is not member of  their preferred 
political party. Parliamentary representation requires 
that a party receives at least 5% of  votes in the pro-
portional voting. Add this to a much stricter party 
discipline in parliament (if  not declared an open 
vote, MPs risk losing their seat if  they vote against 
their party’s line), and a far-reaching devolution 
of  legislative, taxation and political powers to the 
federal states, counties and municipal council to 
diversify channels of  democratic participation and 
to counter-act tendencies of  centralized aliena-
tion. This makes a long list of  safeguards to avoid 
political disasters such as the Brexit referendum 
where a meek 37.4% of  eligible voters have decided 
on a matter of  epic and international dimensions. 
Ostensibly, British parties have no proper 
institutional way of  responding to this vote and are 
on the verge of  exploding instead of  channelling the 
vote’s result into a reasoned parliamentary debate. 
The most vocal leader of  the Leave campaign, Nigel 
Farage, is not even a MP himself  and his party is 
represented with only one seat in Parliament. The 
dynamics of  Brexit are mostly extra-parliamenta-
ry. Every ingredient of  the disaster of  Weimar’s 
dismissal are united at this very moment. 
And yet, many, even Remainers, celebrate the 
Referendum as a strong show of  democracy. Clearly, 
many British citizens have expressed their strong 
feelings of  anger and frustration with Westminster 
more than the EU (given the level of  ignorance 
about the implications of  Brexit), and many may 
have secretly hoped that their vote would have 
exactly the destructive effect it had. Rather than 
calling it a democratic vote, hence, one should call it 
a luddite vote. The intent was to break the machine 
and to claim people power. It might well be that 
Leave voters had no clue what they wanted control 
over but they were certainly sure that they wanted 
neither the EU nor Westminster to have it. The 
argument that sovereignty in Britain lies in Parlia-
ment since it forced out the King in 1688 will only 
reinforce those feelings of  bitterness and the wish to 
destroy the system. The cry is for popular, not par-
liamentary sovereignty. Trying to make up now for 
democratic safeguards that have never existed with 
this terribly ill-conceived Referendum, will, in the 
current situation, alienate the Leave electorate even 
more and fuel their propensity for further (auto)
destructive voting. 
Very few politicians currently debate the leave 
vote on these terms and think about how it might be 
possible to de-locate Parliamentary decision-making 
from London to loci of  decision-making which 
are closer to the people who reject Westminster 
democracy. With the notable exception of  the 
Greens who tabled again proposals for propor-
tional voting, there is absolutely no debate about 
forms of  federalism and about the question how 
local councils and counties could be made more 
responsive and participatory. Yet, even if  propor-
tional voting will allow a better reflection of  voters’ 
preferences and therefore counter-act feelings ‘that 
my vote doesn’t count’, it is not sufficient. 
The biggest constitutional work that is awaiting 
Great Britain in the wake of  this referendum is 
to think about the form of  the Union and how 
to get political decision-making close to the local 
and county level in order to better respond to the 
diversity and concrete needs of  the British popu-
lation in a globalised world. This not only means 
strengthening local and regional institutions but 
also making sure that there is much more equitable 
regional distribution of  the country’s wealth. 
This includes developing further devolution 
to downsize political decision-making on the one 
hand, and integrating the existing European citizen 
rights (like the right to participate in local elections) 
to open up British politics, on the other. It means 
as well as to think creatively and collectively about 
representation beyond the tyranny of  a minority. 
The British could certainly copy something from 
Germany’s present political system (or other federal 
states like Switzerland). 
But, sure enough, the tide of  xenophobia 
and nationalistic hubris that was unleashed with 
the Referendum campaign will prevent any such 
learning from European neighbours, and that’s 
where the real misery of  this referendum lies. In 
the end, Brexit is a nationalist vote and that is a 
vote for narrow-minded closure. 
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The place of  Scotland in the narrative of  this 
election was assured as soon as the results became 
apparent, and the UK-wide vote to leave cast into 
stark contrast a Scottish vote of  62% in favour of  
Remain. With memories of  the referendum for 
Scottish independence from two years earlier still 
fresh in the mind, early analyses raised the alienation 
of  the Scottish electorate – even more than the 
Remain-supporting voters of  London and Northern 
Ireland – and the implications this may have for the 
survival of  the United Kingdom. Placing for now 
aside the now-likely second independence referen-
dum, I want to explore the considerable influence 
the Scottish factor had over the campaign itself.
The political ramifications of  what academics 
routinely refer to as the “personalisation of  politics” 
were rarely more apparent than in this election. 
Prime Minister David Cameron presumed to speak 
for Remain, and his most prominent opponent in 
Leave was former-Conservative Mayor of  London 
Boris Johnson. This was to the disadvantage of  
the UK Labour Party, and Jeremy Corbyn’s visibil-
ity was undermined by this “blue-on-blue” tussle 
with its ramifications for the Prime Ministership. 
Where Scotland figured in the personalisation of  
the campaign was in the appearance first of  Scottish 
First Minister Nicola Sturgeon, and then to a 
lesser extent of  Scottish Conservative Leader Ruth 
Davidson. Sturgeon was invited to participate in 
one of  the televised debates along with Leave star 
Boris Johnson, having already become a high-pro-
file personality in UK politics (Higgins and McKay, 
2015), bearing a political mantra of  an independent 
Scotland within Europe (Smith, 2016). 
However, a chief  point of  attack on Sturgeon 
related to the frame of  “Project Fear” that had 
been mobilised against her and her party during 
the previous Scottish referendum. This expression 
had been internalised in that campaign within the 
unionist Better Together campaign to refer to 
negative communication tactics, on the basis that 
those in government or supporting the constitu-
tional status quo are able to generate uncertainty 
around the implications of  change. This was 
leapt upon by opponents including Sturgeon as 
a damning and cynical admission. However, this 
negatively charged phrase was revitalised at the 
UK level and used to dismiss the warnings of  
Remain. This was at its most explicit in Boris 
Johnson’s debate clash with Sturgeon. Using the 
technique of  epitrope to cite Sturgeon’s prior 
description of  the Better Together campaign as 
“miserable, negative and fear-based - and fear-
based campaigning of  this kind starts to insult 
people’s intelligence” (quoted in Phipps, 2016), 
Johnson sets Sturgeon as previously opposed and 
now engaged in a politics of  malign negativity. 
While just one example, this formed part of  a 
more broadly expressed set of  concerns about 
the aggressiveness of  the debate. Reflecting 
on the death of  Labour MP Jo Cox, London 
Mayor Sadiq Khan characterised the referendum 
campaign as a “climate of  hatred, of  poison, of  
negativity, of  cynicism” (Mason, 2016). While 
undoubtedly sincere and warranted by the tragic 
circumstances, this also drew upon longer-term 
narratives around the retreat of  civility in public 
discourse (see Higgins and Smith, forthcoming).
Ironically, the debate in Scotland was compara-
tively mild-mannered and courteous: even described 
as “tepid” by BBC political commentator Brian 
Taylor. In large part, this was because of  well-found-
ed assumptions that EU membership was compar-
atively popular in Scotland, translating to support 
across the majority of  politicians. This left a lack of  
dominant personalities around which to animate any 
clashes. Leader of  the Scotland Leave campaign was 
former Labour MP Tom Harris, with support from 
sole Scottish UKIP MEP David Coburn. Signifi-
cantly, all of  the major political figures in Scotland – 
from party leaders including Sturgeon and Davidson 
to grandees Gordon Brown, Alex Salmond and 
Alistair Darling – were united behind the Remain 
side.
It remains to be seen whether this campaign 
signals the shift from what Mouffe (2005) describes 
as an “agonistic” clash of  ideas to an “antagonistic” 
trade of  insult and spite. It may be that the bipolar 
character of  a referendum, with a comparative 
loosening of  the constraints of  party discipline, 
encourages a more rancorous mode of  engage-
ment; and the Scottish example properly was cited 
as evidence of  an on-going pattern of  deteriora-
tion. However, more likely, the Scottish experience 
of  the two campaigns suggests that the tone is as 
much determined by assessments of  public opinion 
and appetite for rancour, as well as such factors as 
the status and performative style of  the political 
personas involved.
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Remembrance of referendums past: Scotland in 
the campaign
European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, left, greets Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon upon her arrival at 
his office at EU headquarters in Brussels, Wednesday, June 29, 2016. Sturgeon is in Brussels to meet with EU officials. Scottish 
voters overwhelmingly chose to remain in the European Union but were drowned out by English voters. Sturgeon has indicated 
there may be a new referendum on Scottish independence. (AP Photo/Geert Vanden Wijngaert)
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Public personalities in the EU debate: elites vs 
the majority and Bullingdon resurgent
While the corporate media’s reporting of  the 
Referendum campaigns tended towards relaying the 
proclamations of  key figures within the political/
corporate establishment, some of  their coverage 
also sought out public opinion on the UK’s EU 
membership. The Guardian’s John Harris, through 
his travels across the UK, uncovered an electorate 
that articulated exasperation at traditional political 
institutions and expressed a sense of  abandonment 
by the political class. For many, the Referendum 
presented an opportunity to strike back against 
an elite with whom they had grown increasingly 
estranged. In the discourse of  the Referendum, the 
complexities were largely stripped away in favour of  
simplistic messages that reached the electorate on 
an affective level. Benefits of  European unity and 
fear of  the potentially dire consequences of  leaving 
the EU were pitched against notions of  sovereignty 
and patriotism that veiled a strain of  xenophobia to 
emerge more fully after the result was declared. 
When public sentiment is provoked in such a 
manner, yet tied to abstract concepts, it provides the 
type of  environment in which the interventions of  
entertainment celebrities might prove effective for 
mobilising the majority. For the Remain Campaign 
JK Rowling, Jude Law, and Benedict Cumberbatch, 
among others, argued the benefits of  staying within 
the EU. As it is impossible to determine the in/ef-
fectiveness of  their individual contributions, we are 
left to speculate on whether the privileged, largely 
London-based celebrities had become too closely 
aligned with the Westminster elite in the minds of  
the electorate, of  whom many faced the thin end of  
the wedge in austerity Britain. Read in this way, the 
dichotomy between ‘ordinary’ and ‘elite’ might be a 
determining factor in our understanding of  the role 
played by public personalities in the EU debate. 
These types of  emotionally charged campaigns 
also present fertile ground for radical populists and 
political opportunists who rank among profession-
al politicians. The more successful figures, such 
as Nigel Farage, have crafted public personas that 
position them as outsiders to elite political institu-
tions. They have used this with great effect to align 
themselves with the disenfranchised masses, in spite 
of  the economic and class interests their persona 
might have masked.
Such efforts can also be seen with key protago-
nists in the Conservative Party. The more prominent 
spokespeople in the party, such as David Cameron 
and Boris Johnson, have worked throughout their 
careers to fashion public personas more appealing 
to the majority of  voters, and they drew on these 
in the Referendum campaign in order to sway the 
electorate. Cameron, lead proponent of  the Remain 
Campaign, has sought over time to manufacture a 
political brand that unites the antithetical concepts 
of  ‘compassionate’ and ‘conservatism’, but fell back 
on the authority of  his prime ministerial position 
to support his case. Within the Leave Campaign, 
Johnson utilised his persona as the bumbling 
buffoon which has routinely proven lucrative in 
capturing public affection. A clash of  personalities 
ensued between the two, and much could be gained 
through considering the Referendum campaigns in 
terms of  the various aspects of  their constructed 
public personas and other components of  their 
personal biographies.
Throughout their careers, both sought to 
underplay the unique privileges afforded to them 
as Old Etonian, Oxford-graduate millionaires. This 
includes distancing themselves from their former 
membership of  the Bullingdon Club; a highly 
exclusive, all-male, dining society for a clique of  
privileged Oxford students. With a reputation for 
raucous, destructive behaviour, members were said 
to vandalise the local restaurants in which they 
dined, while in pursuit of  their self-indulgent aims, 
and pay restaurant owners on-the-spot, in cash, for 
the damage. The Referendum pitched two ex-Bull-
ers against each other. Where Cameron sought to 
retain his grip on power, Johnson aimed to pursue 
prime-ministerial ambitions. 
Nick Cohen’s profile of  Johnson for The 
Spectator presents him as a chameleon-like political 
opportunist who changes his stance in pursuit of  
self-interest. Taking this at face value, Johnson’s 
position in the Leave Campaign and subsequent 
post-Referendum back-peddling on key Brexit 
policies, combined with a lack of  coherent exit 
strategy, becomes clearer. Policy analysts may ponder 
the political and economic strategy of  figures 
such as Johnson, and question what will actually 
be different after the UK’s exit – aside from the 
probable withdrawal from the European Convention 
on Human Rights, for which Theresa May is likely 
already salivating. However, reading the campaign 
in terms of  some of  the personalities involved 
suggests an old-fashioned fight for individual 
political power. It may not be entirely inaccurate to 
view the Referendum campaign being part-fuelled 
by a raucous scrap between two ex-Bullers in pursuit 
of  their own self-interest which, rather than being 
limited to undermining the prosperity of  an Oxford 
restaurant, might cripple the economy of  an entire 
continent, and leave the majority to foot the bill.
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My long-time collaborator and friend, Martin McKee, 
saw it before I did.
“I’m getting a few people together on the health 
aspects of  the EU referendum debate”, he explained, 
back in January (“A few people” for Martin tends to 
mean, say, members of  the House of  Lords, or the 
Royal College of  Physicians, or in the World Health 
Organisation). “We could do with a lawyer who 
understands the EU and health – would you join us?”
And so my involvement in the EU referendum 
debates began. A small contribution, in the grand 
scheme of  things. I spent an entire weekend reading, 
re-reading and decoding the negotiating texts of  the 
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. 
I nervously prepared to speak on Radio 4, appear in 
a panel for Sheffield Law School, address a group 
of  interested people at CoVi with Craig Bennett of  
Friends of  the Earth and Lord Andrew Lansley, the 
former Health Secretary. I learned more about how 
social media works from Mike Galsworthy of  Scien-
tistsForEU. I reluctantly deleted a post on Facebook, 
because someone in another law school dubbed the 
post as ‘smug’ for its claim of  expertise.
My daughter searched the internet for a quotation 
from the late MP Jo Cox, and painstakingly wrote it on 
our front window, as a small act of  solidarity.
And, even by 22 June, there was still a part of  
me that simply could not believe that the NHS could 
be such a central part of  the EU referendum debate.
Because the way health systems are organised 
and financed is not an EU competence. Because EU 
migration isn’t the main migration issue when it comes 
to health. Because governments have a great deal of  
discretion on how they implement EU law involving 
health (even public health). Because EU governments 
have negotiated health system opt outs from TTIP.
But these were all nuances that became lost in the 
way the discussions unfolded.
When you’ve spent your entire career, as I have, 
learning about and teaching EU law, and trying, in any 
small way possible, to use that knowledge to pursue 
socially progressive agendas, it does feel odd to be 
arguing for the EU. After all, as I have often observed 
to my students, the EU may be understood as a “nasty 
capitalist organisation”. Trade deals (like the TTIP) can 
have similar unpleasant – and sometimes devastating – 
effects on those without power.
But the UK referendum on EU membership 
forced us all into a yes/no debate. There’s no room for 
the conditional in such a choice. So, at least to begin 
with, I found myself  explaining the potential of  the 
EU for change for the better, with illustrations of  those 
things that the EU has done (for women, for workers, 
for impoverished regions, for the environment, to 
constrain the global tobacco industry, and so on) as 
evidence of  the promise of  more.
But as time went on, I found myself  spending 
a great deal of  time simply correcting gross factual 
inaccuracies as they emerged and trying to use legal 
arguments to stop misleading uses of  the NHS logo.  I 
had not appreciated the ways in which the media, in 
an age of  ‘instant news’, simply reproduce each other’s 
stories, without checking their veracity. Parts of  the 
media from which I expect more disappointed me 
hugely. I will never buy the Guardian again (though 
they did publish a later letter).
And it wasn’t enough.
For me, as perhaps for others in universities, 
the ways in which “experts” were depicted by the 
media as untrustworthy became impossible to ignore. 
Scientists, economists, academics were all branded as 
equivalent to power-driven politicians. As my former 
colleague Rebecca Sanders observed, it is hugely 
insulting to assert that the general public are not 
interested in the views of  experts, or too stupid to 
understand those views.
One thing the EU referendum has taught me is 
that the claim of  authority that comes from the kind 
of  knowledge built on deep reflection and learning, 
valued within the academy, is much more fragile than 
I hoped.
But equally, I was reminded, over and over, of  the 
generosity of  the academic communities to which I am 
privileged to belong. In Twitter conversations, emails, 
Facebook, videos, infographics, and in face-to-face en-
counters – people were giving up their time and energy 
to inform and assist. Some were ‘big names’ – known 
to me only through reading their published work. We 
were all still doing our ‘day jobs’ – teaching students, 
marking their work, writing papers, going to meetings. 
But no one was ‘too busy’ or ‘too important’ to opt 
out. And in all of  this, the disciplinary distinctions that 
sometimes beset universities were irrelevant. This was 
the academy at its best.
I can’t name everyone here. I lost count of  the 
times Steve Peers, Paul James Cardwell and Jo Shaw 
helped me out. I couldn’t have got on top of  The 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
without Gabriel Siles-Brügge.
Simon Hix (by Twitter) and Lisa McKenzie (by 
email) reminded me that, while overall immigration 
is a net benefit to the economy and creates jobs, 
we mustn’t ignore its geographical dimensions. 
The localized effects of  migration are an important 
part of  the lived experiences of  many in the UK 
today. Rather than demonising immigrants, we need 
redistributive policies that bring more local services – 
including health services – to those parts of  the UK 
directly affected. Now the UK has to renegotiate its 
agreements with the EU and the rest of  the world. 
The details of  these agreements will affect the NHS, 
public health, education, and social welfare both in-
directly through their effects on the economy, and in 
some cases directly. Where global (or European) trade 
is underpinned by law that supports the interests of  
capital, there’s a job to be done to secure a better deal 
for those who need it most. Law professors have a 
small part to play.
I shall be carrying on, until we are all ‘healthier 
ever after’.
Prof Tamara Hervey
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Wales, immigration, news media and Brexit
Despite Wales benefiting significantly from EU 
funding, on June 23rd voters in Wales voted to leave 
the EU. Beyond Gwenedd, Ceredigion, The Vale 
of  Glamorgan, Cardiff  and Monmouthshire, Leave 
gained 52.5% of  the overall share of  the vote. The 
economic arguments to leave were unconvincing 
at best, with most credible, expert analyses arguing 
that Remain had a better, more evidence-based and 
well-founded case.
And yet, in Wales, as in many areas across the 
UK that have gained most advantage from EU in-
vestment, votes were cast that seemed diametrically 
opposed to their social interests.
In the immediate aftermath of  the result, 
the atmosphere in Cardiff, where 60% voted to 
remain, and where I live and work, felt to be one 
of  genuine shock and anxiety. Passionate and vocal 
political conversations seeking to make sense of  
and assess the potential fallout of  the result were 
encountered in everyday contexts – the pre-school 
nursery, the trendy hairdressers, the bank foyer, 
the supermarket checkout. Having participated in 
the democratic process, people all seemed to want 
to talk about their feelings of  shock and struggle 
to interpret fellow voters’ behaviour. They also 
wanted to talk about the influence of  immigration 
as an issue and about their feelings of  shame sur-
rounding Wales’ apparent endorsement of  UKIP’s 
message on this issue. 
UKIP’s highly inflammatory ‘Breaking 
Point’ poster, for which Nigel Farage refused to 
apologise, was emblazoned on a fleet of  vans in 
the final days of  the Leave campaign. Picturing a 
queue of  Syrian refugees at the Slovenian border, it 
symbolically condensed the complex conflation of  
refugee and other migration issues for which media 
scholars have long criticised immigration coverage. 
This was neatly wrapped in a securitising discourse 
and linked firmly with EU power: ‘we must break 
free of  the EU and take back control of  our 
borders’ the poster claimed, ‘The EU has failed us 
all’. The poster was widely condemned as ‘disgust-
ing’ and likened to a Nazi propaganda technique by 
many mainstream public figures. It was emblematic 
of  an atmosphere engendered by the UKIP-led 
Leave campaign’s approach, thought to give license 
to xenophobic violence – an argument expressed 
eloquently by many commentators, including 
Brendan Cox, the husband of  MP Jo Cox, who 
tragically was murdered, allegedly by a fascist 
Britain First supporter, during the campaign itself. 
Across the national press, the ‘Breaking point’ 
controversy was highlighted as a key moment in the 
campaign. Of  56 national press articles reporting 
criticism of  the poster as xenophobic between 16th 
and 24th June (identified through a simple Nexis 
database keyword search), most focused on its 
uncouth pandering to the worst of  public instincts, 
yet nonetheless noted the likely resonance of  its 
message with some voters. Few sought to reflect 
upon how such resonance may have been aided or 
encouraged by the seemingly inexorable rightward 
shift of  mainstream public discourse on immigra-
tion over at least two decades, and how that may 
have prepared the ground for the campaign. 
It was not just a xenophobic campaign, 
arguably, but the cumulative force of  an aggressive 
anti-immigration sentiment, long legitimated by 
the political mainstream and reproduced in the 
news media that won it for Leave. This long-
standing ‘cultural work’ provided the immediate 
conditions of  plausibility to scapegoat immigration 
for society’s ills. Key claims of  UKIP’s populist 
discourse are to represent an ‘anti-establishment’ 
position, to stand up against ‘our’ lack of  freedom 
and to take back control of  the nation. Yet, more 
than ‘regulation’, ‘red tape’ and other generalising 
euphemisms, immigration as a familiar national 
object of  hostility served as the most tangible 
symbol of  what could be ‘changed’ if  only ‘we’ had 
more power. 
Why did Wales vote against its own interests? 
The answer is evidently not simply to be found in 
the mediated construction of  antipathy towards 
immigration. We might point out that years of  
political failure to represent ordinary peoples’ 
interests adequately, the erosion and hollowing-out 
of  publicly owned resources that allow everyone 
at least a small, tangible stake in a society that feels 
like it cares about their existence, combined with 
nearly 20 years of  a dominant public discourse 
advocating a ‘tougher’ approach to immigration 
seem plausible explanations. All Leave had to do 
was press the buttons. 
One reason people vote for change is that 
they are fearful of  what the future holds. Another 
reason is hope for a better one. One question for 
the news media is whether it might have a role 
in addressing the ‘deficit of  hope’ that arguably 
facilitated the Leave campaign’s xenophobic 
message. Can assertive and positive arguments 
for the things people should have a right to hope 
for be more newsworthy? There would of  course 
be disagreements about those hopes, but with 
reports of  increasingly confident xenophobic 
violence now populating headlines, it is surely 
worth renewed reflection.
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The referendum campaign and the public’s 
constitutional understanding
The decision to leave the EU is constitution-
ally momentous. The legal issues it raises have 
been analysed by, among others, Mark Elliott, 
Alan Renwick, Stephen Tierney, and Steve Peers. 
This contribution does not wish to replicate 
them. Instead it discusses where the referendum 
campaign itself  leaves the public’s understanding 
of  the constitution.
Referendums should have an educational 
function. Their suitability for resolving knotty 
questions rests not on the bare fact that the 
public decides, but that it is an informed public. 
Rather than rising to the occasion, the referendum 
descended into a series of  questionable assertions 
that saw its closing stages punctuated by pleas for 
the facts. Despite organisations such as Full Fact and 
initiatives like UK in a Changing Europe, half-truths 
and untruths abounded. Among the most notorious 
were Vote Leave’s incorrect claims that Turkey was 
poised to join the EU and persistent disagreement 
between both sides about their economic forecasts. 
This failure in political communication was not 
confined to the specific issues concerning the rela-
tionship between the UK and the EU; it overflowed 
into the wider constitutional sphere. 
Particular problems arose from Vote Leave’s 
constitutional vision. In line with mainstream 
thinking, this had Parliamentary sovereignty at its 
core, but its interpretation was one-dimensional. 
It failed to appreciate the wider constitutional 
framework within which Parliament operates and 
gave the public an oversimplified view of  the con-
stitution. Its misunderstandings could have serious 
knock-on effects. 
During the campaign, the Queen’s stance on 
Brexit was apparently twice leaked to The Sun. The 
legitimacy of  a hereditary monarch with various 
formal roles, including ultimate responsibility for 
appointing the Prime Minister, hinges upon their 
public neutrality. These incidents, presumably 
intended to boost Vote Leave’s patriotic message 
by drawing on the Queen’s royal capital, under-
mined this premise. The irony – to protect one 
core constitutional principle, the leaker tarnished 
another – implied that the constitution is only 
about Parliamentary sovereignty, not about other 
matters, even those as obvious as the Queen’s neu-
trality. Similarly, the focus on ‘restoring’ an idyllic 
British Parliament meant, at least in England, that 
little attention was paid to the equally obvious 
devolution issues. It was not made sufficiently clear 
that Brexit could jeopardize the Union. 
Rhetoric was deployed about ‘unelected EU 
judges’ overriding Parliament’s will. This misrepre-
sented the situation which will prevail until Brexit 
concludes. In domestic law, EU law is only effective, 
and only takes primacy over UK legislation, because 
of  the terms Parliament wrote into the European 
Communities Act 1972. It is not because of  EU 
judges. Indeed, there are good legal reasons to 
suspect that, if  Parliament expressly instructed 
UK judges to ignore applicable EU law, or if  EU 
law conflicted with a fundamental constitutional 
principle, it would not be enforced in domestic law. 
It is inaccurate to perceive EU law as an unstoppa-
ble invader; even in the rare situation where the UK 
government did not vote in favour of  EU legisla-
tion, Parliament had chosen to accept it. 
Relegating Parliamentary sovereignty’s value 
to a matter of  all-or-nothing patriotism disguises 
facts like this showing that it encapsulates a rep-
resentative political process capable of  nuanced 
thought on difficult issues. It is valuable because it 
can weave competing ideas, arguments, and prin-
ciples into its decision-making process. Depicting 
it as a blunt object oversimplifies the complexity 
of  constitutional politics and encourages shallow 
thinking about fundamental issues within our 
system of  government.
Attacking ‘unelected’ judges also neglects the 
value of  an independent and expert judiciary. It 
ignores that British judges are, happily, unelected: 
this helps them remain independent and uphold 
the rule of  law. The double standard – unelected 
judges are fine for us but not for them – is 
troubling. It corrodes respect for the rule of  law. 
This attitude to the EU judiciary may legitimise 
British unwillingness to comply with other interna-
tional legal obligations and normalise claims that 
judicial decisions are illegitimate if  one disagrees 
with them. 
Why does this matter? Apart from the general 
importance of  encouraging constitutional literacy, 
the result precedes further constitutional events 
and reforms. The Prime Minister has announced 
his intention to resign. There may be calls for 
a snap election when his successor is named. A 
second Scottish Independence referendum seems 
likely, and the situation in Northern Ireland is 
unclear. Proposals to replace the Human Rights 
Act 1998 with a ‘British Bill of  Rights’, and 
perhaps to withdraw from the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights itself, loom. Understanding 
these issues requires an awareness of  constitutional 
principles outside of  Parliamentary sovereignty: 
when and how can Parliament be dissolved? What 
are the powers of  the Scottish Parliament? What 
about the Good Friday Agreement? How should 
we protect human rights? It is to be hoped that 
these crucial matters are debated within an atmos-
phere more appreciative of  our intricate constitu-
tional tapestry than was the EU referendum.
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The EU referendum and the Country of Origin 
principle (COO)
The debate about the EU referendum has been 
polarised, the Remain camp stressing the risks of  
Brexit, the Leave camp arguing that the UK would 
be better off  if  it reasserted its sovereignty, took 
control of  its borders and stemmed immigration. 
Each side has been accusing the other of  scaremon-
gering, of  exaggerating the financial threats associ-
ated with a UK departure or the threat of  immigra-
tion, of  EU’s further widening or its development 
to a super-state. This debate has been unhelpful to 
voters, as it has failed to explain the nature of  the 
EU as a supranational organisation, its workings 
and the benefits of  being a member. Media policy 
has hardly featured as a campaign issue. This piece 
attempts to retrospectively fill this vacuum and to 
expose some of  the fallacies of  the case for Brexit – 
which unhelpfully also underlay the Remain Camp’s 
soft Euroscepticism – by taking a bird’s eye view of  
one specific aspect of  EU’s audiovisual policy: the 
country of  origin principle (COO). 
The COO and national sovereignty
The COO is the cornerstone of  the Audiovis-
ual Media Services Directive (AVMSD) (former 
Television without Frontiers Directive), the most 
important regulatory instrument for the audiovis-
ual sector in Europe, adopted in 1989 as a single 
market initiative to establish a legal framework for 
the cross-border transmission of  TV programmes. 
In simple terms the meaning of  the COO is that 
Member States are obliged to ensure the unhin-
dered reception of  audiovisual media services, i.e. 
TV broadcasts and on demand services, lawfully 
transmitted in their state of  origin. They only have 
a limited possibility to restrict such foreign services 
when they manifestly, seriously and gravely breach 
provisions concerning the protection of  minors or 
public order. The COO is a specific manifestation 
of  the very mechanisms that allow persons, goods 
and services to move freely across the EU. It unde-
niably encroaches upon the power of  the Member 
to shape their broadcasting orders at will. Some have 
even exaggeratedly stated that it signifies the end of  
the broadcasting sovereignty of  the Member States. 
However, one needs to pause and ask: what is the 
real meaning of  this sovereignty in an interconnect-
ed world where countries have limited possibilities 
to contain satellite transmission to their territories 
and are forever caught in the internet’s global web?
Why does the UK support the COO?
Both the Leave and Remain camps were united in 
their single-minded insistence on the UK’s national 
sovereignty, the former seeing departure as a way 
to strengthen it, the latter wishing to further it 
by staying in and working with the EU. If  sover-
eignty is at the core of  what makes or breaks the 
UK’s EU membership, one might have expected 
a principle such as the COO to be anathema for 
the UK government. A principle that weakens 
national sovereignty would surely be something to 
fight against, to dilute, to eradicate. Yet, the exact 
opposite is the case. The UK has been one of  the 
most vocal proponents of  the COO. A quick look at 
the official UK response to a recent consultation on 
the AVMSD is telling. The UK government fiercely 
defended the COO from Member States such as 
France that wished to transfer the power to regulate 
broadcasts from the country of  transmission to 
the country of  reception, thus allowing Member 
States to impose their own standards on incoming 
programmes. The UK’s argument was that the COO 
is a ‘fundamental and critical precondition for the 
generation of  a Digital Single Market in content’, 
that it makes broadcasts subject only to ‘the regula-
tory standards of  whichever country the service is 
based, as opposed to requiring a channel to adhere 
to 27 slightly different regulatory standards in each 
country in which it is received’, that it ‘lowers trade 
barriers by facilitating operation for industry and 
reducing costs’. In particular, as a result of  this 
principle, ‘the broadcasting market has seen an 
increase in the number of  channels from 47 in 1989 
to over 11,000 today, an increase for VoD [video on 
demand] revenue from 61 million Euros in 2007 to 
616 million Euros 2011 (up 45.7%). 
A sense of  bewilderment is inevitable at this 
point. Is it really the UK government that extolled 
the benefits of  the digital single market for its 
economy? The same government that gave in to a 
populist, high-risk referendum deal, whose dest-
abilising consequences will reverberate for a long 
time to come? If  the COO has been so undeniably 
beneficial, and if  similar mechanisms govern what 
was the referendum’s bone of  contention, the 
free movement of  persons, then perhaps it would 
have been worth revisiting the contribution all the 
allegedly hand to mouth living, benefit seeking 
migrants make to the UK economy. It would have 
also been worth bearing in mind that the UK has 
been able to meaningfully influence EU decision-
making, as it has done by successfully arguing in 
favour of  the retention of  the COO principle for 
the future, an argument that it could only make by 
being a member, not an outsider. 
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Calming the storm: fighting falsehoods, fig 
leaves and fairy tales
Will the EU referendum be remembered as a golden 
moment in British democratic history? Was it really an 
example of  how to ‘do’ democracy in the Twen-
ty-First Century? Or was it an example of  fairy tales 
and falsehoods that tended to create more heat than 
light and a dysfunctional system that was unable to 
enforce truthfulness? 
In its report published at the end of  May 2016, 
the House of  Commons Treasury Select Committee 
complained that ‘The public debate is being poorly 
served by inconsistent, unqualified and, in some 
cases, misleading claims and counter-claims.’ It added, 
‘Members of  both the ‘Leave’ and ‘Remain’ camps are 
making such claims.’ But the standard of  public debate 
did not improve, and the former Prime Minister, Sir 
John Major, felt forced to state publicly that he was 
‘angry about the way the British people are being 
misled’. Such claims resonate with a public letter signed 
by over 250 leading academics that suggested that the 
level of  misinformation in the Referendum campaign 
was so great that the democratic legitimacy of  the final 
vote might be questioned. 
Now that the Referendum has happened and the 
storm has somewhat abated the question that demands 
urgent attention is how any future referendum might 
be conducted on the basis of  a more rigorous – dare 
we suggest even fact-based – public discussion? 
If  the problem that the EU referendum exposed 
was the inability of  the British political system to 
enforce even the most basic requirements in relation 
to publicly-funded information campaigns, there are at 
least four reforms that could be considered to prevent 
such situations arising in future. The first is a legal 
response in the form of  new legislation that would 
state that, just as some lying in election campaigns 
is against the law, so too should lying in referendum 
campaigns be against the law. Campaigners who violate 
such provisions could then be subject to criminal 
sanctions. The risk is that this may create significant 
unintended consequences in the form of  far-reaching 
concerns about freedom of  speech and the transfer of  
powers from elected politicians to unelected judges. 
Tighter press regulation would be a second 
option. The Independent Press Standards Organi-
sation, has upheld at least four complaints relating 
to inaccuracy that related to the Referendum. But its 
rulings typically take two or three months and there is 
a case for insisting that not only are rulings delivered 
more quickly but, where those complaints are upheld, 
retractions or corrections should have a prominence 
commensurate to that of  the original article.
If  statutory measures are deemed too draconian 
and press regulation too harsh then the official 
campaign organisations could be obliged to recognize 
their civic responsibilities, in the sense of  promoting 
engaged and informed citizenship, in return for their 
civic rights, that come in the form of  public funds, free 
mailings, broadcasts, etc. The mechanism in this case 
might be an enforceable code of  conduct, which 
the Treasury Committee’s report (at paragraph 235) 
seemed to favour. Once again, the devil would be in 
the detail: who or what would be the arbiter of  when 
the facts strayed from tenuous but legitimate into the 
terrain of  deceit and political lying? Would they be able 
to act quickly enough to work effectively? How would 
penalties be decided and enforced? 
A final option would be to alter the statutory 
role of  the Electoral Commission to include a duty to 
enhance public understanding of  the issues at stake 
in the referendum. The extensive materials the New 
Zealand Electoral Commission produced for that 
country’s 2011 Referendum on the voting system, for 
example, included detailed explanations of  each option, 
statements of  the criteria against which the options 
might be evaluated, and analyses of  how the options 
perform against these criteria. In what was (it should 
be acknowledged) a much less intense or politicised 
campaign than the current one, journalists frequently 
relied heavily on the Commission’s guide as a basis for 
their reporting.
There is also a rather awkward question con-
cerning the meaning and delivery of  public service 
broadcasting in the UK, notably in relation to the BBC. 
If  major broadcasters have a public service obligation, 
if  they are maintaining high quality ‘fact-checkers’ and 
‘myth busters’, then why are they required to maintain 
a degree of  impartiality and balance between both 
sides of  the debate when the expert analysis, on certain 
specifics, overwhelmingly favours one side of  the 
argument over the other? Impartiality in this context 
risks simply facilitating the promotion of  falsehoods, 
fig leaves, fantasy and fairy tales as fact. 
The twist, sting or barb in the tale is, however, that 
institutional change is unlikely to prevent future storms 
without a complementary shift in the cultural foundations 
of British politics. This is a critical point that the EU 
Referendum brutally exposed. The operating culture of  
British politics appears increasingly infused with a form 
of attack politics in which negative campaigning, personal 
slurs and populist declarations are dominant. The paradox 
is that this form of politics risks achieving little more 
than fuelling anti-political sentiment and the emergence 
of ever-greater numbers of ‘disaffected democrats’. In 
this context, there is a danger that any policing of the 
standards of claim and counter-claim in future referen-
dums could simply be used to fuel a populist fire: that 
injunctions against certain claims could be turned around 
and presented as further evidence of the perfidy of ‘the 
establishment’. Fighting falsehoods therefore requires fun-
damental change in how we think about and structure our 
democracy. That is a challenge that we should all seek to 
address once the referendum is over. Failure to do so may 
do more than render future referendums unhealthy. If  
the degree of mendacity witnessed in this campaign were 
to become commonplace in our electoral politics as well, 
one of the crucial foundations of our democratic system 
would be badly damaged.
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The press and the Referendum campaign
Our initial findings from research of  press coverage 
in the first three months of  the referendum 
campaign shows that the majority was heavily 
skewed in favour of  Brexit. Here we provide some 
further detail on those findings together with some 
preliminary thoughts on their wider significance.
 
Key findings about the coverage
Our research is based on a study undertaken with 
communications research consultancy PRIME 
Research into press coverage of  the referendum 
campaign. The findings presented here come from 
analysis of  two sample days per week (Tuesday 
& Saturday) of  press coverage in the London 
Editions of  9 National newspapers during the first 
three months of  the referendum campaign, from 
David Cameron’s post-summit Cabinet meeting 
on February 20 to 31st May. A full report for 
the whole period up to referendum day will be 
published in September. 
Of  the 1558 articles focused on the referen-
dum (an average of  52 per day studied across the 9 
newspapers), 41% were in favour of  leaving, with 
only 27% in favour of  staying in the EU. (23% 
were categorised as ‘mixed or undecided’ and 9% 
as adopting no position.)
Of  the total number of  spokespeople quoted 
in the articles, 35% were UK politicians, of  whom 
70% were Conservatives and just 13% Labour, with 
UKIP spokespeople quoted in 8% of  articles. 
The Daily Express had the highest share of  
pro-leave articles (75% of  all its articles about the 
referendum, compared to only 5% of  pro-remain 
ones) followed by The Daily Mail (61% vs. 14%). A 
majority of  the articles published in The Sun, The 
Daily Star and The Telegraph were also pro-leave, 
while the newspapers with the highest share of  
pro-remain articles were, in order, The Guardian, 
The Daily Mirror, and the FT. The Times’ coverage 
was relatively evenly balanced between positions, 
with a slight preponderance of  pro-leave articles. 
All newspapers, whatever their main position, 
included some articles from the other point of  
view, but the proportion was smallest in The Daily 
Express, The Daily Mail and The Daily Mirror.  
In terms of  issues, the economy featured most 
heavily in the FT and The Times, with migration, 
sovereignty and security jointly taking on a 
dominant position in the largely pro-leave 
coverage of  the Daily Express, the Daily Star and 
the Daily Mail. 
A campaign that operated at two levels
We have still to analyse the tone of  the coverage in 
detail but believe this may have been a factor in the 
campaign as the two sides increasingly operated in 
very different registers. The Remain camp’s focuses 
on economic risks and expert endorsement of  these, 
appears to have compounded the sense that they 
represented an elite. It contrasted with the more 
emotive pull of  the Leave campaign’s approach, their 
hostility to experts and elites, and their very effective 
slogan of  retaking control of  the country, which 
neatly brought together concerns about sovereignty 
and migration. In that sense the Leave campaign’s 
messages offered a better balance of  hope as well 
as fear and worked better in the popular press (In 
arguments about the post-referendum future only 
12% were coded as positive for Remain compared to 
40% positive for Leave). 
Press coverage resonated beyond its readers
The rise of  online news and the continuing decline 
of  newspaper circulation has not ended the 
relevance of  the press to political debate. Recent 
Reuters Institute research shows that two thirds of  
people use BBC TV news each week compared to 
14% who read the Sun in print and 17% who use 
the Mail online. But as John Gapper wrote recently 
in the FT, Fleet Street may be “smaller, weaker and 
less profitable than before, but it still bites”. 
The long recognised agenda setting role of  
the press for the broadcast media, may have been 
particularly important in this campaign. All broad-
casters are bound by a requirement to offer due im-
partiality. Given the way the referendum debate cut 
across traditional party lines, broadcasters may have 
relied more than usual on the press in deciding 
how best to balance their campaign coverage.
As Dominic Wring and colleagues found, the 
influence of  pro Brexit coverage increased once 
circulation is taken into account since over 80% 
of  consumers who buy a daily newspaper read a title 
favouring British withdrawal from the EU.
Age mattered too in terms of  readership and 
voting behaviour. Press readership skews heavily to 
the older age groups; recent research on UK news 
consumption suggests that while 29.3% of  15-24s 
are print newspaper readers, this compares to 
67.9% of  over-65s. The BBC reported a survey by 
Lord Ashcroft of  over 12,000 voters after they had 
cast their ballot suggesting that older voters were 
more likely to have voted Leave and in addition 
that turnout among older people also appears to 
have been higher than average.
In conclusion, based on our initial findings 
of  the first three months of  press coverage, the 
majority of  the press was heavily skewed in favour 
of  Brexit. It also seems possible that this may have 
had some influence on the wider media coverage. 
However, understanding whether and how that 
might have impacted on the result is beyond the 
scope of  this research.
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The Referendum was always going to pose signif-
icant challenges for those covering the campaign. 
When the battle lines became clearer, it was 
obvious that news organisations could not resort to 
established practices derived from their reporting 
of  electoral contests. With the Party so divided, the 
“Tory press” had to decide which Conservatives 
they preferred. Broadcasters had to assess whether 
inclusion of  participants beyond the governing 
party risked introducing new imbalances in their 
coverage given the other significant parties wholly 
or mainly endorsed staying in the EU.
The Centre for Research in Communication and 
Culture audited national news coverage of  the Referen-
dum between 6 May and 22 June. We analysed the 
main weekday bulletins on BBC1, ITV, Channel 
4, Channel 5 and Sky News, as well as a repre-
sentative sample of  pages from the print editions 
of  all ten UK national daily newspapers. Our 
purpose was to measure three balances: the extent 
to which coverage favoured one or other position 
(‘directional’), the amount of  coverage given to 
the respective campaigns (‘stopwatch’), and the 
range of  issues covered (‘issue’).
Directional balance
One measure for discerning press alignment 
involved subtracting the volume of  items that 
advanced the IN position from the total that 
supported OUT. This enabled us to position 
different newspapers on an ‘opinion continuum’. 
To varying degrees, five newspapers favoured IN 
and five OUT. Overall there was a greater volume 
(60 to 40%) of  articles supporting OUT over IN. 
When these figures are weighted by sales, this 
advantage is far larger (80% versus 20% in favour 
of  OUT).
Pro-IN and Pro-OUT newspapers gave more 
prominence and quotation space to IN and OUT 
campaigners respectively. In TV terms none of  
these clear directional tendencies were evident. 
Analysis of  482 TV news items found a small 
surplus of  28 IN orientated items over OUT 
items. There was also much greater parity in 
the broadcasters’ presentation and quotation of  
competing viewpoints. 
Stopwatch balance
Table 1 compares the amount of  times parties, 
corporate and civil society representatives were 
featured in news coverage. The results show the 
dominance of  Conservative sources, particularly 
in the pro-OUT newspapers. Business sources 
were most prominent in Pro-IN newspapers. TV 
news gave far greater prominence to reporting 
and quoting the views of  citizens. Where there 
was marked consistency was in the marginali-
sation of  other parties. Labour’s presence was 
boosted by increased prominence during the last 
two weeks of  the campaign. UKIP (mainly its 
leader) sustained some media presence but the 
other parties were side-lined. The era of  mul-
ti-party politics witnessed by us in last year’s General 
Election found scant expression in coverage of  
this campaign.
Reporting was highly ‘presidential’. The top 
five most frequently reported participants were 
David Cameron (8.9% of  all appearances), Boris 
Johnson (6.7%), George Osborne (4.0%), Nigel 
Farage (3.2%) and Michael Gove (2.8%). Cumu-
latively these individuals accounted for more than 
one in four of  all media appearances.
Issue balance 
Table 2 compares which issues gained the most 
coverage in the press and TV news.
There was remarkable consistency in issue 
coverage across the media (i.e. TV, and pro-IN 
and OUT newspapers), with three issues domi-
nating media debate: the economy, immigration, 
and the conduct of  the campaign itself. Figure 2 
shows the relative prominence of  the ‘Economy’ 
and ‘Immigration’. 
Initially the economy received considerably 
more attention than immigration, potentially to 
the benefit of  the IN campaign. Later there was, 
however, a significant shift with immigration 
overtaking economic issues and this may have 
given the OUT campaign valuable momentum. 
Subsequently, while the economy regained pole 
position, there was closer proximity between the 
two main substantive issues in the closing stages 
of  the campaign than at the start. 
The marginalisation of  many other major 
issues including the environment, taxation, em-
ployment, agricultural policy and social welfare 
was striking. Devolution attracted less than 1% 
of  news coverage. Given their clear Remain 
majorities and the future implications for both 
Scotland and Northern Ireland this is a remarka-
ble absence.
The authors would like to thank Jon Crannage, Charlotte 
Hester, Simon Huxtable, Sarah Lewis, Nadilla Mohamed-Jamil, 
Amanda Overend, David Smith, Lukas Stepanek, Ian Taylor, 
Dane Vincent and Judy Wing for their invaluable assistance.
The narrow agenda: how the news media 
covered the Referendum
Prof David Deacon
D.N.Deacon@lboro.AC.UK
Prof John Downey
J.W.Downey@lboro.ac.uk
Dr Emily Harmer
E.Harmer@lboro.ac.uk
Prof James Stanyer 
J.Stanyer@lboro.ac.uk
Prof Dominic Wring
D.J.Wring@lboro.ac.uk
The authors are all 
members of Loughborough 
University Centre 
for Research in 
Communication and 
Culture which has been 
analysing media coverage 
of elections and referenda 
since 1992.

36
Dr Julie Firmstone
Associate Professor 
in Media and 
Communication 
and Convenor of the 
Journalsim Rsearch 
Group, School of Media 
and Communication, 
University of Leeds.
Email: j.a.firmstone@leeds.ac.uk
Newspapers’ editorial opinions during the 
referendum campaign
Without solving the million-dollar question (or 
should that be £350 million?) about media effects, 
it is unwise to claim that newspapers’ editorial 
positions influenced the referendum. However, my 
analysis of  all editorials in the fortnight preceding 
the vote reminds us that newspapers should be 
scrutinised as independent political actors. Repre-
senting a newspaper’s collective opinion, newspapers 
intervened in the debate through declarations of  
editorial positions with the strategic aim of  influenc-
ing politicians, campaigners and readers. Whilst we 
already know that news coverage was skewed towards 
Brexit, what editorial positions were taken, how 
strongly were these injected into the debate, and how 
were positions constructed?
Deep divisions within political parties, public 
opinion, and Britain’s complex relationship with the 
EU were always going to make it difficult to predict 
which side newspapers would support. Including 
their Sunday counterparts, and the surprise positions 
of  The Times and the Mail on Sunday, 6 newspapers 
supported Remain (Mirror, Guardian, Independent, 
Financial Times) and 5 backed Leave (Sun, Daily Mail, 
Daily Express, Daily Telegraph, Sunday Times). The 
sibling disagreement between the daily and Sunday 
editions of  the traditionally Conservative supporting 
Times and Mail titles adds to evidence that editorial 
opinions are determined by a far more complex set 
of  influences than loyalties to proprietors or parties. 
Although all papers declared a position, not all 
chose to promote their agenda to the same extent. 
Measuring the salience of  opinion between 10-23 
June, Diagram 1 shows that on average Leave news-
papers published editorials on more days (9.4) than 
Remain papers (7.6). The Sun and Mail voiced their 
opinion every day and the Telegraph and Express were 
not far behind. The Guardian was most vocal on the 
Remain side, but the other Remain papers made for 
much quieter company. 
Perhaps more revealingly, combining a range 
of  factors in addition to basic salience to provide a 
score for the tenacity of  each newspaper’s editorial 
position illustrates that those supporting Leave 
had by far the loudest voice during the last week 
of  the campaign. Even without considering that 
the combined readership of  the pro-Leave papers 
outweighs that of  pro-membership titles, it is clear 
that Leave newspapers dedicated more resources 
to promoting their view (Tenacity score 92). The 
Express created a campaign logo from their English 
Knight masthead to announce the paper’s crusade 
to ‘get us out of  the EU’ on two front pages and 
used this in a free poster claiming “We demand our 
country back”. The Daily Mail and Sun frequently 
published more than one Leave editorial on the 
same day and gave their opinion the highest possible 
prominence by featuring it on the front page at 
least twice. They were joined by the Telegraph and 
Express in using their front pages to plead with 
readers to vote Leave on polling day. Such vigorous 
campaigning was not matched by the Remain papers, 
which were 30% less tenacious and varied in their 
campaigning efforts (Tenacity score 61). Only the 
Mirror came anywhere near a Tenacity score (21) to 
rival the highest of  the Leave papers (24). The front 
page was used sparingly by 3 out 5 (Mirror, Times, 
Guardian) to declare and/or promote their position. 
Most disappointingly, whilst the Leave papers pulled 
out all the stops on polling day, only the Mirror 
clearly called for a vote to Remain. The Independent 
chose simply to urge readers to ‘get out and vote’, 
the Guardian said nothing, and the Times seemed to 
get cold feet, using one of  its three editorials to point 
to multiple ways it thought the EU should reform. 
Newspapers’ constructions of  the issue were 
characterised by three themes. First, the majority of  
editorials on both sides focussed on criticising and 
denouncing each campaign, ironically perpetuating 
the very lack of  ‘facts’ that they criticised. Second, 
a narrative of  ‘us vs them’ was a strong feature of  
this criticism, with both sides (although Leave more 
so) emphasising the gap between politicians/elites/
experts and the electorate. Although details of  
who constituted ‘us’ and ‘them’ varied according to 
predictable Labour/Conservative affiliations, papers 
were united in their anti-establishment view which 
arguably played into the Leave campaign’s hands (see 
Diagram 3). 
Third, Leave newspapers employed compelling 
narratives and metaphors, combining language more 
familiar to descriptions of  war with nationalistic 
concerns about sovereignty and immigration: “This 
is truly a Battle for Britain” (Express, 19/6); the Daily 
Mail claimed to explode and demolish the four main 
Remain lies (23/6); “Today you can make history – 
by winning Britain’s independence from the crushing 
might of  the Brussels machine. We urge you to vote 
Leave … and make today our Independence Day” 
(Sun, 23/6). 
Overall, in keeping with their reputation, the 
anti EU newspapers shouted loudest, with the 
strongest conviction, and with a message that we can 
assume voters found more compelling. Why does 
this matter now that we have voted to Leave the EU? 
Because, whilst we no longer have seat at the table, 
we are still next door neighbours, which makes the 
job of  scrutinising the EU more important than it 
was before. 
The Tenacity Score is aggregate of  the daily scores for each newspaper. The Tenacity score was 
calculated for each day of  a newspaper’s coverage as follows: 1 point per editorial article, 3 points 
for editorial comments featured on the front page, 3 points when the entire space for editorial 
comment was dedicated to the referendum, 1 extra point for editorial positions promoted with 
banners or logos on the front page. Maximum Tenacity score per day = 9. 
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Brexit ‘mansplained’: news coverage of the EU 
Referendum campaign
Media coverage of  British politics is stubbornly 
male-dominated at the best of  times and EU ref-
erendum news would be no different. Eventually, 
Labour’s Harriet Harman made an intervention 
into the debate criticising the lack of  visible women 
in the campaign. As it turned out, Harman’s 
intervention had some impact on the strategies 
employed by both sides, as women campaign-
ers were subsequently deployed to take part in 
prominent televised debates; however this seemed 
to have very little impact on the subsequent news 
coverage. Analysis by Loughborough University’s 
Centre for Research in Communication and Culture 
showed that between 6th May and 22nd June, 
women accounted for just 25.3% of  all individ-
ual sources included in television coverage and 
just 15.4% in the press. This demonstrates the 
extent to which the debate was dominated by men 
(Figure 1). 
When we examine the roles that women 
actually take up in the coverage it is clear that 
women are less likely to be portrayed as exhibit-
ing any form of  expertise and much more likely 
to be included as ordinary citizens. On television 
women accounted for 16.5% of  all politicians 
featured in the coverage, 25.5% of  experts and 
19.6 of  business spokespersons whilst 48.1% of  
citizens were female. The press featured even fewer 
women, just 14.9% of  politicians, 15.6% of  experts 
and 10.3% of  business voices. Even ordinary 
women were underrepresented in the press, ac-
counting for just 39.1% of  citizens (Table 1). 
Despite the marginal status women occupied 
in the news coverage, when women were actually 
quoted in the press and on television their average 
quotation time or length were comparable with 
those of  men. On television the average quote 
from a woman was 29 seconds long, compared 
to 28 seconds for men. Similarly, women were 
given 31 words on average compared to 33 words 
for men (Table 2). This means that when women 
actually appear they are granted a voice on similar 
terms to men, meaning that the main problem 
women had with regards to the the coverage was 
gaining access to the media in the first place. 
The thirty most visible campaigners included 
nine women in total, with Priti Patel the most 
prominent woman in 9th place (making 65 ap-
pearances). Furthermore, women account for 
only 10% of  the total number of  appearances in 
the top 30. It is also noteworthy that Patel and 
London Mayor Sadiq Kahn were the only BAME 
campaigners to feature in the top 30 demonstrat-
ing that this most important of  political discus-
sions, one in which the spectre of  immigrants was 
routinely called upon to emphasise the benefits 
of  withdrawing from the EU, was troublingly 
presided over by not just men, but primarily by 
white men. 
Since the news coverage was dominated by 
just two policy areas - the economy and immigration 
- the prominence of  white men in the debate 
was rendered still more problematic. The Leave 
campaign and their supporters in the press 
pushed immigration as the dominant reason for 
leaving the EU, increasingly framing the issue in 
intemperate and inflammatory language. That 
such rhetoric appeared so frequently in the 
everyday utterances of  privileged white male 
campaigners like Nigel Farage and Boris Johnson 
is deeply problematic, serving to normalise and 
legitimate openly xenophobic and occasional-
ly racist sentiments which could have real and 
lasting consequences, reinforcing troubling ideas 
about who is and who is not welcome to a diverse 
audience of  voters.  
Given that immigration was one of  the key 
issues, it is surprising that Home Secretary Theresa 
May was so marginal to the campaign (she made 
just 29 appearances in seven weeks of  coverage). 
Secretary of  State for Education Nicky Morgan 
was also conspicuous by her absence. Both women 
seem to have emerged as potential contenders for 
the Conservative leadership, perhaps suggesting 
that strategic motivations explain their lack of  
presence in the campaign. Even Scottish First 
Minister Nicola Sturgeon failed to make much 
impact in the media debate, especially given that 
she had linked the outcome of  the EU referendum 
to a potential future Scottish Independence ref-
erendum, something which is only now receiving 
the attention it deserves. 
Many have criticised the tone, content and 
quality of  the EU referendum campaign and its 
media coverage throughout this campaign. Both 
press and broadcasters should also be ques-
tioned for the narrow range of  voices, issues and 
opinions that were given prominence in this most 
crucial political debate.
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Scrutinising statistical claims and constructing balance: 
Television news coverage of the 2016 EU Referendum
During the 2016 EU Referendum campaign many 
people will have been confronted by a blizzard 
of  facts and figures about the consequences of  
voting one way or another. So how well did UK 
television news interpret the statistical claims 
conveyed by both sides? 
Cardiff  University carried out a content 
analysis of  evening television news bulletins over 
the ten week campaign. We examined bulletins 
on Channel 5 at 5pm, Channel 4 at 7pm and at 
10pm on BBC, ITV and Sky News in order to 
assess not just the balance of  issues, parties and 
personalities given airtime, but how broadcasters 
routinely scrutinised the claims made by the 
Leave and Remain campaigns. 
Overall, we found roughly half  of  the 571 
items examined related to the process of  the Ref-
erendum, notably about campaign walkabouts or 
the strategies of  competing sides, as well as public 
opinion towards the EU and the way people 
would vote. There was also a focus on Conserv-
ative party infighting and speculation about the 
likely successor to David Cameron. 
The economy was the major issue reported 
over the campaign, representing over a fifth of  
coverage, which included stories about economic 
forecasts and trade agreements. Immigration 
made up just over one in ten items, although this 
issue sometimes overlapped with stories about 
public services, housing and security. 
Of  the on-screen sources we examined, 
Boris Johnson made up 8.7% share of  appear-
ances – the most prominent figure for the Leave 
campaign – while 4.4% featured Nigel Farage. 
On the remain side, the PM and Chancellor were 
the most visible on television news (accounting 
for 7.2% and 4.1% respectively), with Jeremy 
Corbyn’s share of  appearances – 2.4% - well 
behind Conservative sources.
But beyond the issues, personalities and par-
ty-politics involved in the Referendum coverage, 
it was perhaps the lack of  scrutiny by non-parti-
san sources that was most conspicuous by their 
absence. If  we exclude the 12% of  sources that 
did not express a favourable or unfavourable 
opinion towards EU membership, Tables 1 and 2 
show the overwhelming voices heard on television 
news were by Leave or Remain campaigners. More 
independent actors – from think tanks, say, or 
academics – made up a tiny share of  sources used 
to inform coverage. 
Since over 4 in ten items featured a statistical 
claim about the EU, the burden of  independent 
scrutiny was thus left to journalists. But how did 
they communicate the competing facts and figures 
of  the campaigns? About a quarter of  news items 
involving statistics were either challenged or contex-
tualised by journalists, such as questioning the claim 
made by Leave that the UK paid £350m per week to 
Brussels or explaining that much of  this money was 
reinvested in the UK.. Put another way, 3 in 4 items 
involving statistical claims were not subject to either 
further analysis or additional context. 
In effect, this meant much of  the coverage 
about the EU Referendum was left to campaign 
groups to argue with each other about the 
relative merits of  leaving or remaining. Indeed, 
we found almost a third of  news items involving 
statistics were tit-for-tat exchanges between rival 
camps, where journalists did not intervene one 
way or the other about the veracity or credibility 
of  competing claims. Without a great deal of  
prior knowledge, it would be very difficult for 
audiences to make sense of  these claims and 
counter-claims, regardless of  their veracity.
Why does all this matter? Although broad-
casters have to abide by ‘due impartiality’ guide-
lines, this does not necessarily mean they have to 
be balanced when reporting facts and figures. The 
editorial goals of  accuracy and objectivity involve 
challenging or questioning claims about being in 
or out of  the EU. Our analysis of  Referendum 
coverage suggests that, while broadcasters may 
have been even-handed in terms of  giving both 
sides equal time, they could have more inde-
pendently scrutinised, challenged or contextual-
ised many of  the facts and figures that were used 
repeatedly by both sides. 
Despite the ten-week campaign, just days 
before Referendum day one representative survey 
found less than a third - 31% - felt well or very 
well informed about their EU vote. The tit-for-tat 
exchanges between rival camps and the trading of  
statistical claims would probably not have helped 
many viewers make better sense of  the issues con-
fronting them. There may have been exaggerated 
claims from both sides of  the debate, but it was 
also the case that some of  the statistics presented 
were more credible than others. In this campaign, 
however, there was a sense that broadcasters were 
afraid to make such a judgement. Objectivity, in 
this sense, was trumped by impartiality. More 
regularly drawing on independent analysis may 
have enhanced people’s understanding of  the 
issues before they had cast their vote.
The research was carried out by Natasha Egan-Sjodin.
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Under normal circumstances, one of  the great virtues 
of  broadcasting in the United Kingdom is the way in 
which it is closely regulated. This has been true of  both 
the public and private sectors since their inception. In 
the case of  the BBC, upon incorporation in 1927 under 
the first of  a long series of  Royal Charters, it was to be 
a public service - one which would rarely depart from a 
core principle of  impartiality. 
The arrival of  a licensed commercial radio sector 
in 1973 meant an expanded regulatory body, the 
Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA), assumed 
the power to ensure that commercial radio should 
also be impartial over matters of  politics and other 
public controversy. Relaxation of  the regulation of  
private-sector radio with the passing of  subsequent 
legislation and the replacement of  the IBA with firstly 
the Radio Authority and then in 2003 Ofcom, did bring 
about successive changes over rules on ownership and 
the general nature of  programming, but here, too, the 
core principle of  impartiality still lies at the heart of  
commercial radio.
As is the case with television broadcasting in the 
UK, regulation over impartiality at least means that 
radio is free from the kind of  crass partisanship we 
have witnessed over Europe in the press. While some 
newspaper titles owned by Rupert Murdoch and other 
press owners lost little time in promoting the case for 
Brexit, continuing a long tradition of  printing mainly 
negative and even ridiculously exaggerated or even 
fabricated stories about the European Union, Sky was 
also bound by the regulation in force to be impartial, 
despite the influence of  Mr Murdoch over the conduct 
of  most of  its business. Conversely, any streamed 
services which might be described as television or radio 
but which are not broadcast are, of  course, exempt 
from content regulation, but compared to mainstream 
broadcasting services their audiences tend to be rela-
tively small.
What this close regulation of  broadcasting meant 
for radio’s coverage of  the referendum is clear. Impar-
tiality meant the various arguments of  both the Remain 
and Leave camps were widely treated equivocally, 
irrespective of  their own merit. Shortly before the ref-
erendum campaign began in earnest, Ofcom published 
an advisory statement, clarifying how the standing pro-
visions of  its Broadcasting Code should be interpreted 
by licensees in the context of  the referendum. The 
BBC’s Editorial Guidelines were also clarified for the 
benefit of  its own producers, reports and presenters. 
There can have been few experienced contributors to 
UK broadcasting who did not already realise that the 
referendum was to be one of  those subjects over which 
the utmost professionalism - namely impartiality - was 
to be required, but both the BBC and Ofcom intended 
there to be little room for doubt.
We sampled a number of  radio broadcasts of  
different kinds, with the intention of  presenting our 
findings at a forthcoming conference and providing 
some empirical and qualitative evidence for a forth-
coming book. There was no intention, and neither were 
resources available, to analyse every broadcast on every 
regulated radio station in the UK, in order to establish 
to what extent the rules were adhered to or broken. 
By monitoring a range of  news bulletins, discussion 
programmes and magazine programmes, we were 
nonetheless able to identify general trends and form 
some conclusions about the nature of  the referendum 
coverage on radio and its possible effects.
There were some exceptions to what we found 
generally to be strict adherence to the impartiality 
requirement. In the commercial sector, some presenters 
announced their own voting intention - for example 
Julia Hartley-Brewer, who began an interview on Talk 
Radio with UKIP leader Nigel Farage by noting their 
common cause in supporting Brexit, but adding that she 
would nonetheless be asking him some tough questions. 
Generally, though, on both the BBC and commercial 
radio, every point made by or for the Remain campaign 
was countered by a ‘balancing’ point - often of  almost 
exactly the same duration - in either the same bulletin or 
one shortly afterwards for the Brexiters, as is stipulated 
by the impartiality regulation. 
Unfortunately for the Remain campaign, this 
balancing act meant however many economic experts, 
world leaders, business people or celebrities they 
produced to support their case, the manufactured 
‘balancing’ riposte tended to consist of  one of  the 
Brexit supporters dismissing that case, usually without 
any further substantiation. Some presenters, notably on 
Radio 4’s Today and PM programmes did occasionally 
attempt to challenge unfounded or misleading assertions, 
but there was little attempt to evaluate the claims of  
either side or to point out that Remain had the support 
of  the vast majority of  economic experts.  Often the 
BBC referred listeners to a ‘fact checking’ service online, 
but its findings were rarely broadcast.
We believe this regulated equivocation may well 
have encouraged the undecided in believing that the 
decision facing them was a simple choice between 
binary opposites of  little real consequence for the UK, 
when in fact the period immediately after the vote 
supported many of  the economic claims of  Remain. 
This equivocation reminded us of  that adopted in the 
early 2000s, when the public debate over the safety 
of  the MMR vaccination was also treated as a simple 
‘take it or leave it’ choice by many broadcasters, only 
for the widely disputed claims by one individual that 
MMR was unsafe to be subsequently disproven by a 
large body medical evidence. We hope the decision 
taken over Brexit does not subsequently prove to be as 
potentially disastrous.
Regulated equivocation: the referendum on radio
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Referendum night goings on
The live drama of  election night results’ pro-
grammes constitutes a moment of  ritual affirmation, 
reminding people that even the most contested 
political conflicts are bounded; that the allocation 
of  power has been settled without bloodshed; that 
everyday life will go on the day after and the cycle 
of  plebiscitary choice will come round again before 
too long. Like switching off  the Christmas lights, 
these are ceremonies of  closure, signalling that the 
moment of  democratic choice is now over and the 
return to mundane governance can commence. 
The referendum result’s programme on BBC1 
tore up that script. Far from being an exercise in 
soothing reassurance, this was a precarious fair-
ground ride. Far from being an exercise in closure, 
it seemed more like the announcement of  a closing 
down sale. Such moments of  existential instabil-
ity present a challenge to broadcasters who are, 
as Roger Silverstone reminded us, key framers of  
everyday normality. 
What can be gained from pursuing a forensic 
study of  media spectacles of  this kind? From the 
narrow perspective of  political science, results’ 
coverage would seem to be a peripheral detail, ex-
plaining little or nothing about why voters chose to 
vote one way or the other or how political campaign 
strategies succeeded or failed. Beyond such instru-
mentalist accounts, there is rather more going on in 
the political sphere than the dynamics of  competi-
tion. Politics is inherently dramatic and illuminating 
political analysis seeks to understand the dramatic 
structures that underlie the distribution of  power. In 
Victor Turner’s terms, drama occurs when there is 
an interruption in the rhythm of  mundane expe-
rience; a ‘time out of  time’ in which relationships 
between scene, script and potential action seem 
somehow open-ended. Political drama entails inde-
terminacy and the ways in which people choose to 
respond to it. Where there is no disagreement there 
is no politics. Where there is certainty about what 
will happen next there is no drama. Few moments in 
politics capture the intrinsic uncertainty of  politics 
more vividly than election night. It is here that 
rhetorical certitude is forced to encounter historical 
unpredictability. The drama of  democracy resides in 
moments when people endeavour, however crudely, 
to shape the scene in which they are social actors. 
Election results’ coverage provides a rare 
moment of  liveness in a political world that is 
largely dominated by memories, hearsay, narratives 
and visions. Most of  the time political discourse is 
buried in reflections and aspirations. Even the live 
coverage of  parliamentary proceedings is overshad-
owed by an architectural edifice designed to invoke 
the authority of  the past. Election night pro-
grammes are live performances, reminding viewers 
that there is no script, only extemporarality. 
The unfolding drama of  the Referendum 
result on the night of  23/4 June, 2016 will be 
recorded by historians as a pivotal moment in 
the decline of  the United Kingdom. The results’ 
programme began, as most of  these events do, 
with guest politicians offering self-serving spec-
ulations and strange, animated maps of  the UK 
flashing in anticipation. These were moments of  
prelapsarian innocence in which liberal expecta-
tions of  business as usual still prevailed. 
The first crack in the appearance of  normality 
occurred just after midnight when the result from 
the Newcastle area came in, defying the psepholo-
gists’ predictions and signalling a ripple of  dramatic 
uncertainty. As the hours passed it became clear 
that the vote was likely to be very close. At just 
after 4am Nigel Farage, having earlier appeared to 
concede defeat, made a victory speech, asserting 
that ‘we fought against the merchant bankers’ and 
that the anticipated vote to leave was a victory for 
‘decent people’. At 4.16 Chuka Umunna was the 
first person to use the word ‘seismic’, a metaphor 
than then ran wild, with no fewer than seven 
different speakers using it eleven times to describe 
the emerging reality. At 4.38 the BBC forecast a 
leave result. At 4.52 a tearful Keith Vaz appeared 
via video link, speaking of  the result as a ‘crushing, 
crushing decision’. A tweet from Paddy Ashdown 
declares ‘God help this country’. By 5am the mood 
in the studio was funereal. 
As dawn broke the programme began to move 
from shocked acknowledgement to stuttering 
explanation. At this point a new metaphor emerged: 
voters had decided to give the establishment ‘a 
kicking’. This phrase was used five times, evoking 
images of  voters as a gang of  street thugs putting 
their boots into anyone who looked like they had 
passed their A-levels.
My plan in the coming weeks is to: 
• note every single metaphor used in the course 
of  the results’ programme.
• explore the meanings and genealogies of  these 
metaphors.
• devise an affective ‘heat map’ of  the pro-
gramme’s content with a view to seeing how 
the referendum played out as feeling.
It will be a modest contribution to a much larger 
analysis of  what preceded and followed the referen-
dum result. But sometimes it is in the liveness of  the 
moment that meanings can best be grasped.
Prof Stephen Coleman
Professor of Political 
Communication in 
the School of Media 
& Communication, 
University of Leeds. 
His most recent book 
is ‘How Voters Feel’ 
(Cambridge University 
Press) and he is the 
author of the forthcoming 
book, ‘Can the Internet 
Strengthen Democracy?’ 
(Polity).
Email: S.Coleman@leeds.ac.uk
44
When the majority of  Britons voted to leave the 
European Union on 23rd June 2016, American 
media immediately took notice. TV networks, 
national newspapers, and their web portals quickly 
filled with live reports and commentary as the EU 
referendum results started to trickle in and a political 
and economic crisis began to unfold in Britain. In 
contrast with British media coverage, which was 
split between pro-leave and pro-remain outlets, U.S. 
media appeared to offer a unanimously negative 
interpretation of  the results. This scramble to cover 
“Brexit” in the aftermath of  the referendum stood 
in stark contrast with the approach that American 
news media had taken to this issue up to polling 
day. In the months leading to the vote, U.S.-based 
specialist publications such as the Wall Street Journal 
offered some dire predictions. Yet, Britain’s EU ref-
erendum gained little traction in the top American 
media outlets that traditionally influence the broader 
national news agenda, including the New York 
Times and the Washington Post.
The EU referendum was clearly of  strategic 
importance to the U.S. government and president 
Obama made his preference for the UK to remain 
in the EU clear when he argued that “The UK is at 
its best when it’s helping to lead a strong European 
Union” during a trip to London in April 2016. Yet, 
it was particularly challenging for American media 
to report on this issue as it involved communicating 
a complex and technical foreign affairs topic to an 
audience that realistically had little knowledge of  
the EU and whose interest in international politics 
is generally low. This problem was exacerbated by 
the fact that “Brexit” also competed for attention 
with the bombastic 2016 U.S. presidential election 
campaign, which focused primarily on domestic 
issues. Looking at Google Trends data, which 
measure the popularity of  a given topic on Google, 
it is clear that American users began to show some 
interest in the UK EU referendum only in the very 
final days before the vote. Although in part this may 
reflect the lack of  news coverage about “Brexit,” it 
more broadly provides an indication that this issue 
lacked salience for the American public, which did 
not appear interested in finding out more about it.
Under these circumstances, American media 
were pressed to find ways to frame the referendum 
that would increase its relevance for American 
audiences. One potential angle would have been to 
draw a parallel between some of  the anti-globaliza-
tion and anti-immigration sentiments that animated 
the referendum campaign in the UK and similar 
positions that underpinned the campaign of  2016 
Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump. In 
fact, Trump himself  pointed out these commonali-
ties during a strategically timed trip to Scotland on 
the day that followed Britain’s EU referendum. Yet, 
although some U.S. news outlets highlighted this 
angle in their commentary on the results, coverage 
that preceded the UK vote did not connect these 
two issues. 
Instead, American media focused on an issue 
that has little to do with U.S. politics in their scant 
coverage of  the EU referendum in the weeks prior 
to the vote. That is, the possibility that the UK itself  
may disintegrate following a vote for “Brexit.” Both 
the Washington Post and the New York Times framed 
some of  their most prominent pieces on the EU 
referendum by tying this event to the possibility of  
follow-up referenda on Scottish independence and 
Irish unification in case that English people voted to 
withdraw from the EU, but voters in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland did not.
Surprising as it may seem, the decision to 
frame the EU referendum in this way suggests that 
applying a domestic lens – in this case the effects of  
Britain’s exit from the EU on the U.S. economy or a 
parallel with the 2016 presidential election campaign 
– may not necessarily be the preferred option for 
American media to report on complex internation-
al news. Instead, in order to augment the salience 
of  a foreign event for domestic audiences, it can 
be useful to link these issues to somewhat similar 
events that were mediated previously and can now 
be used as a template to explain new ones (Kitzinger, 
2000), such as in this case the Scottish independence 
referendum of  2014. In the wake of  the EU ref-
erendum result, the predictions that some U.S. media 
made about a deep constitutional crisis for the UK 
seem prescient. “Brexit” is now firmly on the agenda 
of  American news outlets. Yet, finding templates 
to complement the coverage and make sense of  
the events that lie ahead in this process could be 
challenging considering that the UK and the EU are 
about to venture into unchartered and to a certain 
extent unpredictable territory.
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A victory of the nation state: the EU Referendum 
in the Southern European press
The EU Referendum was consistently construct-
ed as the biggest democratic decision of  our 
lifetimes in British political and media discourses. 
Whilst this once-in-a-lifetime decision undoubted-
ly constituted a pivotal moment in British history 
– clearly confirmed by the political and economic 
crisis that has followed – the Referendum was 
also a critical moment for the European Union as 
a whole. The UK’s decision to leave would mean 
the departure of  the second economy of  the EU, 
the third largest state in terms of  population, and 
a key player in European and global politics. A 
vote to leave would have seismic consequences 
over the European project and its current config-
uration, as well as for individual member states. 
Consistent with the importance of  the event, 
newspapers in the continent intensely covered 
the Referendum. In this piece, I summarise the 
issues driving the coverage in French, Italian, and 
Spanish newspapers.
I looked at the 266 stories containing the 
term ‘Brexit’ in newspapers of  record available 
through Nexis (Le Figaro, Le Monde, Il Corriere 
della Sera, El Mundo, and El País) during the 
week before the Referendum. Coverage was 
eminently led by campaign events, focussing 
on the different arguments put forward by the 
Leave and the Remain sides. Key events, such 
as the nautical battle in the Thames, Farage’s 
‘Breaking Point’ poster, the murder of  Jo Cox, 
and the BBC’s ‘Great Debate’ got covered across 
the three countries. Coverage focussed on the 
evolution of  pre-electoral polls too, underlining 
how close the race was between both sides of  
the campaign. Special attention was paid to rank 
and file citizens, particularly through voxpops, 
both to better understand the reasons motivat-
ing citizens to vote for one of  the options, but 
also as a means to describe the main cleavages 
dividing the British public around this issue. Il 
Corriere, for example, compared how the privileged 
parents of  public school students would vote with 
parents taking their children to a state school in 
a deprived area. El País, in turn, used a train ride 
between Aberdeen and Penzance to capture the 
critical issues for citizens throughout the country. 
Le Figaro opted for a dissection of  the electorate 
in Peterborough and Aberystwyth, epitomising the 
Brexit and Remain camps, respectively. 
A significant number of  stories (17%) 
discussed the potential consequences of  a Brexit 
vote. A handful of  stories discussed how the 
process of  Brexit would be handled should 
Britons vote to leave the EU. The implications 
Brexit would have for travelling to and from the 
UK, including mentions to roaming charges, were 
discussed in a limited number of  stories focussed. 
Most stories about the potential consequences 
of  Brexit focussed on the economic consequenc-
es, and were always framed through a national 
lens. In a textbook case of  news domestication, 
newspapers in all three countries warned about 
the effects Brexit could have over their main in-
dustries, over their GDP, and over French, Italian, 
and Spanish citizens living in the UK. Coverage 
also devoted attention to the economic impact 
Brexit could have upon the British economy, 
as well as upon British citizens living in other 
EU countries (above all in Spain). The pre-emi-
nence of  the nation state in the coverage of  the 
Referendum was furthered in the stories warning 
of  a possible contagion effect onto Denmark, the 
Netherlands, or France. This was particularly the 
case in France, where Euroscepticism is reaching 
unprecedented levels, and support for extreme 
right politician Marine Le Pen is growing.
Scholars have debated the emergence and 
the nature of  a European public sphere for more 
than twenty years. Amongst other definitions, the 
European public sphere has been defined as the 
simultaneous discussion of  the same topics in the 
national media of  different European countries 
within a similar frame of  reference. The EU 
Referendum constituted a unique opportunity for 
European media to transcend the limitations of  
national boundaries and highlight the monumen-
tal blow Brexit would have upon the European 
project. By constructing Brexit as eminently a 
British issue, and by focussing on its potential 
impact upon individual member states, coverage 
contributed to reinforce the remoteness of  the EU, 
whilst signalling the vitality of  the nation state. 
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How our mainstream media failed democracy
Three days after the Referendum, I spoke to a Labour 
MP who represents a Northern constituency with 
one of  the lowest proportions of  immigrants in the 
country. A majority of  her constituents had voted to 
leave the EU. 
Why? Mainly, she said, because they were 
convinced that waves of  immigrants would soon 
overwhelm their local communities, take their jobs, 
and undermine their way of  life. They were particularly 
concerned about Turkey’s imminent arrival in the EU.
If  there is one normative principle that is taught in 
virtually every journalism and media course throughout 
the western world, it is this: that a free, well-function-
ing, pluralistic media system is essential for an informed 
democracy. Without it, citizens will be ignorant and 
ill-informed, and democracy will suffer.
A referendum is ostensibly the purest form of  
democratic inquisition: a single issue, uncomplicated 
by tactical considerations or concerns about individ-
ual candidates, a decision that can be based purely on 
weighing up the facts and arguments to answer a single 
question. So our media have an uncomplicated but 
profoundly important role of  conveying information 
and analysis to assist the decision-making process.
In 2016 our mainstream media failed spectacularly. 
Led, inevitably, by the viscerally anti-EU Mail, Sun, 
Express and Telegraph papers, most of  our national press 
indulged in little more than a catalogue of  distortions, 
half-truths and outright lies: a ferocious propaganda 
campaign in which facts and sober analysis were sac-
rificed to the ideologically driven objectives of  editors 
and their proprietors. 
Having charted some of  the worst excesses of  
those four publications, journalist blogger Liz Gerard 
wrote of  the scaremongering about immigration: 
“Turks, Romanians, Iraqis, Syrians, Afghans, Albanians: 
millions of  them apparently want to abandon their 
homelands and settle in the English countryside - and 
only leaving the EU will stop them. No claim was too 
preposterous, no figure too huge to print.” Gerard 
compiled a montage of  front page headlines whose 
constant reiteration of  words such as “migrants”, 
“borders” “EU” systematically ramped up the xeno-
phobic message. 
Perhaps the most egregious example was the Daily 
Mail headline of  16 June (inevitably followed up by 
the Sun), claiming that a lorry load of  migrants had 
arrived from Europe. Despite video footage which 
clearly demonstrated they were refugees from Iraq 
and Kuwait, the banner headline “We’re from Europe 
– let us in!” was plastered across the front page. The 
following day’s “correction” consisted of  54 words 
at the bottom of  page 2. Hugo Dixon, founder of  
InFacts, has drawn attention to both the number of  
inaccurate stories and the chronically inadequate “cor-
rections” relegated to inside pages.
Did this rampant Euroscepticism make a differ-
ence? Effects studies over the years have taught us 
that media influence on voting is empirically unknow-
able. Those newspapers will, however, have exerted 
substantial influence on the national conversation in 
three ways. 
First, the barrage of  headlines designed to 
reinforce campaign slogans will have shored up Leave 
strategists with confidence to pursue their simple 
messages. An orchestrated tabloid campaign around 
EU pen-pushing bureaucrats, EU cost to the UK, and 
untrammelled EU immigration lent itself  perfectly to 
the oft-repeated mantra of  Take Back Control. 
Second, it is inevitable that – even with falling 
circulations and readership fragmentation – the 
constant drumbeat of  headlines in newsagents, garage 
forecourts, on TV and radio news programmes and 
online, will have infiltrated the minds of  some voters. 
Anxieties about hordes of  Turkish immigrants, with 
no foundation in fact, were reinforced by tabloid 
scaremongering.
Third, and perhaps most important, is their 
agenda-setting role for broadcasters. Remain campaign 
strategists were confident that the message of  
economic risk would succeed – as it had in the Scottish 
independence referendum – but had not factored in a 
deeply hostile press whose slogans served as an echo 
chamber which broadcasters could scarcely resist. 
This echo chamber was particularly evident on 
the BBC which – mired in negotiations about Charter 
review – was far more susceptible to following than 
leading. Early in the campaign, a classic example 
followed Emma Thompson’s outspoken criticism of  
Britain as “a cake-filled, misery-laden, grey old island”. 
The Sun had responded with a front page splash 
headlined “Shut Yer Cakehole”, followed by quotes 
from Eurosceptic MPs labelling her “the worst sort of  
fat-cat luvvie” and an “overpaid, leftie luvvie”.
On the following night’s BBC Newsnight, Evan 
Davis interviewed Lord Mandelson and suggested that 
“Luvvies and New Labour” would be “a big problem 
for the Remain campaign over the next few months”. 
It was an irrelevance prompted entirely by a deliberately 
mischievous Sun front page. 
We need more detailed ethnographic research 
in newsrooms to identify the nature and scale of  
this agenda-setting problem, but anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the newspapers’ overwhelming and 
full-blooded Euroscepticism seeped easily into broad-
casting agendas.
In her post-referendum media round-up, the 
Guardian’s Jane Martinson revealed that, within an hour 
of  victory for Leave being declared, Sun editor Tony 
Gallagher told the Guardian: “So much for the waning 
power of  the print media.” And that is precisely our 
problem. A world in which social media was supposed 
to democratise communicative power is still dominated 
by the same unaccountable behemoths that have 
dominated Britain’s political discourse for decades. 
A referendum that was supposed to be an exercise 
in informed participation has fuelled hatred and 
ignorance, and debased our politics. Our mainstream 
media failed us at a time of  greatest democratic need. 
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Divided Britain? We were already divided…
It couldn’t have been a more different atmos-
phere. Back in the heady days of  the 1975 ref-
erendum on whether to stay in the ‘Common Market’, 
every single national newspaper urged a ‘yes’ vote 
with the exception of  the Morning Star. Rupert 
Murdoch, the Mail’s Sir David English, prime 
minister Harold Wilson and former PM Edward 
Heath all scorned the arguments of  left-wing 
proponents of  a ‘no’ vote such as Tony Benn 
and urged Britain to renew its ties to the rest of  
Europe. The result was a 2 to 1 ‘yes’ vote and 
relief  for the political establishment.
Fast forward to June 24, 2016 and things are 
very different. The decision to leave the European 
Union is evidence that consensus has now offi-
cially broken down. ‘Today we wake to a deeply 
divided country’, cried LibDem leader Tim Farron 
on the morning of  the referendum result while 
the Guardian commentator Jonathan Freedland 
noticed that, given the hugely different poll results 
between the biggest metropolitan centres and 
the rest, ‘England is exposed as a land divided’. 
Story after story, meme after meme, now talks of  
‘Divided Britain’: a land marked by a collapse in 
trust and working-class communities at war with 
the political ‘mainstream’.
Unlike 1975, we also have a divided press 
with the Sun, Mail, Express, Sunday Times and 
Sunday Telegraph on the ‘leave’ side with the 
Guardian, Observer, Times, Mail on Sunday and Mirror 
all lining up behind ‘remain’. True, if  you weight 
their impact by partisanship and reach, there was 
an 82% circulation advantage for the ‘leave’ side but 
‘Fleet Street’ (let alone individual newsrooms), as 
well as the country as a whole, would appear to be 
irredeemably divided.
This is all surface analysis. First, the press 
may have been divided on their specific attitude 
to ‘Brexit’ but they remain largely united on the 
bigger issues that surround the debate: on the 
need for immigration controls, austerity and 
deregulated markets. Endorsements for either 
side emanated from a heady mixture of  proprie-
torial influence, ideological fixations and material 
interests – not least the views of  their readers. 
According to YouGov, over 70% of  Sun, Express 
and Mail readers supported ‘Brexit’ in March 
2016 before their papers formally endorsed one 
side while 91% of  Guardian readers and 62% of  
Times readers were ‘remain’ supporters before the 
campaign officially started. Given the fragile state 
of  news finances, it would be a bold editor who 
would go against the views of  their readers. 
More fundamentally, Britain was divided 
long before the referendum campaign got going. 
The economic disparities behind the powerless-
ness that led voters to reject the status quo in 
such large numbers are, according to Larry Elliott 
writing on the morning after the vote, ‘deep-seat-
ed and of  long standing.’ He concludes that the 
UK is a ‘country divided by wealth, geography 
and class.’ The tragedy is that the bulk of  media 
attention during the referendum totally failed 
to do justice to these underlying questions of  
inequality, alienation and frustration with ‘official’ 
politics and focused instead on painting the vote 
mostly in terms of  a civil war inside the Conserva-
tive Party. 
The whole problem is that neither a press 
that is largely dominated by billionaire proprietors 
nor broadcasters that are all too often enmeshed 
with the elites themselves, are able to make sense 
of  and to articulate the divisions that exist in our 
society. Of  course, some titles – like the Express, 
Sun and the Mail – are determined to ramp up 
divisions by blaming immigrants for all social 
problems, adding to a poisonous atmosphere 
generated by politicians on both sides of  the 
campaign. By and large, however, the national 
media are mostly not interested in highlighting 
and analyzing the divisions that are truly meaning-
ful and that would require them to acknowledge 
the structural inequalities that permeate the UK.
The breakdown of  consensus that we 
are now being assaulted with in headlines and 
hashtags masks the existence of  a more enduring 
consensus: the determination of  Britain’s elites – 
including those inside the media – to hold onto 
power and to maintain their influence. True, they 
may have had very different perspectives on how 
EU membership would assist this, but their un-
derlying devotion to vested interests, capital flows 
and market fundamentalism goes beyond a tactical 
question of  ‘remain’ or ‘leave’. This is what was 
missing from the referendum campaign and what 
progressives from both sides will have to confront 
in the uncertain days and months that lie ahead.
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Deliberation, distortion and dystopia: the news 
media and the referendum
The EU Referendum was a classic test of  the 
concept of  media framing of  deliberation. Yet, 
it perhaps ended up demonstrating that it is 
politicians and the public who set the agenda and 
that the news media has short-term, shallow but 
significant effects.
No one can say that the media has not given 
us enough debate or information to help voters 
make up their minds. Broadcasters, newspapers, 
social media, universities, political parties, think-
tanks and corporations created vast amounts of  
data and debate.
 The side that lost complained loudly about 
the news media. They accused it of  bias and of  
failing to explain the issues and the risks clearly 
enough. While the wider public say they were not 
given the facts. Some even now wish they had 
voted differently. They are both mistaken.
Politicians (and to a degree the voters) get 
the coverage they deserve. At times it appeared 
that both Leave and Remain campaign teams 
abandoned any coherent idea of  deliberative, 
policy-based argument in favour of  exaggerated 
scenarios, self-serving statistics and appeals to 
emotions and fantasies. This is part of  a longer-
term trend in political communications where 
the strategy is to destabilise the discourse while 
controlling your own message based on emotional 
appeals to voters. The damage being done to 
democratic deliberation will be long lasting and 
will get worse after the vote as the two main 
parties continue to implode.
 This critique is not just that of  an academic 
or a journalist. The Commons Treasury 
Committee also condemned both sides for the 
low standard of  campaigning. The Remainers 
wildly exaggerated the risks involved in leaving, 
while the Brexiteers brazenly misrepresented the 
cost and impact of  EU membership and its rela-
tionship to other issues such as immigration. 
 Not surprisingly, the Prime Minister found 
it difficult to convince the public that the organ-
isation that he’s been slating for years is now a 
wonderful thing. At the same time, the various 
‘charismatic’ Leave leaders failed to give a coherent 
explanation of  what will happen after June 23rd if  
we cut off  the continent. Instead they flag waved 
and dog whistled about foreign hordes.
 So what can the journalists do to shine light 
into this shade? At this point we must accept the 
limits of  media effects. Politicians as well as jour-
nalists tend to exaggerate the impact of  journal-
ism on the public. Long term it is significant but 
there is a range of  other influences on people’s 
thinking including non-mediated factors that 
swamp the power of  journalists to swing votes. 
 When the campaign started I wrote about 
how the newspapers will have less influence on the 
final outcome than some people might think because 
of  their diminished status. In this campaign, 
however, they were more important than I 
expected in helping shift the frame of  the debate 
towards issues such as immigration and generally 
encouraging the febrile mood of  lashing out at 
the status quo and risk-taking. 
If  you wish to consider how this media 
campaign has gone then don’t start with the journal-
ist or politician, ask the citizen. New LSE research 
suggested that many only made up their minds in 
the last days of  the campaign. So with such a close 
and unstable campaign the small influence of  the 
press might be significant at the margins.
 The public have plenty of  sources for 
campaign news if  they had the will, time 
and (sometimes) money. Overall, too many 
newsrooms have been distracted by the latest lines 
peddled by the campaigns, but there has been 
plenty of  good political information and debate 
out there. 
But did people bother to consume any of  this? 
The evidence is that people were interested and 
sought out information. Relatively large audiences 
tuned into the TV set-piece programmes. 
But as voter reaction after the poll suggested 
- including people Googling ‘EU referendum’ 
after the result - they may have ended up feeling 
confused because of  the contradictory claims and 
uncertain about the purpose of  the vote (“buyer’s 
remorse”). That is the nature of  this issue and the 
crudeness of  a referendum process. It is also the 
reality of  post-factual politics with the govern-
ment and opposition parties riven ideologically 
and tactically. It is messy and the media coverage 
reflected that. It is politicians that lead debates, 
not the media, and on this issue and in this 
campaign their previous parochial failure to take 
responsibility for our place in Europe is coming 
back to haunt them.
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UK newspapers and the EU Referendum: 
Brexit or Bremain?
How far do newspapers influence public opinion 
on vexed political issues, such as the Europe 
question in Britain? This is a very difficult question 
to answer definitively because causation one way 
or the other can never be proved beyond doubt. 
However, what we can establish in light of  the 
British public’s decision to leave the EU is that the 
media – and the most widely read UK newspapers 
in particular – have played a vital role in structuring 
the parameters of  the debate for many years. Senior 
politicians from all the main parties over the past 
two decades have consistently testified to having 
had to consider how their policies will ‘play’ in 
the opinion-forming press. They have long felt it 
important to rub shoulders with influential media 
magnates such as Rupert Murdoch in a bid to elicit 
his support or at least assure his acquiescence in 
new or controversial policy manoeuvres.
On the Europe issue the public has been 
fed by many quarters of  the press a solid diet 
of  anti-EU reporting, centering on an undem-
ocratic ‘Brussels’ machine subverting Britain’s 
governing institutions, British liberty and its 
way of  life. These scare stories (akin to a twenty 
year-long Project Fear of  the press’s making) have 
covered the full range, from the inflammatory to 
the mythical and the plain wrong, as the Leveson 
Inquiry pointed out. The divorce between fact and 
reality has done nothing to lessen the appeal of  
EU-bashing in Britain because there has been such 
little pushback on these stories from a political 
class unwilling to put the positive case for British 
achievements at EU level. The British public has 
been given a limited knowledge of  EU history, 
politics and policy-making from politicians, the 
press and through the general educational system, 
which has amply fed Eurosceptical narratives of  
Britain’s past, present and future outside the EU. 
Britain’s uneasy status as an ‘outsider’ within the 
EU makes the referendum outcome seem less of  a 
shock when the structuring effects of  Eurosceptic 
media coverage, combined with the abdication of  
political leadership on the question until it was too 
late, are taken into account. 
Given this long tradition of  EU-bashing in the 
UK press it was no surprise that many newspapers 
came out on the side of  Brexit before the referen-
dum: the tenor of  reporting by the Telegraph, 
Mail and Sun has long been antithetical to British 
membership of  the European project. The Express, 
moreover, was the first newspaper to launch a ‘Get 
Britain Out’ campaign as long ago as November 
2010. What was less widely predicted was that there 
would be differentiation within media groups. Rupert 
Murdoch’s Sun and Sunday Times urged Brexit, while 
the Times supported Remain. The Mail Group was 
also split, with the Mail on Sunday supporting Remain, 
in opposition to its daily stablemate. 
The differences within newspaper groups 
are interesting for two reasons. First, they reveal 
the extent to which a newspaper’s editorial line 
is driven by commercial reality as much as its 
ideology on political matters. Newspapers spend a 
good deal of  time polling their readers and clearly 
do not want to alienate core audiences. Second, 
it gives us a potential insight into the commercial 
calculations underpinning ownership positions. 
For example, Roy Greenslade’s magisterial history 
of  UK newspaper proprietorship amply demon-
strates that the Sun has always been known to 
be Murdoch’s favourite UK press outlet – his 
authentic voice, as it were. The strident nationalism 
in the Sun has been toned down for ‘establishment’ 
Times readers, where more balance has also been 
injected over the years by the inclusion of  more 
Europhile voices. This façade of  ‘balance’ in the 
Murdoch empire works to head off  criticisms 
that he is one-eyed on the European issue. Yet in 
truth Murdoch knows that the lukewarm Europe-
anism on offer in even the most EU-sympathetic 
newspapers (Times plus Independent, Guardian 
and Observer) cannot outweigh the Eurosceptic 
commentary elsewhere across the press. 
Both in terms of  breadth (judged in read-
ership numbers) and in terms of  intensity, the 
Eurosceptic press has more or less had the playing 
field to itself  for years. Thus, as the Conservative 
and Labour blood-letting begins, and analysis 
gets underway into what won the referendum for 
Brexit, the newspapers are already playing a central 
role. If  the Brexit newspapers are deemed to have 
been crucial then it should not be overlooked 
how far their professed faith in Britain is in fact a 
subtle mask for commercial imperatives. ‘Europe’ 
has become one more battleground for readership 
numbers in a declining newspaper marketplace.
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X marks the spot but the Ys have it: Referendum 
coverage as a boys’ own story 
Sometimes it’s hard to be a woman (/feminist political 
communication scholar) because most of  my time 
is spent on absences, peering into the black hole 
of  women’s silencing. Any number of  men, both 
politicians and journalists, regularly claim that this or 
that election will focus on the Mumsnet vote or, in the 
case of  the EU Referendum, that women voters will 
determine the outcome. The implication of  these pon-
tifications is that women will somehow be addressed as 
women, as if  their/our concerns, interests and ballot box 
behaviour are both biologically-determined and ho-
mogenous. Not only is this fatuous nonsense, but even 
if  it was a little bit true (for example, most of  the folks 
who campaigned against the tampon tax were probably 
women), political parties and the media make scant 
effort to find out what women, individually or severally, 
might actually want. The siren song of  ‘where are the 
women?’ has been heard as much during this campaign 
as any others although the final weeks of  the campaign 
did see an improvement in the visibility of  women 
politicians speaking on both sides of  the argument. 
The consideration of  women’s ‘specialness’ was 
exemplified by both Remain and Leave’s launch of  
femme-campaigns, with Remain’s Women IN campaign 
launched in January via an open letter to the Evening 
Standard signed by fifty “leading businesswomen, 
scientists, trade union officials and health profession-
als.” Leave’s effort, Women for Britain, was somewhat 
cynically deployed on International Women’s Day, 
fronted by UKIP’s Suzanne Evans and Priti Patel 
for the Tories, with Patel subsequently becoming the 
only woman politician who enjoyed media traction 
in the first weeks of  the campaign. Unfortunately for 
Patel, comparing herself  and the other EU refuseniks 
with the Suffragettes’ struggle did not sit well with 
Emmeline Pankhurst’s great grand-daughter, Helen, 
who demanded an apology for the (in)appropriation. 
What unites both campaigns is the strange fact that 
their respective official launches constitute their only 
significant media appearance, not so much a campaign, 
more a PR stunt. There have been a few soundbites 
from their various spokespeople since their launches 
but they do not add up to a campaign for women’s 
votes: on polling day, Women for Britain’s Faccebook 
page had a mere 1448 likes. 
By May, the domination of  a few male voices 
(Dave, Boz and Mike) and the extreme narrowness of  
the debate – it’s all about immigration, stupid – not to 
mention #allmalepanels, mansplaining and the beauty 
contest for next Tory Leader, was revealed in a Labour 
report discussed by Harriet Harman, prompting her to 
say that women were being “frozen out of  the debate” 
and that she would be making an official complaint to 
Ofcom about women’s under-representation. Labour’s 
research showed that between January and the end 
of  May, only two out of  14 commentators on BBC 
TV’s breakfast show were women as were 10 of  the 
58 politicians contributing to the Today programme 
alongside the six women out of  24 guests invited to 
chat on Good Morning Britain. This resonates exactly 
with Loughborough University Centre for Research in 
Communication and Culture’s rather excellent campaign 
coverage reports which persistently showed the margin-
alisation of  women’s voices throughout the campaign.
By early June, the parties and the media seemed 
to have taken notice of  the conspicuous and voluble 
social media critique of  the exclusionary tenor of  
the tory-boys-story and ITV’s EU debate fielded five 
women and Boris. Remain had Angela Eagle (Lab), 
Amber Rudd (Cons) and Nicola Sturgeon (SNP) and 
Leave had Andrea Leadsom (Cons) and Gisela Stuart 
(Lab). The BBC followed suit in the last televised 
(The Great) debate on 21 June with the same pair of  
women for Leave but a different line-up for Remain 
(Ruth Davidson, Leader of  the Scottish Conservatives 
and Frances O’Grady, General Secretary of  the TUC) 
bookending Sadiq Khan. The media coverage of  the 
event, at least the stories I read, was mostly gender-neu-
tral with none of  the routine trivialisation on women’s 
sartorial style. However, the Mail could not resist 
commenting on Davidson’s passion for kick-boxing 
and her recent engagement to her “partner Jennifer 
Wilson”, a level of  personal detail not provided for 
any of  the other panellists. Whilst the last week of  
the campaign did indeed render women more visible 
in terms of  these set-piece debates, general coverage 
remained a boys’ own story, with Jo Cox the most 
significant woman politician in the media spotlight for 
all the wrong reasons. We now know that xenopho-
bia won the day and her belief  that we have more in 
common than divides us has failed to persuade. We are 
the poorer for that.
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Mind the gap: the language of prejudice and the 
press omissions that led a people to the precipice
A pervasive Euroscepticism has now reached its 
zenith, drawing on a collective memory, borne 
of  the moment we chose to be a good friend of  
post-war Europe - but not part of  it. As the UK 
eventually joined, unable to influence the project’s 
direction, we have never fully understood what the 
pooling of  sovereignty nor belonging to the club 
mean. The projection of  Europe in the collective 
memory, reinforced by seldom articulated facts (by 
either politicians or press) has resulted in an ‘other’, 
based less on a grasp of  the reality and more a com-
mon-sense understanding. Neither the political class 
nor the mainstream press has ever confronted the 
cultural presuppositions of  a British past never really 
harnessed to a European future. 
Initial linguistic analysis has established a 
discursive construction, prevalent in the mainstream 
mainly right-of-centre national newspapers in the 
weeks running up to the referendum, claiming to 
“take back our country”; “regain control”; and 
divorce from Ever Closer Union, as unprecedented as 
the constitutional and democratic crisis in the UK it 
has clearly contributed to. The main conduit for the 
articulation of  the preceding notions is immigra-
tion. It is argued that never before in living memory 
have some newspapers fed the public’s hopes, fears 
and yes prejudice against Europe (and Europeans) 
to this extent. They have tapped into a selective 
collective memory, the resulting common sense pre-
suppositions and ignorance. Some newspapers have 
acted irresponsibly, have damaged our democracy 
and played a pivotal role in creating the crisis we 
now face. 
The evidence to support this position can be 
found in the high levels of  argumentation, metaphors 
and misinformation prevalent in mainstream 
newspaper discourse in the weeks before the EU 
referendum, as much prevalent in news stories as 
commentaries, despite the tenuous claim they are 
reporting the facts. For example, in The Sun’s editorial 
on June 20, the paper backed leaving the EU “partly 
because it’s a bloated, undemocratic and ruinously 
expensive political relic.” But also so MPs could 
“regain control over Britain’s borders”, so they can 
“get a grip on the spiralling rate of  immigration 
putting such a strain on wages, jobs, schools and 
hospitals”. The Sun then added a caveat, mitigating 
possible fallout, acknowledging “some on the fringes 
of  this debate have unjustly targeted migrants.” The 
Daily Mail editorial on June 20, argued: “How will he 
(Cameron) prevent the NHS and other services being 
overwhelmed if  unfettered free movement continues?
“It is argued, what is far more serious is 
what was not said about reclaiming the country’s 
economy, sovereignty and control of  immigration. 
There was plenty of  unsubstantiated argumentation 
prevalent in the right-wing and particularly popular 
newspapers, regarding immigration. None of  it (on 
initial scrutiny) addressed how, on leaving, Britain 
would be unlikely to actually curb it. Barely any of  
the coverage spoke of  how subsequent trade deals 
with Brussels would likely include free movement as 
a precondition. Instead the rhetoric fed the collec-
tive memory; nationalistic fervour; the understand-
ing of  the nation in relation to the ‘other’, Europe 
and through ellipsis, an ill-informed common sense 
understanding of  how we would get our country back, 
was left for the reader to fill the gaps. Countless 
English working class voters, often in impoverished 
parts of  the UK, were televised using this refrain. 
Within a day of  the vote, the extent to which 
they had been led to this conclusion by populist pol-
iticians and the press (without supporting evidence) 
was apparent. Brexiters were soon backtracking.
Tory MEP, Daniel Hannan said free movement 
could result in similar levels of  immigration after 
Brexit. He added: “Frankly, if  people watching think 
that they have voted and there is now going to be 
zero immigration from the EU, they are going to be 
disappointed.” Hannan also made clear there had 
been no suggestions of  changing the status of  any 
EU nationals in Britain. Leading Brexiteer, Liam 
Fox, said: “A lot of  things were said in advance of  
this referendum that we might want to think about 
again…” Boris Johnson himself  said during his 
speech after the result that Brexit, needn’t mean 
pulling up the drawbridge and that the victory for 
Farage would somehow “take the wind out of  the 
sails” of  anyone playing politics with immigration.
Few read the Foreign Affairs Committee 
analysis of  Brexit. It will be used as benchmark, 
together with fact-checking websites, to establish the 
extent of  misinformation in coverage.
It is therefore the consistent discourse of  taking 
back our country and regaining control of  immigration, 
that were established in the collective memory in the 
years prior to the campaign that facilitated the final 
result, which itself  has led to the deepest crisis this 
country has faced since the Second World War.
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‘They don’t understand us’: UK journalists’ 
challenges of reporting the EU
In the coming weeks and months journalists will be 
accused of  fuelling the toxic tone of  the referen-
dum campaigns and ultimately for being at least 
partly responsible the impending Brexit. However, 
this is too simplistic. We need to take into account 
the organisational structures they are embedded 
in, the newsroom routines and practices they have 
been socialised into and their personal relationship 
with EU officials and sources. These discursive 
practices (Fairclough, 2010) have a strong impact on 
EU reporting in UK media and can explain some 
of  the patterns we have seen in 2016. In order 
to understand media representations in the final 
news product and their interrelation with dominant 
discourses in society, social practices of  production 
need to be considered since they provide important 
insights into journalistic decision-making.
In my recently conducted interviews with UK 
journalists and EU officials several issues have 
been raised which impact on EU and EU referen-
dum coverage.
Limited staffing and resources are paired with 
time and space constraints. Journalists pointed 
out the complex nature of  the EU which does 
not lend itself  to engaging reporting, particularly 
when there is little time for explanation. In order 
to keep the audience interested, they have to tell 
a human story, more emotional than factual, to 
avoid viewers switching off. They have to address 
their audiences’ preferences which leads to a focus 
on the domestic realm and topics they are most 
interested in, such as EU migration. Addressing 
audience preferences requires journalists to avoid 
offending their audiences by too firmly advocating 
a Remain or Leave vote. Media organisations are 
businesses which need to secure their share in the 
market which will always result in tensions between 
the commercial and public purpose of  news. Also 
the BBC, although not directly dependent on 
viewer numbers, has to fulfil its duties of  providing 
information from both sides, acutely aware of  
accusations of  pro-EU bias.
Furthermore the relationship between EU 
officials and UK journalists has been mentioned as 
an obstacle to reporting in particular. In interviews, 
EU officials clearly pronounced their frustration 
with the UK based news organisations while the 
interviewed UK journalists felt similar about EU 
officials. EU officials were frustrated about the 
‘EU-bashing’ of  UK journalists and their lack of  
engagement with the processes while some UK 
journalists feel at a disadvantage compared to their 
colleagues from other member states. 
One explanation for the strained relations has 
been mentioned repeatedly by UK journalists. They 
strongly advocate a British tradition of  adver-
sarial journalism. Although they see their role as 
informers they also emphasised their duty to scru-
tinise the EU, a duty which they feel is in conflict 
with a more consensual EU system. Consequently, 
according to UK journalists, EU officials mistake 
their tradition of  journalism as ‘EU bashing’ and 
are less likely to provide them with useful, up-to-
date information.
EU officials evaluated the situation differently. 
They stated that they were trying to inform UK 
news workers by providing them with the same 
services as anyone else. However, they did feel 
that their information was regularly distorted, 
often deliberately so, describing UK journalism as 
‘EU-bashing’. Although they emphasised jour-
nalism’s duty to scrutinize the powerful, they also 
stressed its responsibility to create supranational 
debate and bring the EU closer to citizens – a re-
sponsibility UK journalists opposed. They felt this 
was the EU’s own responsibility.
One example of  how those differences impact 
collaboration between organisations and EU 
officials is the Financial Times. The FT is regarded 
by UK journalists as the EU’s ‘pet’ which is has 
privileged access to information. Without hesita-
tion, one EU official admitted he rather works with 
the FT than with some other UK news organisa-
tions, since they have established good contacts 
and represent the EU ‘more fairly’.
These differences in understanding the role of  
journalism but also understanding each other has 
implications for reporting the EU and reporting 
during the referendum campaign. It is too simplis-
tic to blame the development on journalists alone. 
It needs to be understood within the context of  
practices of  production, which in turn are not 
detached from the society they are embedded in. 
A more nuanced picture is needed in order to 
understand EU coverage in UK media. This brief  
discussion only takes into account some of  the 
aspects which need to be considered. Increased 
frustration on both sides in combination with 
a lack of  resources for journalists and market 
pressures requiring news organisations to address 
audience preferences concerning the EU, may have 
formed an obstacle to ‘fair’ reporting of  the EU. 
The domestic realm has been given priority over 
the European realm and framing of  the EU has 
been generally negative (e.g. Anderson & Weymouth, 
1999; Hawkins, 2012). Since UK citizens have very 
little direct exposure to the EU, these persistent 
patterns have reinforced distrust and Euroscepti-
cism over years. 
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Bending over backwards: the BBC and the 
Brexit campaign
BBC journalists, under their Editorial Guidelines, 
have an obligation to provide balanced coverage, but 
what precisely does balance mean? The BBC has 
long accepted that when reporting climate change it 
does not have to seek a balance between the views 
of  most of  the world’s scientists and those who deny 
climate change. But there was no similar judgement 
made during the EU referendum campaign resulting 
in coverage that was, unintentionally, misleading. The 
problem was that virtually every BBC radio and televi-
sion news bulletins that I heard or watched contained 
a format of  ‘balanced’ news that was stupefyingly pre-
dictable. A claim by the Remain or Leave campaign was 
automatically contradicted by a rebuttal from the other 
side. First, it made for tedious listening and viewing, 
second, it probably left much of  the audience confused 
and third left them vulnerable to simplistic slogans e.g. 
£350 million going to the EU instead of  the NHS.
Let me offer three of  the worst (and hence most 
memorable) examples of  this phoney balance. First, 
just one day before the vote 1,280 business leaders 
signed a letter to The Times backing UK membership of  
the EU. Within this very headline the BBC ‘balanced’ 
the letter with a quote from one - repeat one - entre-
preneur, Sir James Dyson, saying he was in favour of  
Leave. Dyson’s support for Leave had already been 
broadcast on the 11th June hence his statement on the 
eve of  polling was hardly ‘news’. Nor was there any 
mention, in the more extensive web report of  Dyson 
opposing The Times signatories of  the fact that he had 
moved his entire business not just out of  the UK but 
out of  the EU, to Malaysia, a background fact highly 
relevant to the overall story.
Similarly when on the 20th June ten noble-prize 
winning economists warned of  the dangers to the 
British economy of  a Brexit the BBC ‘balanced’ this 
story with a quote from one economist – Patrick 
Minford, as they had done two days before, with a 
story of  the IMF issuing a similar warning, and again 
the previous month when an Ipsos Mori poll found 
that 88% of  UK economists were against Brexit. As 
eminent as Professor Minford might be, didn’t the 
absence of  any other leading economists supporting 
the Leave campaign ring even the tiniest of  alarm bells?
A third example of  phoney balance came on the 
13th June when the former Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown entered the debate urging Labour supporters to 
vote to remain. That story led the morning radio and 
TV bulletins but by mid-morning the BBC was leading, 
not on Brown’s speech, but on the Leave campaign’s 
rebuttal. This rebuttal was followed by a summary of  
what Brown had to say followed by clip from leading 
Leave campaigner Liam Fox saying why Labour 
supporters should reject Mr Brown’s advice. There is 
always pressure on broadcast journalists to keep finding 
a new top to a running story but editorial judgement 
is also required and in this case it was plainly lacking. 
Roger Mosey, the BBC’s former Editorial Director 
recently reported on a conversation with a senior BBC 
presenter who observed: “Balance has too often been 
taken to mean broadcasting televised press releases 
... Instead of  standing back and assessing arguments, 
we have been broadcasting he says/she says campaign 
pieces, which rarely shed any light on anything.” 
There was also a problem with campaign visuals. 
Who can forget the image and slogan on the Leave 
campaign battle bus? A claim that even Leave cam-
paigners have subsequently said should not be taken 
too literally. 
Rick Bailey, the BBC’s Chief  Political Advisor, 
speaking on Radio 4’s Feedback programme implicitly 
accepted that the £350 million claim could not be 
justified. But when asked how TV and Radio news 
audiences would know this, he referred a Radio 4 
programme about statistics – More or Less – that 
despite its quality, gets a fraction of  the audiences for 
BBC News. So how ‘balanced’ is it to allow political 
leaders to appear in front of  their own slogans, when 
this involves a palpably untrue statement being shown 
day-in-day out? If  the campaigners were only prepared 
to make themselves available in front of  the bus then 
surely the correct editorial decision would have been 
not to broadcast the footage but instead, to summarize 
what the campaigners were saying that day.
The other aspect of  BBC balance that gives 
concern has been the attempt to ‘balance’ so-called elite 
opinion with that of  the ‘common man or woman’. 
This has entailed two aspects of  coverage worthy of  
criticism. First, there has been a tedious over-reliance 
on the ‘vox pop’ - the quick soundbite from a member 
of  the public that gives the appearance of  being 
representative but is probably atypical. And in the edit 
suite the vox pop of  the man or woman denouncing 
all politicians as “liars” stands a far better chance of  
being used than more nuanced comments. This is 
dangerous ground. Roger Mosey refers to how these 
incidents then become amplified by being the focus of  
the BBC news reports of  the programmes. He gives 
the example of  a student who had criticised the Prime 
Minister as “waffling” being “elevated to the status of  a 
national seer” and added “segments that discuss policy 
are ditched in favour of  having as many “zingers” as 
possible in the News at Ten.”
So what’s the answer – one-sided partial coverage? 
No it’s simpler than that. What I am suggesting is that 
instead of  interpreting balance as meaning “he says, she 
says”, editorial judgement would be better employed by 
balancing a positive Remain story, not with a rebuttal 
from Leave but with a positive Leave story, and vice 
versa. It might make for more work but it should also 
ensure a better informed electorate, more interesting 
viewing and, maybe who knows, even bigger audiences 
for news.
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On the morning of  the 1966 World Cup final the 
Daily Mail wrote: “If  Germany beat us at Wembley 
this afternoon at our national sport, we can always 
point out to them we have recently beaten them 
twice at theirs.” If  anyone had been in any doubt, 
football had become, as George Orwell wrote, war 
minus the shooting. Since that point the Boys from 
’66 and their victory have been hardwired into 
English national consciousness and the England 
men’s football team has become a metaphor for the 
country - a barometer for its health.
Due to the Brexit referendum in the United 
Kingdom, the Euro 2016 football tournament was 
played during a time of  heightened awareness and 
reference to what it meant to be English, both in 
the context of  the UK and Europe. The narrow 
margin of  the result did nothing much to answer the 
question while the ensuing political and economic 
chaos kickstarted a debate about the state of  the 
nation. The coverage of  the country’s men’s football 
team during the tournament against this domestic 
political backdrop can therefore give us important 
insights because in modern societies sport is an 
important part of  identity formation on both indi-
vidual and collective levels making it a key area for 
cultural negotiation.
Benedict Anderson defined a nation as an 
“imagined political community”. This perception 
of  a unique national community is created through 
a common language, the education system and 
the mass media. To an extent this shared culture 
is predicated on a set of  traditions which have 
come to define the nation. Sport is key among 
them; one that Eric Hobsbawm argues is ‘uniquely 
effective’ in instilling feelings of  national belonging. 
Events like the Olympics, the World Cup and the 
European Football Championships provide key 
arena in which national identity can be articulated. 
So a nation’s football team, which is adorned with 
national symbols (be it the English Lion or the 
Welsh dragon) and begins each match singing the 
national anthem, has become a powerful symbol 
of  the nation. As Hobsbawm argues: “the imagined 
community of  millions seems more real as a team of  
eleven named people”.
The emotive drama provided by football 
(indeed by all sports, but in England football 
dominates) means that the press doesn’t just report 
on England games and relay their results. Instead 
they play a crucial role in producing a shared set 
of  traditions and expectations for the imagined 
community that is England. Never was this more 
clearly articulated than by the Daily Mirror in the 
run up to England’s Euro 96 semi-final against 
Germany. The paper declared “football war” on 
Germany in a front page which used pictures of  
then-players Stuart Pearce and Paul Gascoigne in 
army helmets along with the headline “ACHTUNG 
SURRENDER: For you Fritz, ze Euro 96 Champi-
onship is over”. This ‘us’ and ‘them’ rhetoric infused 
with military metaphors shows no sign of  abating 
20 years down the line. Two days before England 
played Russia in their opening game of  Euro 2016, 
The Sun launched a “VARMARDA”, led by Jamie 
Vardy lookalike Lee Chapman in Admiral Nelson 
garb, to challenge a Russian submarine in the Straits 
of  Dover.
If  the national team is a metaphor for the 
nation then the manager and the players are national 
ambassadors. The loss to ‘little’ Iceland, the team 
with a ‘big’ heart has been framed by a focus on the 
man, or men who let the ‘great’ nation of  England 
down. In the initial aftermath of  defeat there was 
no analysis of  the long-term structural failings that 
beset the national team, instead England’s ‘misfiring 
millionaires’ were humiliated by ‘minnows’ Iceland 
in a defeat branded by The Sun as “CODSWAL-
LOP”. Following Roy Hodgson’s resignation, the 
Daily Mirror was moved to opine: “In keeping with 
recent events, an England without a functioning 
government, opposition, nor any future plan, no 
longer has a manager for its national football team 
either.” This provided a mirror for the post-Brex-
it criticisms of  the politicians at the front of  the 
papers: “YOU IDIOT, GEORGE” screamed The 
Sun at Chancellor George Osborne, while the Daily 
Mirror labelled “No-show BoJo [a] political pygmy”.
Over the last 50 years, English national identity 
as articulated by the football press has been built 
of  a range of  key signifiers that both draw on and 
feed into the wider articulation of  the imagined 
community. These include glorious victories of  the 
past both on and off  the pitch to the bunglers now 
betraying the nation. It is a narrative that, like the 
tactics used by the team, looks increasingly tired, 
confused and outdated.
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It’s the ‘primary definers’, stupid!
Like many a disbelieving, frustrated, angry and bereft 
“Remainer” (the 48%) I signed the petition. I did so not 
because I favour another Referendum (I think them a 
terrible, divisive, binary means of  seeking and claiming 
democratic legitimacy). Nor did I sign because I have 
any hope that the current result can be overturned. 
Nor, I should say, do I think the result ought to be over-
turned. Such action might very well finally fracture our 
already weak democracy and lead to social upheaval. 
But sign I did. I did so because, in our unrepresenta-
tive system, it felt like an act of  solidarity with other 
like-minded citizens and with migrant communities 
now living in fear and facing increasing levels of  intimi-
dation and outright racist attack. Perhaps less impor-
tantly, I signed as a means to display that I am firmly 
one of  the 48%. In the midst of  a personal ontological 
crisis, amidst the growing social, political and economic 
crisis, signing the petition became one of  the means 
by which I could register my anger, bewilderment and 
utter dismay at the result. 
But over the course of  the last 6 days, I have been 
told to “accept the result”, because, after all “that’s 
democracy”. However, I remain frustrated by such 
calls to “respect our democracy”. Democracy exercised 
on the basis of  misinformation is not democracy, 
it is a corruption of  it. The “Brexit” campaign had 
the hallmarks of  a mis-selling scandal, “Take Back 
Control” becomes the “democracy” equivalent of  
mis-selling PPI.
Media scholars are of  course well-versed in 
the theories that our politics is laced with, or even 
structured around misinformation. That it may seem 
hackneyed, does not though invalidate the claim. 
Misinformation ensures that the political class and 
fourth estate effectively works to disenfranchise a mass 
of  the population. To reduce democracy to merely 
placing one’s cross on a piece of  paper is simplistic 
at best, false at worst. Democratic empowerment can 
only be achieved if  that cross is made with a degree of  
knowledge to hand. However, in the case of  the EU 
Referendum, such knowledge is significantly blurred, 
or even withheld from the very people “exercising 
their democratic right(s)”. The entire campaign(s), 
both Leave and Remain – but particularly the Leave 
campaign – seemed, not only to run on, but glory in 
reductive simplicities. 
Post-result, when the lies on which the Leave 
Campaign were built came tumbling down around us, 
(turns out, those experts dismissed by Michael Gove 
may have had a point) I have also been told “Politicians 
lie…we all know that”. While this may be true, it is 
hardly a robust defence of  democracy. As alarmingly, 
in the course of  the same debate, it was explained “…
we accept the premise that politicians are going to lie 
in order to achieve their end goal”. But we must reject 
that as the frame, as the starting – and end – point. We 
might suspect that they lie, but to accept it is too passive 
a response. 
The problem with “knowing” and passively 
“accepting” that politicians lie is what it does to us. It 
cultivates cynicism. Hearing the lies but accepting them 
as “the way things are” undermines our already fragile 
and unrepresentative system. It leaves “us” - the voters 
- with misinformation on which to base our decisions; 
and it leaves “them” – the elected – with a “mandate” 
to do with as they please. Its logical end-point is disen-
franchisement.
But if  politicians lie, how do they get away with 
it? To understand this, we must examine the relation-
ship, the nexus between politics and media. Above 
– referring to politicians – I used the term “withheld”, 
but this is a problematic term. Of  course we may 
suspect deliberate misinformation, deliberate malfea-
sance, deliberate “withholding”, but is the same true 
of  our media, of  journalists, editors and owners? Even 
without ethnographic or political economy research, 
by using a range of  well-established methods, we 
can assess the ways in which journalism operates, its 
practices, its forms, and crucially, its relationships to 
power. Or to use Tuchman’s phrasing, to assess the 
extent to which news is the “ally of  legitimated institu-
tions.” From this, we can draw some conclusions. 
To quote Stuart Hall et al 
“In the main, journalists position themselves so 
that they have access to institutions which generate 
a useful volume of  reportable activity at regular 
intervals.”
What emerges, we might call: 
“… professional ideological rules in journalism. 
The important point is that these professional rules 
give rise to the practice of  ensuring that media state-
ments are, wherever possible, grounded in ‘objective’ 
and ‘authoritative’ statements from ‘accredited’ sources. 
This means constantly turning to accredited repre-
sentatives of  major social institutions … Journalists, in 
attempting to fulfil ‘public interest’ aims and present 
authoritative accounts, purposively seek out those 
who already appear knowledgeable, authoritative or 
representative ... as such they reinforce as well as reflect 
power imbalances by awarding such ‘primary definers’ 
greater visibility and legitimacy” 
Though written thirty-five years ago, the clarity 
and accuracy still resonates. To paraphrase (and bas-
tardize) a well-worn truism. “It’s the ‘Primary definers’, 
Stupid”. The “Primary definers” primarily define the 
terms, the frames, the discourse. Who were the most 
high-profile primary definers of  the (two) Leave 
campaigns? Gove, Farage, Johnson. Granted authority 
by way of  location in, or proximity to institutions of  
power. Over the course of  the campaign, these three 
primary definers gained legitimacy by their status, 
they were reported on as legitimate social and political 
actors; what they said, mattered, and what they said, at 
important points, turned out to be false. 
When the (necessary) complexity of  politics is 
reduced to slogans, and when even those slogans turn 
out to be false and undeliverable, calls to “accept” that 
politicians lie, and that “That’s democracy!” ring a little 
hollow.
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Brexit has come as a shock to many people – 
including those who voted for it. It reveals the 
scars, we are told, of  a deeply divided nation. An 
election like no other. But referenda are not normal 
elections. As a snap choice of  this or that they 
bring to the fore fears and anxieties while offering 
solutions that are never as simple as either/or. To 
begin to explain what has happened we need to 
bring context and history to bear. One thing we 
have known for some time is that inequality has 
increased. As inequality has increased so social 
mobility has fallen. As the poor have got poorer so 
they have had less and less influence over policies 
and politicians and feel ever more cut adrift from 
politics, left without the dignity of  being able to 
influence the making of  their own history. 
The last decade has also been marked by 
public manifestations of  dissent – mass demon-
strations against student fees, public sector strikes 
and riots, the Occupy movement – protest is now 
more common than ever, but rarely taken notice 
of  by those who govern. Functions of  the state 
that once were public have been handed over 
to the private sector and then judged solely on 
economic grounds. Anti-trade union legislation 
has hollowed out the ability of  workers to have 
any effective representation over falling wages 
and facilitated ever more insecure employment. 
Welfare services and public investments have 
been diminished while corporate prowess gains 
in cock-sure confidence through deregulation. 
Neoliberalism has built a structure of  feeling that 
people are dispensable, that publics don’t need to 
be listened to.
So the tag line for the Leave campaign – 
‘Let’s Take Back Control’ – speaks to a very real 
disaffection that this democracy doesn’t work 
for the vast majority of  its members. Crouch has 
famously termed our current democratic decay 
as a continuing process of  dissolution towards 
‘post-democracy’, a state where ‘the forms of  
democracy remain fully in place’, yet ‘politics and 
government are increasingly slipping back into the 
control of  privileged elites in the manner charac-
teristic of  pre-democratic times’. 
Forgotten publics
When publics are abandoned, when their voices no 
longer matter and their identities are demolished 
through economic inequality, precarity and non-rec-
ognition, they lose faith in the political institutions 
that are supposed to represent them. And they see 
a political system that is entangled with a neoliberal 
practice - forms of  power detached from authority 
and from responsibility to those left behind, particu-
larly in periods of  economic crisis.
So it is possible to see the Brexit vote as a 
desperate plea for change; a bid to turn politics 
from something that is done to us into doing 
something for ourselves. Is it any surprise then 
that in the pursuit of  reassurance and solidar-
ity in the face of  economic insecurity, that for 
some life takes on a sinister and resentful white 
nationalism – us against them – a convenient 
xenophobic rhetoric peddled by the three white 
men of  Johnson, Gove and Farage all too willing 
to feed a tabloid frenzy. British newspapers were 
overwhelmingly in favour of  Brexit, with the Mail, 
Telegraph, Express and Star accounting for four 
times as many readers and anti-EU stories as their 
pro-remain rivals. 
The fact-checking pro-Remain website In 
Facts run by a group of  editors, made complaints 
to IPSO against 20 pro-Brexit stories in the 
national press that are mostly concerned with in-
accurate and distorted stories about the numbers 
of  EU migrants coming to Britain and their 
impact on the UK. Only 5 of  these false stories 
have so far been corrected but even then the cor-
rections are never given the same prominence as 
the original article. The misleading headlines and 
sensationalist reporting are nothing new – this 
is a discourse that emanates from a longstanding 
Eurosceptic press that has campaigned against 
Brussels for years. And while research tells us 
that the media’s influence resides in telling us 
what to think about rather than telling us what to 
think, we also know that most people consume 
news from sources that largely reinforce their 
views. When views go unchallenged they gain in 
popular credibility. This begins to explain research 
undertaken in 2014 by Ipsos Mori that mapped 
popular perceptions against reality. According to 
their survey the British public think that one in 
5 British people are Muslim when in reality it is 
one in twenty and that 24% of  the population are 
immigrants when the official figure is 13%. 
If  you were ever in any doubt that media 
reform is needed in the UK to support 
something approximating democracy, the 
reporting of  the Leave campaign surely gives 
you your answer. When newspapers lie to bring 
about referendum results and the regulator is 
not prepared to stop them, the consequences are 
socially and politically catastrophic.
Brexit: inequality, the media and the 
democratic deficit 
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Why facts did matter in the campaign
Knowing the outcome of  the referendum, it is 
both tempting as well as wrong to conceive of  
a simple narrative of  why one side won and the 
other lost. Moreover, given the narrowness of  the 
result with only 1 in 10 voters tilting the balance, 
one can easily exaggerate the influence of  any 
particular factor. 
Nonetheless, I argue that the acceptance of  
what I call evidential and causal claims played 
a crucial role in supporting or undermining 
dominant narratives about the EU during the 
campaign and may play a key role in determining 
what happens next as the UK appears to enter a 
constitutional crisis. 
This may appear counter-intuitive as the Leave 
campaign won despite being faced with strong 
expert critiques of  its claims about, for instance, 
the positive economic prospects of  the UK outside 
the EU or Turkey joining in the EU soon. Leave 
drove around the country with a prominent claim 
on its bus that was manifestly false, whilst Michael 
Gove said “people had enough of  experts”
Yet, all successful arguments, narratives and 
frames need to be rooted in facts held to be true 
and consistency of  argument with fact is crucial 
to credibility of  advocates. Evidential beliefs are 
directly accessible or observable information, such 
as the legal powers each EU institution has or UK 
government policy on Turkish accession to the EU. 
Causal beliefs relate to analytical judgements about 
past, present or future dynamics, for instance, 
claims that the EU-27 would be unwilling to give 
the UK access to the Single Market whilst opting 
out of  freedom of  movement. 
The Leave campaigns central slogan of  
“taking back control” from a corrupt, failing, 
alien, oppressive and anti-democratic Brussels was 
successful with many audiences, because it was 
rooted in thousands of  evidential and causal claims 
made over a long period of  time about “Brussels”, 
especially in the written press. The issue here 
is not solely about the predominant “anti-EU 
bias” during the campaign itself, but the effects 
of  negative press coverage of  the EU on collec-
tive beliefs over decades. While other European 
countries also know Euroscepticism, Britain is 
unique in the nature of  its media coverage of  
European integration.
The many hundreds of  Euromyths about 
unelected bureaucrats envisaged bans on loved 
British foodstuffs and customs, reports about 
Britain being isolated as other countries gang-up 
on it, the lack of  coverage of  MEPs doing their 
legislative job, supported an overarching narrative 
of  the EU being all powerful, Britain being without 
a say and friends, and EU institutions unaccount-
able. Some of  these claims had a grain of  truth 
in them, but the overwhelming majority has been 
at best misleading and often manifestly false. 
Whilst television coverage has been perceived as 
considerably less biased and more trusted, it was 
not proactive to educate citizens about the EU.
Successive governments have contributed to 
these beliefs by claiming any economic and political 
successes for themselves and blaming Brussels 
for uncomfortable outcomes. We know since the 
Leveson inquiry how successive Prime-Ministers felt 
severely constrained to stand-up to the power of  the 
Eurosceptic press and their owners’ editorial agendas. 
The rejection of  the case made by an over-
whelming majority of  elite actors points partly to 
a source credibility issue affecting some of  the 
leading figures, particularly Cameron, but also 
Corbyn. However, more importantly the Remain 
campaign started from a huge “deficit” in public 
knowledge about the nature of  the EU, its powers 
and the UK role within it. There are natural limits 
to how much the Remain side could to do to 
overcome deeply ingrained views about the EU, 
but there is little evidence that they tried, and some 
‘in-‘campaigners such as Labour leader Jeremy 
Corbyn, endorsed the “leave” critique of  the EU as 
undemocratic and unaccountable without specify-
ing the reasons or being clear about the remedies. 
Two lessons to draw from this: First, those 
who are interested in the UK forging a constructive 
and friendly relationship with the EU, will need to 
invest more in educating the public about what the 
EU is and how it actually works and, perhaps more 
importantly, do not let inaccurate reporting and the 
press ownership creating it go without challenge. 
Otherwise, persuasive positive frames and narra-
tives about the EU will struggle to resonate.
Secondly, profound questions about the 
linkage between democracy, political promises and 
knowledge arise: does it matter on what grounds 
votes are cast in an advisory issue referendum as 
compared to general elections? Does it matter if  
citizens vote against their best interests as a result 
of  accepting weak, misleading or false claims? 
Does it matter if  promises made by the Leave 
campaign are withdrawn just days after the vote or 
evaporate when faced with economic and political 
reality post-Brexit? 
Politics will show.
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The referendum campaign was not just conveyed 
by our media; it was constituted by them. This 
was not just a matter of  media logic applied to 
politics, but of  cultural conventions forming the 
narrative and content of  the campaign. It was an 
exercise in popular culture and the popular imagi-
nation, rather than in political communication and 
political persuasion. 
The big show-downs were pure showbusiness. 
The BBC staged the ‘Great Debate’ in the Wembley 
Arena, in front of  an audience of  6000, with the 
protagonists projected onto big screens, as if  they 
were rock stars performing at the nearby Stadium. 
Channel 4’s ‘Europe: The Final Debate’ (the Final 
Frontier?) was promoted with the promise of  
contributions from June Sarpong, Nish Kumar, 
Rick Astley, Delia Smith, Mike Read, Theo Paphitis, 
among other media celebrities.
The viciousness of  the exchanges in the debates 
and elsewhere channeled the vindictiveness of  X 
Factor judges and Big Brother House contestants. 
Or aspired to the quaint farces of  an Ealing Comedy 
as Nigel Farage and Bob Geldof  bellowed at each 
other across the Thames. 
Then there was the matter of  ‘expertise’, an 
idea either ambiguously advocated or darkly suspect. 
A Remain leaflet sent days before the vote boldly 
quoted ‘Ian’ on the front: ‘I won’t let anybody else 
decide my future’. On the other side, the third of  
three points pronounced ‘The Weight of  Evidence 
is Overwhelming’, and in support it read: “From 
Richard Branson to JK Rowling, from Stephen 
Hawking to Alan Sugar … all agree that we are 
better off  IN”. 
For the Leavers, experts were – for the most part 
- to be derided, their expertise attributed to self-in-
terest or some darker forces. Conspiracy theories, the 
stuff  of  so many Hollywood movies, were routinely 
deployed to discount unpalatable evidence. Experts 
were all in the pay of  a Bond villain (or worse, if  
Michael Gove was to be believed). 
While the Remainers dabbled in another 
Hollywood myth: the imminent apocalypse, the 
Leavers conjured up an idyllic island of  peace, 
plenty and populist sovereignty. One Leave 
political broadcast about the NHS portrayed 
two scenarios: one in which an elderly patient is 
made to wait because of  all the freeloaders from 
Europe were being treated ahead of  her; the other 
where the waiting room was almost deserted, and 
the treatment was fast and attentive. The images 
and the plot were identical to a Labour election broadcast in 1992, where two young girls were 
being treated for the same complaint, and one went 
privately and the other depended on the NHS. Just 
as Nigel Farage’s ‘Breaking Point’ poster recycled 
both Nazi propaganda and Saatchi and Saatachi’s 
Labour’s Not Working.
All campaigns are narratives (as the creator 
of  Harry Potter pointed out in a blog about the 
Referendum; what matters is the genre of  the 
narrative. Politics has been dismissed in the past as 
soap opera – a benign image of  families at odds 
within and without (YouGov asked people how 
TV characters might vote: the Vicar of  Dibley led 
the list of  Remainers; Jim Royle the Leavers. This 
campaign itself  conjured up less parochial visions. 
At times, it came closer to Game of  Thrones. 
As such, it was a very unmusical campaign. 
Much mockery was made of  the Leave campaign’s 
attempt to organize a concert in support of  its 
cause. The best they could muster, according to the Mirror, was ‘three-quarters of  Bucks Fizz and 
an Elvis impersonator’.  The Scottish referendum, 
by contrast, was more tuneful, although the songs 
belonged mostly to the independence cause. For 
Better Together, as for the EU debate, there was no 
unifying national image to set to music. Maybe it’s 
hard to write catchy songs about the single market 
or the virtues of  a points-based immigration system. 
All of  this might be seen as trivial footnotes 
to the campaign. It might, though, be symptomatic 
of  a marked change in political discourse. It has 
become coarser, but not because ‘we’ have become 
coarser, but because of  the way experience has 
replaced research as the currency of  truth, because 
identity has become the source of  value (cosmo-
politanism vs community), and because political 
principles have been reconfigured and reconstituted 
as popular cultural tastes and imaginaries. 
Less a soap opera, more a fantasy drama?
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The rhetoric of the EU Referendum campaign
The referendum campaign was a long time coming. 
Approximately 26 years, in fact. This is because 
the Conservative Party have been at loggerheads 
over how to manage the UK’s relationship with 
the European Union since Margaret Thatcher was 
deposed. It was an important point in laying the 
foundations for Conservative disunity, as Europe 
ended up contributing towards her demise. In 
1990, Geoffrey Howe resigned over how her 
attitude had made dealing with the EU almost 
impossible. His often over quoted line symbolised 
that attitude: ‘It is rather like sending your opening 
batsmen to the crease only for them to find, the 
moment the first balls are bowled, that their bats 
have been broken before the game by the team 
captain.’ Weeks later, Thatcher was gone, and the 
Tory Party was traumatised. 
Subsequently, Thatcher’s departure and the 
grievances over Europe undermined party unity over 
the course of  John Major’s premiership, and when 
they returned to opposition, it remained a constant 
theme. In 2001, it was there during Hague’s election 
campaign where, he argued ‘talk about Europe 
and they call you extreme. Talk about tax and they 
call you greedy. Talk about crime and they call you 
reactionary. Talk about immigration and they call 
you racist; talk about your nation and they call you 
Little Englanders’. And in 2005, the longstanding 
hostility was again present, embodied by the ‘are 
you thinking what we’re thinking’ posters which led 
the Conservatives message on anti-immigration. It 
took three defeats in a row before they were ready 
to listen to David Cameron’s argument that they 
should talk about something the voters care about 
and should stop ‘banging on about Europe’. With 
the issues unresolved, they did.
Reflecting on the rhetoric of  the referendum 
campaign itself, the Vote Leave side emerged victori-
ous by positioning their arguments in long-standing 
assumptions about how the UK was being mistreat-
ed by the EU. Immigration, loss of  sovereignty, 
expense of  membership, and a growing sense of  a 
detached liberal intelligentsia that failed to under-
stand the plight faced by the poorest in society or 
the issues of  a cultural shift in the UK. Contrasting 
this, the Remain side sought to highlight the benefits 
of  access to the single market, fiscal stability, the 
free movement of  people and ideas, and also the 
potential risk to the economy by withdrawing from 
the EU. These distinct rhetorical positions can be 
analysed using the Aristotelean modes of  persuasion 
which are pathos, logos and ethos. 
Rhetorically, the Leave side used appeals to 
pathos whilst the Remain side relied more upon 
logos-driven arguments. This significant difference 
framed the kind of  arguments both sides would 
use. For example, by appealing to pathos the Leave 
side were able to use fear of  immigration and the 
potential risks of  Turkey joining the European 
Union to instil a sense of  dread of  the future. Aided 
by a sympathetic media, the Leave side were well po-
sitioned to mould their narrative during the debates 
and through sympathetic tabloids. Contrasting 
this, the Remain side used logos by highlighting the 
economic benefits of  immigration, the unlikeliness 
of  an immediate application from Turkey to join the 
EU, and that the UK gains considerable social and 
economic benefits from membership. So, why did 
the Leave side win the argument?
Put simply, the Leave side appealed success-
fully to the third of  Aristotle’s rhetorical devices, 
namely ethos. This concerns character and credi-
bility. Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage construct a 
persona that seems to be likable and open, whilst 
constructing David Cameron and others such as 
John Major and Tony Blair represented a distant 
establishment. The premise surrounding this rhe-
torical strategy concerns convincing the audience 
(or voter) that their background and abilities reflect 
their own. In the case of  Leave they argued that 
understood and sympathised with the voters and 
their concerns. Given the greater likelihood of  the 
older sections of  the electorate to vote, the Leave 
side sought to reflect the concerns of  the ‘baby 
boomer’ generation. Thus, arguing that the EU 
is a distant force that undermines British identity 
and that immigration has swamped the UK with 
alien customs and/or ideas. Contrasting this, the 
Remain side sought to articulate a more positive 
message targeted at the potential opportunities for 
the ‘Millennials’. However, given their hesitation to 
vote, this strategy proved problematic. As a conse-
quence, the Leave side were able to appeal to ethos 
more than the Remain side and to a greater number 
of  the electorate.
On reflection, there are a number of  rhetorical 
strategies that had been employed by both sides 
which can and do explain the outcome. Remain’s 
appeals to logos were designed to highlight the 
benefits of  the status quo, whilst Leave’s use of  
pathos sought to demonstrate the dangers of  the EU 
and its ongoing threat. Ultimately, however, it was 
the successful appeals to pathos, combined with ethos 
that rhetorically swung it for Leave. 
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In our mediated democracy, it has become a truism 
to point to the demise of  traditional methods of  
political communication. The public meetings, the 
speeches from the stump, even the debates about 
issues of  the day in the pub among ‘ordinary folk’ 
were deemed a thing of  the past.
Even when traditional methods were used 
– most notably, with John Major on his soap box - 
they were held almost exclusively for transmission 
through the electronic and printed media. ‘Here is 
our leader, meeting the people’, while a wider view 
would have shown a diminutive figure surrounded 
by the massed banks of  cameras and microphones. 
In other words, these events were not for direct 
public engagement but were part of  the new 
mediated democracy.
Once again, that mediated democracy let the 
people down during the EU Referendum. The 
newspapers, as they did in the last two elections, 
had a dreadful campaign, with both sides peddling 
lies, half-lies and doom-laden warnings of  what a 
vote either way would do. Broadcast media were 
little better, their idea of  balance being to let the 
big guns slug it out and then pointing you in the 
direction of  a website where you could ‘reality 
check’ or ‘fact check’.  
Indeed, voters repeatedly cried out for some 
‘facts’ or at least some considered analysis of  the 
possibilities. Of  course, the ‘facts’ were disputable, 
but they got personality politics of  the worst kind. 
Not a single campaigner has a kind word to say 
about the nature of  the two campaigns, including 
their own.
So, the Referendum debate was characterised 
by the type of  name-calling and wild claims that 
people say turns them away from politics. Paradox-
ically, the only major politician who didn’t make ex-
aggerated claims for their position, Jeremy Corbyn, 
is now under intense pressure to resign, largely for 
his failure to crank up the hyperbole for Remain. 
There was one glorious exception in the 
political public sphere. I took part in a number of  
public debates, as a chair and as a panel member, 
and all the best points came from the floor. These 
debates were also lively but malice-free, a refresh-
ing change from the tactics of  our political elites.
That same willingness to debate was 
evidenced in the shop queues, pubs and cafes I 
inhabited. Sitting in the sun outside a pub in the 
Staffordshire market town of  Leek a few weeks 
ago, five outside tables featuring a broad selection 
of  views, argued quietly and without rancour. I’ve 
never seen this before. Traditional party politics 
is out of  bounds for public debate by the British, 
along with sex and religion.
There appeared to be no such inhibitions 
during this campaign. People asked each other for 
advice and actually listened to what was being said. 
Many minds were changed by persuasive argument. 
Sadly, what we have seen since the result was 
declared is more worrying. Minorities on both 
sides have abandoned any attempt at reconcil-
iation. Remainers call Brexiters ‘racists’, and in 
return are called ‘traitors’. Racist insults and 
daubed walls present a disturbing picture of  a 
totally divided nation.
This is not just a response from a small 
number of  extremist idiots; their bile is being fed 
by the language of  some our supposedly educated 
commentators who are equally guilty. The Ant and 
Dec of  ‘serious’ political commentary, Andrew 
Pierce of  the Mail and Kevin Maguire of  the 
Mirror, traded scowls and childish insults on Sky 
News in the aftermath of  the result. ‘Loser, loser’, 
chanted Pierce. No wonder the public regards our 
political classes with scorn.
But for at least a few brief  and glorious weeks, 
I saw evidence of  a rebirth of  the supposedly 
now totally mediated Habermasian public sphere, 
as the public in coffee houses and inns engaged 
in informed discussion about the key issue of  my 
political lifetime. It was wonderful while it lasted.
A (very) brief period of Habermasian bliss
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The toxicity of discourse: reflections on UK 
political culture following the EU Referendum
The EU Referendum campaign has been widely crit-
icised as one of  the most divisive, ugly and corrosive 
campaigns in modern British history, the (unin-
tended) consequences of  which promise to shape 
political culture in the UK for some time to come. 
On the morning of  24 June, once victory had 
been achieved, Michael Gove characterised the Ref-
erendum as being about ‘one big question: should 
we leave the political structures of  the European 
Union?’ His deliberately narrow formulation here 
presents a sterile reduction of  the vote, one which 
denies the complex emotions, mythologies and 
contradictions at play during this decisive moment in 
political culture and history. Gove’s stripped-down 
‘question’ prompted a personal reflection for me 
on how, in fact, the campaign had been steeped in 
political discourse designed to appeal to feelings of  
national identity and values, brimming with intangi-
ble promises of  sovereignty, freedom and control. 
This was anything but a simple question concerning 
political structures. 
As presented in an earlier study with Kay 
Richardson and John Corner (‘Political Culture 
and Media Genre: Beyond the News’, 2012), the 
‘political culture’ perspective signals a research 
interest that looks beyond the official political 
system to include ‘the wider range of  orientations, 
norms and perceptions within which a political 
system is embedded’ (p4). In this research project, 
one of  our key tasks had been to interrogate the 
ways in which both serious and playful media genres 
offer spaces where diverse actors are able to engage 
with ‘the political’ and to position themselves in 
relation to its prevailing values and character. At the 
time, the MPs’ expenses scandal of  2009 appeared 
to represent a parliamentary low-point in terms 
of  public trust and confidence; with the cultures, 
ethics and practices of  other institutions such as the 
police and national press also coming under serious 
scrutiny in the intervening years. But I would like 
to call attention to three interrelated developments 
which have become especially pertinent in the last 
few months. 
Toxicity as the common descriptor for political 
discourse. There is a noticeable escalation in charac-
terising political culture as ‘toxic’, along with ‘racist’, 
the ‘politics of  fear’, ‘gutter politics’; and this is not 
just a UK trend. At different points the anger-filled 
rhetoric is variously instigated by political actors, by 
traditional media and especially right-wing tabloid 
newspapers, but also by citizens on social media. How 
do we move beyond this acknowledgement of  toxicity 
and rhetorical violence to identify causes, triggers or 
patterns of  use? 
Evocations of  nationhood as anti-immigrant. 
Nationalistic energies have been reignited through 
a potent rhetorical mix of  nostalgia, grievances and 
imagined destiny. Whilst the 2014 Scottish Independ-
ence Referendum may have sparked talk of  self-as-
sertion and governance, the particular character of  
English nationalism during the campaign was defined 
more by its fear of  others (immigrants) than by a 
distinctive national sense of  self. 
Misogyny towards women in public life. 
Especially for those who speak out on feminist 
issues, female public figures are often the targets 
of  an online shadow discourse characterised by 
anonymous and recurrent threats of  sexual violence, 
currently most conspicuously conducted on social 
media platforms. Female politicians did not feature 
prominently during the Referendum campaign with 
the tragic exception of  Labour MP Jo Cox, killed on 
16 June in what her family believes was a political-
ly motivated attack. It transpired that Jo Cox had 
reported threats to the police in the months before 
her death.
The above points suggest a number of  
worrying trends that have become difficult to 
ignore. So how might media scholars contribute 
useful analysis to this state of  affairs? Certainly by 
developing and refining tools and techniques of  
analysis that are able to keep pace with the rapid 
changes in cultural practices and media technolo-
gies where they relate to expressions of  political 
allegiance and activity. As noted above, in rhetori-
cally limiting the referendum result to a rejection of  
the political structures of  the EU, Michael Gove’s 
statement works to deny the troubling complexi-
ties and contradictions at play, and which include 
the emphatically affective. The shocking ‘political 
cultural moment’ offers a disruptive (and hopefully 
constructive) space in which to question the beliefs, 
values and priorities reflected back to us in political 
and media accounts. The generational, regional, 
class-based divisions that have come to the fore 
have been bubbling away and we have not, perhaps, 
paid sufficient attention. It is imperative that we 
continue to investigate and critique the media’s role 
in fostering such divisions while they simultaneous-
ly disregard the cultural, structural and economic 
inequalities which drive them. 
Many thanks to John Corner, Kay Richardson and Nancy 
Thumim for comments on an earlier draft.
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Britishness and Brexit
The surprise outcome of  the EU referendum has 
exposed the extent of  divisions within the UK. 
These differences are geographical with 62% of  
Scots voting in favour of  Remain in contrast to 57% 
of  the English electorate, outside London, favouring 
“Brexit.” Outcomes also vary by age, gender and 
level of  education, with the paradigmatic Remain 
voter a young female Scottish graduate and the 
archetypal Brexiteer a 50 plus Englishman with less 
formal education and limited means. The disparity 
between these identities is clear. Yet more nebulous 
than ever is the cultural construct of  “Britishness” 
which was mobilised in service of  both the Remain 
and Leave campaigns. 
The Leave campaign – incredibly given their 
overwhelmingly upper middle-class leadership caste 
– self-styled themselves as a “people’s revolution” 
poised to “take back control” from oppressive, yet 
distant, elites. In their eyes, cosmopolitan London 
is a “bubble,” entirely out of  touch with the views 
of  “ordinary” folk. Arguably they had a point, with 
Londoners joining Celtic outliers in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland in expressing their strong prefer-
ence to remain a member of  the EU.  By contrast 
the majority of  English and Welsh voters opted to 
leave. Yet a blunt caricature of  the millions of  in 
voters as being supportive of  globalising elites does 
not fit with the populaces of  Glasgow or Belfast. 
In reality they share the political colours of  many 
electorates of  post-industrial cities of  England and 
Wales. Other, more regional factors must therefore 
be at work in these voters’ calculations. 
Both campaigns hinged on a particular 
vision of  Britishness. In one of  several televised 
debates, David Cameron declared the choice 
facing UK voters was between “Great Britain and 
little England.” Cameron distinguished between 
a country that was able to look out beyond its 
shores against one that looks inward on itself. It is 
perhaps a testament to the canniness of  the Leave 
campaign that, despite leading on an anti-immi-
gration platform, they were able to circumnavigate 
accusations of  parochialism. Britain outside the EU, 
they claimed, would be one that could trade beyond 
the boundaries of  what they argued was the dead 
weight of  Europe. Prominent Brexiteers even talked 
vaguely about the possibilities of  forging stronger 
ties with India and China. Through mentioning 
these partners they invoked memories of  Empire, 
a territory that had spanned so vast an expanse that 
‘the sun never set’. In this way the Leave campaign 
maintained an international outlook while tacitly 
upholding the monocultural English ideal so central 
to imperial discourses.
The Economist’s Bagehot columnist identified 
an anarchic streak in the British populace despite 
their traditionally deferential manner. Consequently 
the opinions of  internationally-respected expert 
economists and political leaders, who univer-
sally urged Britain to remain in the EU, proved 
counterproductive. Indeed, they provided further 
targets for an opportunistic Leave campaign to 
argue that a vote for Remain was also a vote for 
David Cameron, the governing elite and the status 
quo. Consequently it is possible to interpret the 
Brexit outcome as a proxy vote reflecting the 
electorate’s increasing distaste for the (outgoing) 
Prime Minister, a politician whose standing quickly 
diminished after securing a majority government in 
the 2015 General Election. 
The Conservative and Labour Party alike are 
now in a state of  disarray while the SNP’s Nicola 
Sturgeon raises a number of  complex constitu-
tional questions about Scotland’s position in both 
the United Kingdom and the European Union. 
This is a situation in which notions of  Britishness 
and, perhaps more significantly, of  unity have 
been radically destabilised. How these notions are 
resolved will be a question that preoccupies elected 
representatives and constitutional experts in the 
weeks and months to follow as Britain renegotiates 
its place in the world. 
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The Brexit result will reverberate for years. Even 
within the first few days of  the Leave vote, UK 
political dynamics twisted into a set of  inter-related 
crises, while economic impacts continue to pile up, 
from a falling currency to financial organisations 
looking to move into the eurozone.
Many came to the instant verdict that the 
Remain side economic case failed in the face of  
anti-immigration sentiment and the ‘take back 
control’ slogan. Yet the communication failures of  
the Remain side go beyond that.
The most startling demonstration of  the 
weakness of  the Remain side was their failure to 
convince the public that Leave’s big fat lie that the 
UK sends £350 million a week to Brussels was 
just that – false. Yet even the BBC, in its efforts at 
balance and impartiality, or perhaps nervousness at 
attacks from the Leave side, failed to correct that, 
rather repeating both sides claim about it.
The Remain side did attempt to set out the 
various economic benefits of  EU membership that 
made it worth being a net budget contributor – at 
about £8.5 billion a year i.e. about £163 million a 
week. Yet this was done – as the whole campaign was 
– in such a narrow, costs and benefits for Britain way 
that the wider, more strategic case for the EU was 
essentially not made.
In addition, some of  the most powerful 
economic statements and arguments were made 
before the end of  May – apparently shifting the 
opinion polls sharply towards Remain. But the 
Remain campaign did not then appear to have a 
strategy for the final month of  the campaign to build 
on this, instead failing to keep up the momentum of  
their arguments on the economy and without clear 
arguments on free movement and immigration. 
The failure to brand the £350 million claim as a 
lie perhaps came in part from the lack of  unity across 
the Remain campaign. But it also came from the 
fact that David Cameron could not have been worse 
placed to explain the strategic argument for solidarity 
and cooperation in the EU.
Under Cameron as Prime Minister, the UK 
lost substantial influence in the EU over the last 
six years. From the start, Cameron and his Tory 
team – if  not, until last year, his LibDem coalition 
partners – wanted to limit and inhibit what the EU 
did. They also deliberately stood back from active 
participation in how to handle the various challenges 
and crises facing the EU – from the refugee crisis to 
the unemployment challenge produced by the global 
economic crisis and eurozone crisis combined. Even 
on Russia and Ukraine, Cameron took a back seat 
leaving Merkel to lead.
With Cameron’s ‘renegotiation’ with the EU 
resulting in a deal whereby the UK, alone of  the 27 
other member states, was no longer committed to 
political integration in Europe, the UK was poised 
to be an outer-tier, opted out member state, with less 
influence, less responsibilities, fewer roles.
Cameron branded this as ‘the best of  both 
worlds’ for the UK. But a world where the UK 
stands by, as the EU faces some of  its biggest 
challenges in several decades, is not a world where 
Remain leaders could also argue that the UK was one 
of  the EU’s leaders, or at the forefront of  tackling 
key common challenges.
Faced with the narrowest cost-benefit analysis 
of  why the UK should be in the UK, Leave voters 
were unconvinced. Equally, both main political 
parties, Tory and Labour failed to make a strong 
case for the social, political and economic benefits 
of  free movement in the EU. Nor were Cameron 
and other Remain Tories going to argue that voters’ 
unhappiness with the state of  the NHS, housing 
and education was a result of  their own policies and 
nothing to do with the EU or immigration.
Meanwhile, Labour was also in some disarray. 
Corbyn proved a reluctant and unconvincing 
communicator on the EU – setting out a few sound 
bites on workers’ rights, without enthusiasm. Nor 
did Corbyn seem any more able than Cameron to 
imagine a wider, strategic case for the EU, even at a 
time of  global and regional challenges from climate 
change to war and conflict in the Middle East. 
Labour could point to Tory cuts as underpinning the 
challenges in education, the NHS and housing – but 
the absence of  a clear, anti-austerity, anti-cuts policy 
from the Labour opposition also weakened this case.
In the weeks, months and years to come, what 
the Leave side branded ‘project fear’ may come 
to look like a considerable understatement. The 
strategic weaknesses of  the Remain side – and not 
only the lies and distortions of  the Leave side – 
contributed to the vote for Brexit. While many are 
already criticising Labour for not getting more of  
its voters to back Remain, it is the case that Labour, 
LibDem, Green and SNP voters all backed Remain 
by more than 60%. It was Tory voters who split 58% 
to 42% for Leave, plus almost all UKIP voters. 
In the end a Conservative Prime Minister, who 
made the fatal choice to hold the EU referendum, 
utterly failed to convince his own Tory voters of  the 
Remain case. It is ultimately Cameron’s failure and it 
stems not just from weak communication and weak 
strategy but from a lack of  real commitment to the 
strategic case for the EU and for the UK to play a 
strategic role in Europe
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Break-point for Brexit? How UKIP’s image of 
‘hate’ set race discourse reeling back decades
There are many lines in Policing the Crisis – the 
seminal account of  a flap about an invented 1970s 
wave of  mob violence supposedly orchestrated 
by black youths - that might have been written as 
a critique of  Grassroots Out’s “Breaking Point” 
poster (or, indeed, the Brexit campaign generally). 
In one of  numerous memorable passages, the late 
Stuart Hall and his co-authors decried the “incalcu-
lable harm” done by politicians’, law-enforcers’ and 
the news media’s repeated claims about a racially 
tinged “mugging” epidemic – accusing them of  
“raising the wrong things into sensational focus” 
and “hiding and mystifying the deeper causes” of  
genuine, but far more nuanced, social problems. All 
of  which brings us back to that poster: an image of  
invading “orientals” so laced with distortion, alarm 
and misrepresentation that it can only be viewed as a 
weapon of  wilfully fomented moral panic. 
But, aside from its manifest racism and un-
settling personification of  Enoch Powell’s baleful 
‘Rivers of  Blood’ speech, what is the poster trying 
to ‘say’? And why is its underlying ‘message’ so 
profoundly untruthful? In deconstructing the 
image – and its equally deceitful slogan – we 
somehow need to divorce ourselves from the acres 
of  commentary it provoked after Nigel Farage 
unveiled it on his battle-bus a week before Referen-
dum-day. So let’s confine ourselves to noting the 
most flagrant falsehood commentators exposed: 
namely that, far from depicting a line of  European 
Union economic migrants (the people to whom 
the principle of  free movement between member 
states applies), let alone one entering the United 
Kingdom, it showed a line of  non-EU refugees 
crossing the Croatia-Slovenia border. 
For all its crucial importance in framing the 
Farage case, though, this removal of  context was 
far from the poster’s most invidious deception. To 
turn to the charge of  racism (as opposed to mere 
xenophobia), the poster depicted a river of  people 
snaking towards the camera – almost all of  whom 
are youthful-looking black or Asian men. This 
was UKIP’s crystallisation of  the fabled Cameron 
“swarm”. Its malice lay in the fact that it simultane-
ously suggested a threefold untruth: that the inward 
migration encouraged by our EU membership is a 
non-white phenomenon; that it principally involves 
young, able-bodied males who can only be coming 
to steal our jobs and livelihoods; and that it is a 
Trojan horse for importing Islamist (ergo ‘Middle 
Eastern-looking’) terrorists. Not since Saatchi and 
Saatchi recruited an army of  young Conservatives 
to stage a similarly sinuous fake dole queue for its 
epochal 1979 ‘Labour isn’t Working’ campaign 
had such a deceitfully anonymised procession 
been constructed in the service of  British political 
propaganda. And it was this same spirit of  calculat-
ed vagueness in its othering – constructing a hazily 
defined, straw-man threat - that underpinned the 
poster’s infamous call to arms. The strapline urging 
us all to “take back control of  our borders” paid not 
the scantest regard to overwhelming independent 
evidence that Britain’s refusal to sign the Schengen 
Agreement already prevented the Syrian ‘migrants’ 
the photo depicted from entering the UK via other 
European countries. 
The poster was, then, a masterclass in con-
flation and exploitation: it conflated the (starkly 
different) identities and statuses of  intra-EU 
migrants/immigrants and inter-EU refugees/asy-
lum-seekers, and it exploited not only these cruelly 
misrepresented subjects but the climate of  suspicion 
and distrust that numerous recent studies have iden-
tified as a growing feature of  advanced neoliberal 
societies. In so doing, it also exploited the insecuri-
ties and anxieties of  those it claimed to represent: 
the “ordinary, decent people” of  the post-industrial 
North-East, South-West, Wales and eastern coastal 
fringes now so besieged by global market forces they 
are primed to be on the lookout for scapegoats. 
The significance of  the poster, then, lies less 
in what its divide-and-rule tactics actually achieved 
than what they sought to achieve. We will never 
know for sure quite how influential it was - though, 
given the Referendum’s result, the possibility that 
it swayed some minds is hard to discount. But in 
spite – or perhaps because - of  the opprobrium 
it drew from the Twitterati and opinion leaders 
across the spectrum of  Brexit debate, its viral 
spread ensured its shock value the infamy and 
ubiquity Grassroots Out doubtless craved. While 
the moral panic dissected in Hall et al’s study found 
a different outward expression – in fears specifi-
cally about violent crime, rather than pressure on 
jobs, housing or public services – it arose out of  
a period as economically turbulent, and socially 
divided, as our own. To this end, it recognised 
that the “mugging” discourse was but one mani-
festation of  a deeper-rooted, perceived “crisis” of  
cultural identity – mobilised by authoritarian con-
servative forces convinced that “the ‘British way 
of  life’” was “coming apart at the seams”. In short: 
an imagined Britain (like UKIP’s) on the verge of  
“breaking point”.
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UKIP leader Nigel Farage launches a new UKIP EU referendum poster campaign in Smith Square, London. Picture by: Philip 
Toscano/ PA Wire/Press Association Images.
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One feature of  the British political and media land-
scapes to have remained pretty much unchanged 
from the time of  the first UK referendum on 
Europe in 1975 was the system for allocations of  
broadcast time on television. An outright ban on 
paid-for political advertising in broadcast media, 
with its origins in the earliest structures of  the 
public service broadcasting monopoly of  the BBC, 
has remained with surprisingly little change to the 
present day. In 1975 there were still only three 
television channels (BBC 1, BBC2 and ITV), only 
the last of  which carried any paid-for advertising 
at all, and whilst the trickle of  new channels in 
the 1980s and 1990s via satellite and cable turned 
into a flood since the 2000s with digital, and now 
online streaming television services, the system 
of  allocated television broadcasts has remained 
pretty static, and in the view of  one recent review 
is seen as still ‘fit for purpose’ as well as being 
consonant with European law, premised mainly on 
the likely huge cost of  shifting to a paid adver-
tising approach, and the potential disadvantages 
that might bring to political parties. In General 
Elections, where they are called Party Election 
Broadcasts (PEBs), the focus of  allocated broad-
casts has changed as television coverage has shifted 
from only reporting results in the early 1950s to 
near saturation coverage today. PEBs have become 
both an important site of  mass audience reach for 
party messages, but also opportunities for media 
agenda setting through effective and memorably 
composition of  the handful of  PEBs the parties 
receive such as “Kinnock the Movie” in 1987, “Jen-
nifer’s Ear” in 1992 or the Green Party’s “Change 
the Tune” from last year’s General Election.
PEBs, then, occupy a role that has evolved 
over time within conventional electoral contexts, 
though this is starting to change with the increasing 
use of  social media platforms by political parties 
for video content- such as dedicate YouTube 
channels for instance. Referendum Campaign 
Broadcasts (RCBs), on the other hand, do not have 
any of  this kind of  routine, and the approaches 
of  the two official campaign groups reveal the 
problem of  how to utilise a mid-20th century 
approach in a 21st century landscape.
The Stronger IN RCBs definitely took the 
approach of  seeing them as traditional PEBs in 
terms of  style, content and format. They produced 
two RCBs that were each shown twice during the 
campaign. Their first RCB, shown on May 24th, 
offered what turned out to be a rare example in the 
campaign of  an attempt at a predominantly positive 
message, with a single filmed piece showing scene 
after scene of  happy workers, families, doctors and 
particularly children, focusing on 14 month-old 
“Sam” and the opportunities for the future the 
EU would bring. Apart from a BBC article that 
described it as ‘cutesy and soft focus’ the ad 
didn’t dent the already predominantly negative and 
attacking agenda of  the campaign in any notable 
manner. Their second RCB also followed a very 
conventional PEB format- the talking head format, 
with a series of  prominent figures from Alan Sugar 
to Stephen Hawking offering soundbites of  why 
the EU was good for all sorts of  reasons- again not 
seeming to impact on media agendas in any way.
Vote Leave went for a very different approach, 
offering effectively compilations of  shorter video 
sequences clumsily run together, suggesting perhaps, 
much more of  a focus on video sequences designed 
for social media platforms, where short, pithy videos 
in general are much more prevalent, than tradi-
tional PEBs. The BBC’s one article on Vote Leave 
RCBs focused on what they saw as a ‘clever’ filmed 
sequence, used in all five of  their slots- a short split-
screen film accompanied only by music, showing 
the difference between an old lady’s experience of  
the NHS inside the EU- queues, waiting, not getting 
treated- to Leave’s vision of  outside the EU- empty 
waiting rooms, immediate service, and being cured. 
This film was regularly topped and tailed by other 
short segments, on Cameron’s comments on Turkey, 
and claims about possible new EU member states’ 
pressure on the NHS using maps. The only major 
variation to this combination was the May 31st RCB 
which had two ordinary “blokes in the pub” making 
sly digs about Turkey and MEPs wages whilst 
promoting the Leave campaign’s £50 million compe-
tition linked to the Euro ’16 football championship.
Neither side’s RCBs generated more than a 
cursory mention in other news media, and then 
only by the BBC, so their impact on the campaign 
itself  is likely to have been minimal. The impact 
of  the campaign on the future of  the party allo-
cation system, on the other hand, may be one of  
the unforeseen longer consequences for political 
campaigning in the UK.
Vote Leave RCB
Stronger IN RCB
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Televised political debates have become a central 
focus of  UK political campaigning. Here I 
consider the mechanics of  the two main televised 
debates of  the EU Referendum campaign by 
analysing particular aspects of  turn-taking and 
floor apportionment in the ‘ITV Referendum 
Debate’ on 9th June 2016 and the ‘BBC Great 
Debate’ on 21st June 2016. Both debates ran for 
two hours with the Leave and Remain arguments 
represented by two teams of  three speakers 
responding to questions from the studio audience. 
Apart from the more striking features of  the 
debates, such as the repeated mantra to ‘take back 
control’ by the Leave side, and the speakers’ overt 
self-identifications as mother, grandmother, immigrant, 
Turk and lawyer, an analysis of  debate turns can 
illuminate how the speakers occupied the debate 
floor in interactional terms.
In the ITV debate there was some variability 
in the distribution of  turns directly allocated by 
the moderator. As Figure 1 shows, the Leave team 
were allocated 83 speaking turns and the Remain 
team 76. Johnson was allocated the most turns 
overall, with Rudd second. Johnson and Rudd 
engaged in ‘dyadic’ or head-to-head ‘debate within 
a debate’ exchanges that give interactional advan-
tages. Direct challenges and questions directed at 
a speaker mean that they are given more oppor-
tunities to respond and this is often sanctioned 
by the moderator in the interests of  provoking 
debate. In this way, Johnson accrued turns through 
challenges from all the Remain speakers. However, 
unlike the GE2015 TV debates, these debates 
were a team effort, so the dominance of  allocated 
turns by one team member automatically reduced 
the participation of  other members of  the team. 
In this way, Johnson’s dominance of  the allocated 
turns was at the expense (strategically or otherwise) 
of  the participation of  Leadsom and particularly 
Stuart (who took the fewest turns allocated to the 
Leave team), and Rudd’s allocated turns were taken 
at the expense of  Sturgeon and Eagle. However, 
the allocated turns only give a partial account of  
participation as speakers frequently interrupt each 
other and speak ‘illegally’, although these contested 
turns are less secure than those that are allocated. 
Figure 1 shows that the Leave team made 17 inter-
ruptions and the Remain team made 38, with Eagle 
making the most overall, Sturgeon and Johnson 
making the approximately the same amount, Rudd 
only five and Stuart none at all.
Of  course, simply securing speaking turns 
is not enough to ensure a speaker’s success in 
creating an impression on the audience. There 
was very little applause in the ITV debate but 
60% of  it was in response to the Leave team 
and 40% to Remain. Johnson and Sturgeon 
achieved the most positive audience response, 
as measured in applause. Given the equal 
composition of  the studio audience into Leave 
and Remain camps, and the variability of  the 
audience responses towards members of  the 
same ‘team’, this might suggest that it was strate-
gically an advantage for Johnson to take most of  
the Leave allocated turns and a disadvantage for 
Rudd to take most of  those allocated to Remain 
(as she achieved a less positive response from 
the audience than Sturgeon).
However, as with all TV debates, the partici-
pants must balance a range of  competing demands. 
Although Johnson was noticeably dominant in 
the ITV debate, and gained the most positive 
audience reaction, this dominance risked him 
being perceived negatively as overbearing. This 
was highlighted by Ruth Davidson in the ‘BBC 
Great Debate’ when she interrupted Johnson to say 
‘This isn’t the Boris show’ to highlight Johnson’s 
domineering style. In fact, there was far less varia-
bility in allocated turns in this debate. As Figure 2 
shows, both sides in the BBC debate were allocated 
the same amount of  turns and all three speakers 
for Leave took an equal share of  allocated turns, 
possibly a tactical move enabled by the perfor-
mance of  a now well-rehearsed team. For Remain, 
it is Davidson who stands out as the speaker who 
gained the most turns overall. 
The audience response in terms of  applause in 
the BBC debate was also more equally distributed 
between the two sides, with 51.2% for the Leave 
team and 48.8% for Remain. Despite Davidson’s 
successful accrual of  speaking turns, Johnson once 
again gained the most positive audience response 
with 210 seconds of  applause against Davidson’s 
173 seconds.
The performance of  the politicians in this 
‘dispute genre’ of  TV political debates concurs 
with previous analyses of  TV debates in the 
GE2015 election campaign. Although these strictly 
moderated events aim to ensure equal participation, 
this principle runs against an intrinsically adversari-
al genre that seeks to engage audiences and rewards 
those who both directly challenge others and who 
are challenged themselves. 
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Comedy clubs offered a better quality of debate 
than the political stage
On 21st June 2016, at 8pm, two performances began. 
Each contributed to the referendum discussion but 
they differed substantially in the levels of  complexity 
that they employed. At Wembley Arena, the ‘Great 
Debate’ between prominent Leave and Remain 
campaigners was filmed before a live audience of  
thousands, and broadcast on BBC1. Meanwhile, 
Chris Coltrane’s comedy club, Lolitics, took place 
in a small room above a Camden pub; an edited 
podcast was released two days later, coinciding with 
the vote itself.
Coltrane offered a well-formed, incisive 
criticism of  referendum campaigning. He noted 
both sides’ failure to provide reliable informa-
tion, likening the voters’ experience to ‘asking 
two children to guess how many dinosaurs there 
are in the world, and then just taking the average’. 
Coltrane also placed key referendum issues in their 
wider political context. Many Remain supporters 
have been criticised for their readiness to attribute 
Leave votes to racism and xenophobia. Coltrane - in 
favour of  Remain - did attribute much of  Leave’s 
momentum to a ‘poisonous’ discussion on immi-
gration. However, his argument was not simplistic 
but thoughtful; seeking not to abuse but to under-
stand. Referring to a Guardian interview in which a 
member of  the public dramatically overestimated 
the proportion of  immigrants in her hometown of  
Leigh, Coltrane (2016) said:
“It’s easy for people to sneer at that and 
dismiss it as racism but we shouldn’t, because 
here’s what she also said: ‘I work full time, my 
husband works full time, I pay full rent and 
I can’t get anything’. And that is the thing, 
they’ve been let down – they’ve been let down by 
a government that hasn’t given them the basic 
things they need to live and they’ve been let 
down by a media who should have been holding 
the government to account over austerity ... 
but have instead very happily gone along with 
the anti-immigrant rhetoric ... The problems in 
towns like that are a direct result of  Tory policy. 
Leigh was a mining town, right? It was not an 
immigrant that closed down the mines.”
The audience of  the Wembley debate encountered 
no such trust in their intelligence, nor recognition 
of  relevant contexts. As journalist John Rentoul 
observed, its participants ‘mainly traded soundbites.’ 
When the debate turned to the topic of  immigra-
tion, Remain repeated the maxim that there could 
be ‘no silver bullets’, while Leave leant upon their 
platitude: ‘take back control’. Three words on either 
side were intended to stick in the memory: the 
tactic presumed that audiences would seek reductive 
approaches to a complicated matter. Both Gisela 
Stuart and Andrea Leadsom were quick to mention 
that they are mothers; a recurrent but meaningless 
statement later mocked by Ruth Davidson (‘there 
are actually mums and dads...on this side of  the 
argument as well!’).
Attempts to widen the scope of  debate fared 
badly. Remain’s Frances O’Grady endeavoured to 
query a significant donation to Vote Leave from 
a former BNP member; Leave’s Andrea Leadsom 
dismissed the concern as ‘unworthy of  this debate’. 
O’Grady’s later reference to austerity, and particu-
larly the legacy of  ‘those greedy bankers crashing 
the economy’, was shut down by the moderator, 
David Dimbleby: ‘let’s try, within reason, to stick to 
the points that we’ve been asked to raise.’ As with 
Coltrane’s routine, O’Grady’s line of  argument was 
ideologically driven and open to disagreement. Yet it 
was surely reasonable to acknowledge the resonance 
of  her comments to the topic under discussion; 
unreasonable to ignore her points. Perhaps the 
politicians and journalist on that stage were too used 
to working in soundbites, instinctively failing to trust 
their audience’s desire, or capability, to navigate the 
complexities of  the debate.
Politicians and media alike failed to prepare 
the population for the referendum. This is because 
they failed to provide good-quality information, 
and more fundamentally because the choices they 
made when it came to scripting and performing 
the campaign elided real discussion of  the issues. 
The referendum highlighted the simplistic mode 
of  address that has come to dominate political 
discourse, and its inadequacy. Stand-up comedy, by 
contrast, offers richer and more complex commu-
nication with audiences. Coltrane and his colleagues 
have shown that the level of  debate can be raised, 
and the audience will cope. The political stage must 
improve the quality of  its conversation, lest its 
actors fail us once again.
Comedian Eddie Izzard speaks at the University of  Sussex, Brighton in a final push for the Remain Campaign in the EU Referendum. 
Picture by: Hannah McKay / PA Wire/Press Association Images.
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As part of  the Britain Stronger in Europe (BSiE) 
campaign, a group of  prominent, international-
ly-acclaimed artists announced their support for 
the Remain campaign. Among them were sculptor 
Antony Gormley and Michael Craig-Martin. The 
participation of  leading figures in the UK’s art world 
– Craig-Martin curated the 2015 Royal Academy 
Summer Show, for example – lent a specific weight 
to the campaign, but one that was radically at odds 
with Remain’s key narratives. Along with other artists, 
“limited edition” prints of  Gormley and Craig-Mar-
tin’s works were even made available as merchandise 
at the BSiE shop.
If  “Project Fear” was based largely on dire 
economic warnings, with celebrity capitalists and 
corporate announcements forming a populist plank 
of  Remain’s strategy, then “Project Art” offered a 
compensatory strand of  campaigning, as if  someone 
belatedly realised “it can’t just be about the economy, 
stupid”. These artists’ pro-Europe statements circulat-
ed through niche sectors of  the cultural industries, 
and their works were made available for social media 
circulation (Craig-Martin hosted a downloadable 
version of  his vibrant ‘Britain in the EU’ poster on 
his official website). 
In a piece published on the day of  the Referen-
dum, Antony Gormley argued that the “imaginative 
project” of  European membership was a vital part of  
the UK’s successes. For Gormley, staying in Europe 
was about meeting the imaginative challenge of  
climate change, as well as supporting a just response 
to the current migration crisis. The creative imagi-
nation displaces any emphasis on neoliberal corpo-
rate-economic aims here, just as Craig-Martin’s BSiE 
statement reacted strongly against Remain’s emphasis 
on the economy:       
“But the question of  the UK leaving the EU 
is not simply about the economic implications. The 
EU… has guaranteed democracy, the rule of  law, civil 
liberties, and human rights across every member state. 
We should remember that this represents the spread 
of  fundamental British values across Europe.”
This sets out a very different narrative to that of  
“Project Fear”, stressing cultural and humanitarian 
interconnectedness between Britain and Europe, 
and suggesting Europe’s indebtedness to Britishness. 
We may not be an economic leader, after all, but our 
power remains one of  less tangible, humanist values.
Craig-Martin’s cultural capital is not just that of  
a leading figure in the art establishment; his status is 
also significantly linked to having mentored the YBAs 
(Young British Artists) such as Damien Hirst, and 
his previous work has commemorated the National 
Theatre’s 50th anniversary (2013) and supported the 
London Paralympics (2012). Furthermore, his use of  
dazzling day-glo colour combinations carries a British 
eccentricity that is articulated with the transnational 
familiarity of  consumer objects (iPhones, trainers, 
memory sticks etc). In On Being An Artist, Craig-Mar-
tin dismisses any nationalistic, small-minded approach 
to ‘British’ art, suggesting that a “British artist is an 
artist who works in Britain, no matter where he or she 
came from. I should know [Craig-Martin was born in 
Dublin] … [And f]ar too much attention continues 
to be focused on … young [artists in the art world]. 
Again, I should know”. Speaking as a self-conscious-
ly Older British Artist within the BSiE campaign, 
Craig-Martin challenged those of  his generation not 
to deny the benefits they had experienced (via EU 
membership) to their children and grand-children. 
Implicitly, though, the BSiE mobilisation of  art 
world support and its high levels of  cultural capital 
installed a kind of  popular/high-cultural binary at the 
heart of  official manoeuvring. Economic scare-
mongering predominantly targeted populist appeal 
– highly ineffectively as it turned out – whilst a more 
positive, creative and values-oriented appeal remained 
unhelpfully restricted to niche appeal.    
Andrew Smith, writing for The Conversation, 
concluded that this group of  BSiE artworks was 
rather lacklustre. Rather than dismissing “Project Art” 
as ‘bad’ work, I would argue that these prints repre-
sented an attempt, however belated and marginal, to 
counter and complicate Remain’s dominant semiotics. 
But this effort to mobilise cultural capital was part 
of  an overly divided and divisive strategy – one that 
split the realms of  art, imagination and human values 
apart from neoliberal economic concerns. Remain 
evidently wanted the cultural values of  art and creativ-
ity arrayed behind it, but seemingly also presumed 
that such arguments couldn’t reach the populist vote. 
Art-as-merchandise was the commodified outcome; 
limited edition collectibles for middle-class, well-edu-
cated supporters rather than any art-oriented attempt 
to win over a wider public. We may, now, be muddling 
through as a divided nation, with each major political 
party itself  dangerously fractured. But deep-rooted 
cultural divisions between art and commerce, artistic 
imagination and corporate number-crunching, 
ultimately informed the underlying practices of  the 
Remain campaign. The UK’s Art Establishment, and 
figures such as Michael Craig-Martin and Antony 
Gormley, functioned as a badge of  honour and a su-
perficial branding choice, rather than being integrated 
into mainstream messages. BSiE could have been so 
much more artful.
‘Project Art’ versus ‘Project Fear’: the art 
establishment against Brexit
Prof Matt Hills
Professor of Media 
and Journalism at the 
University of Huddersfield, 
and co-director of the 
Centre for Participatory 
Cultures based there. 
He is the author of a 
number of books including 
Fan Cultures (2002), and 
has published widely on 
popular culture and media 
fandom.
Email: mjh35@aber.ac.uk
75
Notes for editors: what press releases tell us 
about Vote Leave and Britain Stronger in Europe
Paula Keaveney
Senior Lecturer in Public 
Relations and Politics 
at Edge Hill University. 
She does politics as well 
as researching it,having 
been a Parliamentary 
Candidate, Euro 
Candidate, Councillor and 
Council Group Leader 
for the Lib Dems. She is 
a former journalist and 
has worked in PR for 
a number of national 
charities. 
Email: keavenep@edgehill.ac.uk
Campaigns have a range of  communication 
methods. There are those with high control, such 
as a paid-for advertisement, and methods with less, 
such as reliance on supporters using social media. 
It is open to debate how much “control” there is 
over media coverage. However in the press releases/
news releases issued by the two campaigns we have 
a clear indication of  which messages were deliber-
ately chosen, what timing was preferred and which 
spokespeople were viewed as credible. By looking at 
the language, content and frequency of  the releases, 
we can also draw some conclusions about the nature 
and internal workings of  the campaigns themselves.
Earlier in the campaign period, I looked at both 
Britain Stronger in Europe and Vote Leave to draw 
some preliminary conclusions. I then returned to 
the topic as the campaigns intensified. This article 
covers findings from both periods of  time. Edge 
Hill University will be publishing more detailed 
material from this research.
Firstly, there can be no doubt that Vote Leave 
was most active in terms of  press releases and media 
strategy. Not only was the volume greater, but there 
was use of  both planned material (for example 
research into MEP expenses) and reactive or op-
portunistic material. Vote Leave’s “rebuttal” press 
release was often published ahead of  the official 
publication of  the other side’s case. Vote Leave also 
made good use of  “piggybacking” opportunities. 
This consists of  taking a predictable news event, 
such as the scheduled publication of  unemployment 
figures or data on allocation of  school places, and 
using this to make a point about the EU (usually 
linked to migration).
By contrast, Stronger In appeared to lack the 
ability to behave in this way. To a certain extent it 
was hampered by being the “establishment”. While, 
for example, Vote Leave made good use of  the Tata 
Steel crisis in the days when the story led the news, 
it took Stronger In longer to make its points. There 
was a 15 June release featuring Stephen Kinnock, 
but this lacked the immediate punch of  the earlier 
Vote Leave material.
It is a basic rule of  press release writing that 
these should be written in a journalistic style. 
However Stronger In’s material occasionally gave 
a sense of  being a news story rather than arguing 
a case. I am surprised for example that the 25 May 
release on military figures supporting Remain refer-
ences gains made by Leave.
While Stronger In and Vote Leave were the offi-
cially designated campaigns, much was organised by 
other players such as the TUC and CBI. This meant 
that the official campaigns would choose which of  
these activities to highlight. Stronger In made much 
use of  both. On these occasions Vote Leave would 
attempt to rebut. The campaign seemed particu-
larly keen to rebut the CBI and used a strategy of  
attacking not just the content but the messenger. 
The theme that the CBI was “EU funded” was used 
several times in an attempt to undermine. This is 
clearly common in some political debate, but the 
enthusiasm to debunk “experts” is a clear theme 
running through the Vote Leave communications.
There is a difference in tone between the 
releases from the two campaigns. Stronger In on the 
whole maintains a measured tone, apart from in the 
text of  some speeches. Vote Leave is much more 
likely to go onto the attack. For example we are told 
that “people will not believe” George Osborne or 
that David Cameron continues to “talk down our 
country”.
In a General Election, we hear from the politi-
cians seeking our vote. It is rare to hear from those 
running the campaigns. In this contest however, 
Vote Leave made considerable use of  Matthew 
Elliott as a quoted spokesperson. Elliott of  course, 
as the former head of  the Taxpayers’ Alliance, had 
media recognition. However, the use of  a campaign 
official can also enable material to be published 
much more speedily. Locating politicians to sign 
off  releases can cause delay and it appears that Vote 
Leave knew that, in political/media terms, “speed 
kills”. The ability to do this must stem from the 
culture of  the campaign as well as its structure and 
I suspect that Stronger In officials sometimes felt 
constrained by their campaign structure and culture.
Finally, the themes. It is no surprise that the 
main theme running through the Vote Leave 
releases is immigration and its effects. This ranged 
from foreign criminals who cannot be deported 
to whether or not Turkey would join the EU. Vote 
Leave responded to worries about the lack of  a plan 
with an announcement on 15 June of  a “roadmap” 
to Brexit. This was somewhat overshadowed by 
George Osborne’s “emergency budget” announce-
ment and subsequent reaction. 
Stronger In’s themes were more diverse. A 
major theme was risk – risk to the economy, risk 
to services, risk to pensions etc. But there was also 
a thread of  patriotism relating to Britain’s place in 
the world and the nation’s ability to be influential. 
This may seem odd from the campaign that does 
not advocate national independence, but planners 
appear to have realised that this was an issue needing 
to be dealt with.
Press releases cannot win or lose an election. 
What they can do however is increase or shape 
media coverage and therefore public perception. 
They can also ensure credibility with journalists. 
More interestingly for researchers, releases can 
give us an insight into the nature of  the campaigns 
as they develop. And on this reading, Vote Leave 
simply had the better campaign.
Parties
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The triumph and tribulations of Conservative 
Euroscepticism
When, after five decades of  skirmishes, Conservative 
Eurosceptics finally secured victory it was spectacular 
and momentous. Defeats had hitherto been more 
common than successes. Conservative Eurosceptics 
helped to keep the UK out of  the Euro (although 
the Maastricht rebellion failed), created the European 
Conservatives and Reformists group in the European 
Parliament, and pushed David Cameron into 
holding an in-out referendum. But painstaking par-
liamentary scrutiny, multiple rebellions and extensive 
extra-parliamentary activity did not stop or reverse the 
incoming tide of  European integration. 
Conservative Eurosceptic opinion had coalesced 
around the goals of  renegotiation and a referendum. 
But differences over the extent of  renegotiation 
and scope and timing of  a referendum blunted their 
influence. Soft Euroscepticism was predominant: the 
UK should opt-out of  European Monetary Union 
and Schengen but remain a member of  a reformed 
EU. Hard Eurosceptics preferring withdrawal or 
fundamental renegotiation appeared a small minority: 
few joined Better Off  Out and key figures like Bill 
Cash and John Redwood spoke in code of  a new 
relationship based on trade. 
Cameron’s unwillingness to press for the radical 
changes proposed by the Fresh Start Group and 
European Scrutiny Committee, and the debate’s 
switch from parliamentary to public arena burst the 
dam. 130 Conservative MPs, some with little track 
record of  activity never mind rebellion on the EU 
issue, declared for Leave. Yet, with some Eurosceptics 
reluctant Remainers, Cameron claimed the support of  
most of  his party. 
The Leave vote will trigger rapid, fundamental 
change to the Conservative Party’s identity, ideology 
and leadership. It will not be smooth. Victory will 
not, for example, unite Conservative Eurosceptics. 
Differences over a post-Brexit relationship with the 
EU were not resolved before the Referendum and 
become more significant after it. What is an accept-
able (and realistic) trade-off  between single market 
access and the free movement of  people has to be es-
tablished. Brexit planning will frame the Conservative 
leadership contest – and there are doubts about Boris 
Johnson’s Eurosceptic conviction and mettle. Johnson 
implied that a Leave vote would secure better EU 
membership terms and favours a (temporary?) 
bespoke version of  the Norwegian model. 
Brexit will dominate this Parliament – and 
Eurosceptic rebellion has not been consigned to 
history. Ministers and veteran Eurosceptics have 
concerns about the Article 50 escape route but 
the latter want a decisive break and will resist 
‘Brexit-lite’. With parliamentary sovereignty a 
defining issue for hard Eurosceptics and the 
‘take back control’ message so potent in the 
Leave campaign, Eurosceptics will demand the 
enactment of  commitments made by Vote Leave 
on disapplying the European Communities 
Act 1972 in specific areas (e.g. on immigration, 
rights and VAT), limiting the European Court of  
Justice’s jurisdiction and withholding payments to 
the EU before formal withdrawal. 
When Douglas Carswell and Mark Reckless 
defected in 2014, UKIP appeared an attractive 
alternative home for Conservative Eurosceptics. 
UKIP played a major part in bringing about and 
then winning the Referendum, pressuring Cameron 
and winning over voters the Conservatives could not 
reach. Factional change in their own party, tensions 
during the Referendum campaign and UKIP’s pitch 
for Labour voters make Farage’s party less appealing 
to Conservative Eurosceptics. But UKIP can stir 
up and take advantage of  any concerns among 
socially conservative Eurosceptics about government 
wavering on Brexit.
Historically, most Conservative dissent on 
European integration has come from Eurosceptics. 
Large scale dissent from pro-European Conservative 
MPs is now a real possibility. When the party adopted 
a tougher stance on EMU under William Hague 
and Iain Duncan Smith, a handful of  pro-European 
MPs defected, rebelled or worked with rival parties. 
The next generation of  pro-Europeans took their 
time to take the torch and develop a new narrative, 
keeping their counsel and employing a discourse 
of  EU reform not dissimilar to the leadership’s soft 
Euroscepticism. The Referendum gave them their 
voice and swollen numbers; narrow defeat gives 
them a bigger cause. With Euroscepticism enjoying 
majority support outside Parliament – notably among 
Conservative members and voters - but not within 
it, will pro-European Conservatives show the same 
desire and determination to put principle before party 
as Eurosceptics did? 
The EU issue wrecked the last three Conserva-
tive premierships. Cameron’s policy was shaped by 
party management and marked by miscalculations. 
Lowering the salience of  the issue and deferring 
difficult decisions allowed hard Eurosceptics to 
set the agenda, and building expectations about 
renegotiation that he would not or could not deliver 
(for which EU leaders share culpability) cost him his 
party and the Referendum. Nonetheless, an in-out 
referendum was the logical course of  action, with 
the best (albeit limited) prospect of  resolving the 
issue. The outcome means that the EU issue will 
frustrate and define the work of  yet another Con-
servative Prime Minister.
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Celebrity politicians and populist media 
narratives: the case of Boris Johnson
Celebrity politics has become common-place in 
modern political communications. P. David Marshall 
has commented that politicians construct ‘public 
personalities,’ which have an ‘affective function’ 
in the organisation of  issues. In turn, Liesbet van 
Zoonen argues that celebrity politics is founded 
upon a paradoxical combination of  an individual’s 
ability to be mediated as being both ordinary and 
extraordinary. Thus, for van Zoonen celebrity poli-
ticians (CPs) try to strike the balance between being 
‘ordinary and just like us’, while demonstrating they 
have extraordinary leadership abilities: 
“The ultimate celebrity politician [is], then, the 
one who … projects a persona that has inside ex-
perience with politics but is still an outsider; his (or, 
in some cases her) performance builds on a unique 
mixture of  ordinariness and exceptionality.”
During the European Union (EU) Referendum 
campaign the Conservative Cabinet member, former 
Mayor of  London and ‘Brexiteer’ Boris Johnson 
provided a problematic example of  van Zoonen’s 
ultimate CP. 
Johnson emerged within the public’s conscious-
ness through his ‘mediated persona’ - or individual 
public image - to attain admiration to effect political 
expression. He adopted populist strategies such as 
appearing on satire programmes and chat shows, 
while making numerous, outrageous statements that 
have commanded media attention. Consequently, as 
a maverick and ‘humorous’ political figure Johnson 
reached the ultimate in brand recognition as he 
became known by his forename ‘Boris.’ Yet, while 
acting as a political ‘superstar,’ Johnson had serious 
political ambitions. His rivalry with Prime Minister 
David Cameron was played out in public in terms of  
class, entitlement, education and wit. 
Thus, Johnson took a calculated risk to campaign 
for ‘Vote Leave’ as he perceived Cameron’s weakness 
concerning the EU. He fashioned his appeal to 
two constituencies - the general public and those 
Conservative Party members who are strongly 
Europhobic. Johnson believed that his Brexit stance 
would enable him to establish a post-Referendum 
leadership challenge. ‘Project Boris’ was launched in 
January amidst a media scrum that engulfed Johnson’s 
decision to ‘Leave.’ 
Throughout the campaign, Johnson maintained 
his maverick appeal in which he engaged (with 
Michael Gove, Chris Grayling and Ian Duncan 
Smith) in a ‘Blue-on-Blue’ descent into personal 
abuse against Cameron and George Osborne. 
Essentially, for Johnson the EU Referendum was 
characterised as a ‘Bullingdon’ club spat in which 
varying forms of  ‘blue blood’ privilege became con-
spicuous. Moreover, taking his cue from the United 
States’ (US) Republican Party’s Presidential nominee 
Donald Trump, Johnson employed hyperbole, 
distortion and outright lies to sustain his public 
image. This occurred within his visceral attack on 
US President Barack Obama’s ‘Remain’ intervention 
and through his comparison of  the EU ‘Superstate’ 
with the ambitions of  Nazi Germany’s Fuehrer 
Adolf  Hitler. 
In this respect, the populist media narrative 
in the Brexit-led newspapers reinforced the view 
that Johnson was standing up to the dysfunctional 
European elite which has undermined Britain’s 
economy, sovereignty and self-confidence. This led 
to comparisons being made between Johnson and 
Britain’s ultimate maverick politician - Sir Winston 
Churchill. In the biggest televised EU debate at 
Wembley Arena on 21st June, Johnson concluded 
that Brexit would become the United Kingdom’s 
(UK) ‘Independence Day.’ Along with his fellow 
Brexiteers, he repeated the xenophobic falsehoods 
that a Vote Leave outcome would Canute-like turn 
back the ‘waves’ of  immigrants who were ready to 
pounce from Eastern Europe. 
Johnson’s cavalier attitude to the truth received 
a significant hearing throughout the news and 
social media during the EU Referendum Campaign. 
Jonathan Freedland compared Johnson with Trump 
by declaring him to be a ‘post-truth’ politician:
“Johnson reminded us that he has more in 
common with Trump than just a lovingly styled, 
idiosyncratic head of  blond hair. … On BBC Radio 
4’s Today programme, Johnson reminded listeners 
how slippery his grasp on the truth has long been. 
… As with Trump, humour plays a crucial part. ... 
Too often, radio and TV interviewers want to appear 
in on the joke, to share in the chuckle … but it’s 
clear why this matters … (as) … how can we have 
a functioning democracy when we cannot agree on 
the most basic facts?”
By engaging in a race to the bottom, Johnson’s 
unreliable political discourse (along with that of  
UKIP leader Nigel Farage) meant that his arguments 
concerning the EU debate were distorted around 
immigration. Therefore, Johnson’s wilful irre-
sponsibility (with Gove, Grayling, Duncan Smith, 
John Mann and Frank Field) was a contributory 
factor to the ‘ugliness’ that surrounded the national 
conversation about the referendum. And as Polly 
Toynbee argued this corrosive intolerance provided 
the backdrop for the terrible actions of  a disturbed 
mind in the unprovoked murder of  the Labour MP 
Jo Cox on 16 June 2016.
Boris Johnson talking to voters in Selby, North Yorkshire as he tours the country on the final day of  campaigning before the 
EU referendum. Picture by: Andrew Parsons / PA Wire/Press Association Images.
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Tuck your shirt in! It’s going to be a bumpy ride: 
Boris Johnson’s swerve to Brexit
Back in February, Boris Johnson came out as an 
Outer. After months of  indecision and ‘a huge 
amount of  heartache’, Johnson decided to stab 
David Cameron in the front and align himself  with 
the likes of  Nigel Farage and George Galloway 
to vote ‘no’ to Europe. What Johnson shares with 
Farage and Galloway is his performative value as 
a celebrity politician who is ‘political box office’. 
Elsewhere, I have applied the theme of  flirtation to 
the practice of  political communication alongside 
the identification with different political positions 
(Yates, 2015). Today, political flirtation applies 
equally to politicians and voters within the scene of  
promotional party politics. Boris Johnson’s flirtation 
with voters on the theme of  Europe provides an 
example of  this phenomenon and his seemingly 
spontaneous, un-spun qualities are key to his ability 
to connect with the public. Combining discourses of  
nation and empire with that of  a kind of  boys-own 
masculinity, Johnson has repeatedly stressed the 
threat posed by the ‘European powers’ to the 
border shores of  Britain. Like helpless infants in an 
Edwardian nursery, he conjures up a picture of  the 
threat of  an all-engulfing Brussels ‘Nanny’ who has 
lulled the British into some kind of  passive state of  
acquiescence, pleading for the British to ‘be brave’, 
to wake up out of  their slumber and imagine ‘an 
independent future’ (Johnson, 2016). 
There were mixed reactions following Johnson’s 
initial Brexit call to arms. Some were thrilled that 
the ‘blonde bombshell’ managed to upset the plans 
of  Cameron. Others viewed him as opportunistic 
and self-serving in his last-minute swerve towards 
Brexit. As some pointed out, in the preceding 
months, Johnson had said that he was definitely not 
‘an outer’ and that his instincts were to stay inside 
Europe (White, 2016).
 For those of  us who have followed Johnson’s 
career over the years, it came as no surprise that 
he should have changed his mind (Yates, 2014). 
Johnson’s political identity is slippery; as joker and 
skilled political orator he seems to enjoy cocking a 
snook at the establishment whilst at the same time, 
as a white, upper middle class, Oxbridge educated 
member of  the Conservative Party, he also symbolises 
all that the establishment is held up to be. With one 
eye on the banking service sector and one on the 
electorate, he has managed the potential contradic-
tions of  his political position by adopting a persona 
associated with Englishness and amateurism. In this 
way, he harks back to an earlier era of  deference 
whilst simultaneously appearing to refuse the patriar-
chal structures of  authority that shaped it. With his 
teddy bear looks and public gaffes that make people 
laugh, Johnson is a seductive figure. It is as if  he often 
appears to represent a cuddly toy with whom the 
electorate can play, thereby undercutting the notions 
of  governance that his roles as former London Mayor 
and Member of  Parliament represent. 
Like his fellow Outers - Farage and Galloway 
(and over the waters, Donald Trump), Johnson’s 
apparent lack of  deference to the establishment sits 
well with an electorate who are increasingly cynical 
and disenchanted with politics and the affective 
dimensions of  his appeal should not be underesti-
mated. It is interesting to explore the emotions that 
get stirred up when identifying with politicians in 
such contexts who may be idealised and loathed in 
equal measure. In an age of  precarity, feelings of  
helplessness and anger may also give rise to an envy 
of  politicians and the power and prestige that they 
seem to represent. Yet Johnson manages to ward 
off  any potential envy of  his position as a wealthy 
politician and journalist by representing himself  as 
an un-impinging figure that people can enjoy.
It is arguably this very traditional English trait 
of  refusing to commit and take things too seriously 
which taps into Johnson’s populist appeal as a 
flirtatious, ‘post-ideological’ politician, who plays 
down traditional party loyalty and appeals across 
cross party lines within the South of  England in 
particular. Despite his Thatcherite love of  the 
free-market, Johnson has constructed a persona 
that fits more with that of  a benign, eccentric 
character straight out of  the comic pages of  The 
Dandy. As a media professional surrounded by 
other media professionals, he is skilled at using 
contemporary methods of  political communication 
to associate himself  with a particular nostalgic 
fantasy of  Britain as ‘a truly great country’ as 
being located within an earlier, less complicated 
age of  nannies and flag-waving street parties. This 
nostalgia can be read as a defence against the losses 
and uncertainties of  late modernity. The desire 
to look back, or at least to turn away from the 
contemporary malaise and to identify instead with 
the retro, personality-driven politics of  Johnson, 
can be seen in that broader psychosocial context, 
alongside the more specific features of  the con-
temporary political moment framed by fears of  
migration and the experience of  austerity.
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There were two clear sides of  the 2016 EU Ref-
erendum: Leave versus Remain. Each campaign 
was constituted by activists from across the 
conventional political divide. However, the media 
largely seemed to fixate on the internal dynamics 
of  the Conservative Party. The media framed much 
of  the Referendum narrative around Conservative 
disunity, which was often portrayed as a ‘blue on 
blue’ civil war. At times, the extent of  this coverage 
was such that the campaign appeared to be a 
largely Tory affair. For example, two days before 
the Referendum, the BBC television’s Daily Politics 
show gave over a prominent slot to a segment 
entitled ‘Conservative Party Future?’. Items like 
this reflected a seemingly dominant narrative of  
the media’s Referendum coverage. 
The news media addressed a diverse mix of  
issues during the Referendum but at times the three 
main UK news broadcasting networks- BBC, ITN 
and Sky- appeared noticeably more preoccupied 
with speculating overthe internal dynamics and 
future of  the Conservative Party than they perhaps 
ought to have. 
The nature of  the news reported feeds into 
the wider normative question about the role media 
should play in election campaigns and referenda. It 
seems pertinent to ask whether the more specu-
lative aspects witnessed in this kind of  coverage 
is necessary? Rather the media should focus on 
providing more quality factual information and 
expert analysis and thereby resist the allure of  sen-
sationalised politics and speculation, because it can 
often be misguided and misleading. 
In recent years media speculation over the likely 
outcome of  campaigns has been driven by mislead-
ing polls. The UK’s 2015 General Election is a prime 
example where the news framed its discourse based 
on information of  questionable accuracy which 
encouraged coverage of  red herrings and distrac-
tions. With successive polls suggesting the electorate 
would vote for another coalition government the 
media narrative largely centred on what such a part-
nership might look like. Conversely journalists took 
a more superficial approach when representing and 
analysing party manifestos. The subsequent Tory 
victory highlighted just how that the media had been 
overly preoccupied by misleading polls that fostered 
misguided coverage and agendas. 
In the Referendum the polls generally and 
incorrectly predicted a Remain victory. Therefore 
the media tended to focus on a narrative asto what 
happens to a deeply divided Conservative Party after 
the vote. This was informed by an assumption that 
there would be a continuance of  the status quo that 
provided a misguided frame and context for the 
ensuing discussion. It was only when the UK voted 
Leave and David Cameron resigned that the media 
narrative shifted sharply away from Conservative 
disunity to focus on divisions within the electorate 
and regions of  the UK as well as the ‘meltdown’ in 
the Labour Party; and a disunited Britain.
Aside from misleading polls why were media 
pre-Referendum assumptions about divisions in 
the Conservative Party so misguided? Academics 
have a potentially important role in challenging and 
improving journalistic understandings of  politics. 
For example, when speculating over the survival of  
the Conservative Party, journalists ought to consider 
more of  the context including, in this case, a 350 
year history as the oldest extant, and arguably most 
successful, political party in Western democracy. 
The Party is known for its pragmatism and ability 
to adapt, change and endure through wider social, 
political and cultural changes with historian Richard 
Cockett likenening it to a ‘Darwinian’ organism that 
adapts to survive. 
Over its long history, the Party’s pragmatism 
has tended to trump ideological divides and thereby 
encourage a display of  party unity of  the kind 
generally recognised to be key to electoral success. 
In contrast to the Conservatives the Labour 
Party has been historically characterised by its 
ideological commitments that have rendered it less 
inclined to take pragmatic steps towards preserving 
party unity. The aftermath of  the Referendum is one 
such example. Cameron’s resignation reinforced the 
appearance of  a revival in Conservative Party unity. 
In terms of  the post-Referendum media 
narrative, the blue on blue civil war evaporated to 
be replaced by a more accurate portrayal of  the 
divisions in Labour under Jeremy Corbyn. These 
fractures are driven by much wider and deeper 
ideological fissures than those of  the Conservatives 
whose historic divisions over Britain’s member-
ship of  the EU has been more of  a single issue. 
Yet comparatively little of  pre-referendum media 
speculation and analysis focused on the future of  
the Labour Party. This demonstrates a need for 
more well-informed debate amid quality infor-
mation. Speculative news discourse has played an 
unhelpful and misleading role in dominating wider 
campaign narratives. In referenda and elections, the 
central role of  the media ought to be to facilitate 
the electorate’s access to quality information and 
analysis. A greater exchange of  knowledge between 
media practitioners, academics and experts during 
campaigns might contribute to more credible 
coverage of  politics in Britain.
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Cameron and the Europe question: could it have 
ended any other way?
When David Cameron was elected leader of  the 
Conservatives in December 2005 many saw him as 
the figure that could finally move the party forward 
and, crucially, away from the divisions over Europe 
that had blighted it in opposition since 1997. Here 
was a modern, liberal, Conservative politician that 
could appeal to the electorate and return the party to 
government at the next election. To many of  those 
that backed him in the leadership election, he was 
also no Ken Clarke style Europhile but a moderate 
or ‘soft’ Eurosceptic who believed European 
integration had reached its limits and that some 
powers should be returned to full UK control. Many 
thought, optimistically in hindsight, that this would 
be the first Conservative leader returned to No.10 
not to be consumed and defeated over the question 
of  the UK’s relationship with the European Union. 
We now know that this has turned out not to be 
the case. 
David Cameron joins the previous Conserva-
tives to make it to No 10, Margaret Thatcher and 
John Major, in having Europe as one of  the reasons 
for hastening their departure from office. In the 
case of  Cameron and the lost Remain/Leave EU 
Referendum, it was the defining reason. However 
these events beg two important questions we need 
to consider when evaluating Cameron and Europe 
: was it always going to end like this and could he 
have avoided a fatal confrontation with his party 
over this issue?
This is not the place for in-depth analysis but 
some initial reflections are considered. There were 
early signs that the European issue would pose 
problems for Cameron’s leadership. To win the 
support for his leadership from influential Euro-
sceptic MPs Cameron had to make a number of  
concessions, including a commitment to withdraw 
Conservative MEPs from the European Peoples’ 
Party-European Democrats’ grouping in the 
European Parliament. He also pledged to return full 
control over social and employment policy to the 
UK government. Later he made significant promises 
on restricting the influence of  the Charter of  Fun-
damental Rights and agreed to ghold a referendum 
on the Lisbon Treaty. The mood music was thereby 
established by Eurosceptics and substantial reform 
of  the UK-EU relationship expected. Cameron 
would make it happen and they would not forget.
Timing- in history, politics and stand-up 
comedy- is everything. For Cameron and Europe 
the failure to win the 2010 election outright and 
the subsequent need to form a coalition govern-
ment dependent on the support of  pro-European 
Liberal Democrats MPs largely stymied Tory plans 
for European reform. Rightly or wrongly, many 
Eurosceptic Conservative MPs blamed Cameron 
both for the failure to win in 2010 election and 
for being too quick to drop their reform agenda in 
the face of  Liberal Democrat opposition. Ex-
pectations had been raised in opposition and the 
reality of  being in coalition left many Eurosceptic 
Conservative MPs, members and voters angry and 
disappointed. This, as much as the rise of  UKIP 
during the coalition years, explains the source of  
the pressure that eventually led Cameron to make 
the fateful decision in January 2013 to concede 
the promise an in/out referendum in the event 
of  his re-election as Prime Minister in 2015. Had 
Cameron won the 2010 election and implemented 
some of  the Eurosceptic reform agenda developed 
in opposition, much of  the pressure for such a 
plebiscite might have been defused. 
Could David Cameron have confronted his 
party in opposition and resolved the European 
issue? Could he have resisted the pressure to 
commit to an in/out referendum? These questions 
need further consideration but the likely answer is 
no, not without a potentially disastrous display of  
party disunity and in fighting that could have seen 
Cameron removed as party leader. In many ways, 
from the Prime Minister’s perspective, it is under-
standable why he pursued the course of  action he 
took. Cameron’s formative experiences as a Con-
servative researcher, special advisor and then MP 
were dominated by periods of  internal party conflict 
over the question of  European integration. The 
prospect of  revisiting this issue was not a priority 
given the party had restored some confidence in the 
public that the Conservatives could be trusted with 
the responsibility of  government again. In the end 
it was Cameron’s failure to convince voters, and not 
just the Conservative Party, of  the wisdom of  his 
vision for Europe that ultimately saw his political 
career end prematurely.
The greatest irony of  all is, of  course, the 
way Cameron might have ultimately succeeded in 
stopping the Conservatives from ‘banging on about 
Europe’, given his fateful decision to enable the UK 
vote to leave the European Union altogether.
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One of  the strangest features of  the June 2016 
EU Referendum was that the most pro-European 
political party in Britain was nowhere to be seen. 
Only 13 months before the then party leader, Nick 
Clegg, was Deputy Prime Minister and the party 
was embedded into every level of  cabinet and senior 
coalition government. Yet come the Referendum 
campaign the Liberal Democrats and new leader 
Tim Farron were conspicuous by their absence.
The Liberals and Liberal Democrats have 
consistently been the most sympathetic to the 
European ideal. The British Election Study repeated-
ly demonstrated that the voting public identified 
the Liberal Democrats as the most Euro-friendly 
political party. This is not to say there hadn’t been 
contradictions in sources of  Liberal support. From 
the 1970s the party built a bridgehead in some of  
the most Eurosceptic regions, especially in the South 
West where agricultural and fisheries industries often 
sat uncomfortably with European community policy. 
Nevertheless, it is remarkable that the party took 
such a backseat during the 2016 campaign.
Much of  this was outside the party’s control. 
Coverage in the mainstream media has frequently 
been a problem for the party and the collapse of  
the LibDem vote in 2015 General Election had 
unanticipated consequences. The reduction of  
Liberal Democrats to a miserly eight seats, and 
the triumphant rise of  the SNP in Scotland meant 
that the party lost their third party status in the 
Commons. Consequently, Farron does not auto-
matically get to ask a question in PMQs, further 
reducing the party’s visibility. Meanwhile current 
affairs programmes looking for an alternative voice 
increasingly turn to the Scottish Nationalists, the 
Greens or UKIP to provide non-Conservative/
Labour political viewpoints.
Not so long ago, it had been different. The 
Liberal Democrats were the focal point of  the 
2011 AV Referendum and prior to the 2014 
European elections, Clegg took part in televised 
debates against the UKIP leader Nigel Farage. 
These didn’t go well for Clegg or his party but 
the LibDems had been the face of  pro-Europe-
an narrative in British politics providing positive 
images about free European travel, work mobility 
and the benefits of  migration – an agenda not 
addressed elsewhere. 
The party could have stepped into the void left 
by Conservatives and Labour, fearful of  alienating 
their core vote, and appealed to those voters in 
England and Wales who might have been receptive 
to a more positive European story. Nevertheless 
the LibDems didn’t play – or were not asked to 
play – a significant role in the Remain campaign. 
The EU referendum campaign included 
TV debates and set piece interviews with a vast 
array of  supporting characters; David Cameron 
and Ruth Davidson, Alec Salmond and Nicola 
Sturgeon; Alan Johnson and Sadiq Khan, Michael 
Gove and Boris Johnson, Nigel Farage and Diane 
James, Gisela Stuart and Andrea Leadsom, even 
Jeremy Corbyn played a part. Tim Farron didn’t 
feature in any of  them. 
Moreover any LibDems playing a bit-part 
in the campaign were from a bygone era. Paddy 
Ashdown briefly appeared alongside Neil Kinnock 
in a rerun of  1992, Vince Cable took time off  
promoting his book to interject on the inadequate 
Referendum campaign. Clegg warned of  the 
dangers of  Brexit on two separate occasions; the 
first overshadowed by President Obama’s visit to 
the UK, the second on the eve of  polling barely 
making a bigger mark. However it might be worth 
considering his prophesy to those still contemplat-
ing voting Leave:-
“Having woken on Friday to the news we’re 
quitting the EU, you will assume that those who 
persuaded you to take that leap of  faith have a plan 
about what to do next.
“So imagine how dismayed you will feel when 
you discover, instead, that Nigel Farage, Michael 
Gove and Boris Johnson can’t agree among them-
selves what life outside the EU looks like? 
“So you will look towards our leaders in West-
minster to sort out the mess. Instead, they argue 
among themselves: the Conservatives descend 
into a bloody leadership election; Parliament 
enters years of  constitutional gridlock …Then you 
discover just how unprepared the Government 
is... imagine how you’ll feel when you discover that 
they don’t have a plan?”
After the Referendum Farron announced a 
Liberal Democrat commitment to non-imple-
mentation of  Brexit and claimed a 12,000 surge 
of  new members in the week after the result, but 
this fails to compensate for the party’s invisibility 
during the campaign. 
Structural problems caused the Liberal 
Democrats to go AWOL in the Referendum 
campaign. A party with a reputation for grassroots 
campaign strength might have been the backbone 
of  the Remain cause, instead the evisceration of  the 
party’s Westminster base had a profound effect of  
its ability to break through to the electorate. The 
party is still playing the price for coalition in 2010; 
the referendum campaign suffered as a result.
The Liberal Democrats: the EU Referendum’s 
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The Durham miners’ role in Labour’s culture wars
‘It’s no good. We can’t do it. The Durham miners 
will never wear it’. With these words the Labour 
Deputy Prime Minister Herbert Morrison refused 
France’s invitation for Britain to join the European 
Coal and Steel Community formed in 1951. 
They were almost prophetic. On the 23rd of  
June, the children of  Morrison’s Durham miners, 
the potters of  Stoke-on-Trent, the steel workers of  
Port Talbot, the car workers in Dagenham, and the 
‘left-behind’ voters from the former industrial and 
mining towns of  the Northeast of  England and 
the Midlands showed that they could not ‘wear it’ 
anymore. They overwhelmingly voted to leave the 
European Union. 
By doing so they exposed the schism in the 
Labour Party that could lead to its destruction. If  
there is a snap general election, 150 Labour MPs 
may lose their seats. In short, two thirds of  the 
Parliamentary Labour Party might be obliterated. 
The problem is that there is no easy fix to 
Labour’s woes. The revolt of  the so-called ‘left-be-
hind’ in the party’s heartlands showed the degree 
of  disconnection between Labour and its tradition-
al supporters. Whilst local Labour MPs campaigned 
for ‘Remain’ their constituents wanted Britain out 
of  the EU. To compound this problem, Labour 
is bitterly – and has been for the past decade – 
divided about Europe and immigration.
This is not a new schism. In the past, some 
factions of  the Labour Party invoked British 
(English) exceptionalism as a reason to oppose 
Britain’s participation in the European Communi-
ties. Ernest Bevin, who was Foreign Secretary in 
the Attlee government, spoke of  his fear of  Britain 
‘chaining itself  to a corpse’. A decade or so later it 
was the turn of  the Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell 
to share his worries. In his view, joining the EEC 
would represent ‘the end of  Britain as an inde-
pendent European state’ and ‘of  a thousand years 
of  history’.
A modern version of  Labour’s British ex-
ceptionalism has been articulated by the MP John 
Mann and by the founder of  Blue Labour Maurice 
Glasman who both voted Leave. Whilst Mann 
feared the urbanisation and the loss of  quality of  
life that more immigration would create, Glasman 
argued that ‘Britain was an island and was always at 
an angle to Europe’ that had developed ‘distinctive 
institutions based on the balance of  powers within 
the Ancient Constitution’. 
Apart from romantic notions about British 
exceptionalism, popular resistance to immigration 
has also informed the party’s ambivalence towards 
Europe. Having fiercely opposed immigration 
controls right after the war, Labour was forced to 
reconsider its position in the 1960s when pro-im-
migration MPs started to lose their seats. Hence, 
Harold Wilson’s government tightened controls 
over immigration in 1965 and 1968. 
Under the leadership of  Tony Blair, Labour 
was a proud defender of  immigration and ethnic 
and cultural diversity. But as the popular backlash 
against the new wave of  migration of  the early 
Noughties began to be felt, this policy of  openness 
was accompanied by a coarsening of  political 
language. In 2002, David Blunkett talked of  British 
schools being ‘swamped’ by non-English speaking 
immigrants and in 2007, Gordon Brown promised 
to train ‘British workers for British jobs’.
In the past decade Labour fudged the issue 
by offering an ‘on-the-one-hand-and-on-the-oth-
er’ approach to immigration. It was an attempt to 
unify two strands of  the party – the Cosmopol-
itans and the Nativists – that represent constit-
uencies which have been treated differently by 
globalisation. But as the 2015 General Election 
showed this fudge did not work. In the north 
east of  England and the midlands Labour lost 
thousands of  votes to UKIP, whereas in places 
like Brighton, Bristol and London it further 
alienated an urban, educated youth. 
Some Labour politicians harbour the hope 
that a charismatic leader will heal the social divide 
among supporters. They invoke Clement Attlee, 
Harold Wilson and Tony Blair as prime examples 
of  the leader Labour needs. But there are three 
problems with this strategy. Firstly, Labour does 
not have politicians of  this calibre. Secondly, 
when Attlee, Wilson and even Blair were elected 
the world was a simpler place. At the time of  
Attlee and Wilson, party politics was more tribal 
and turbo-globalisation was yet to create havoc 
in the lives of  Labour’s traditional voters. In the 
case of  Blair, eighteen years of  Conservative rule 
certainly helped him to win a landslide in 1997. 
But in 2016, party politics is far more fragment-
ed. Discontented voters know they have other 
options. Thirdly, the result of  the Referendum 
suggests that voters will not be easily persuaded 
with a fudged approach to immigration. 
Labour faces a fork-in-the-road decision. It 
needs to choose which coalition of  voters it wants 
to represent: either the winners or the losers of  
globalisation. But whatever road it chooses it will 
not be cost-free.
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The Labour Party struggled to win over its supporters 
in the EU Referendum because of  the issues that came 
to dominate the debates. The choice between Remain 
or Leave was really a contest between economics and 
immigration. 
Both issues are challenging for Labour. Since the 
global financial crisis came to Britain in 2007, Labour’s 
credibility for economic policy was under threat as 
rival political parties placed blame for the crisis at 
their feet as the governing party. If  the Referendum 
campaign had focused mostly on whether exiting the 
EU would amount to jumping off  an economic cliff  
into a certain, and avoidable, recession – this was an 
argument they could make and find support. But that’s 
not how things turned out.
Leave supporters addressed public anxieties about 
immigration and said that only by leaving the EU could 
Britain control its borders. This message resonated 
with voters who blamed the EU’s free movement 
for record net migration putting a greater burden on 
already stretched public services.
Labour might have improved public confidence 
about their economic policies over the last decade, 
but they have performed increasingly less well on 
immigration. 
The party’s problems with immigration are 
partly a product of  core constituency groups within 
Labour’s broad political tent. Many supporters are 
well educated, aspirational and view globalisation 
more as an opportunity. But many other supporters 
– primarily, but not exclusively, in Labour’s northern 
heartlands – are skilled workers who have seen their 
communities decline and see globalisation as more a 
threat. A general split in England and Wales between 
urban areas for Remain and rural communities for 
Leave is an indication of  this.
But the real divide was not demographic, but 
more political. Leave won in large part due to public 
anxieties about immigration levels. ‘Leavers’ responded 
favourably to the message of  taking back control from 
the EU because it was believed that Leave would mean 
stricter border controls leading to less immigration.
The simple Leave campaign claim that leaving the 
EU will mean improving borders is doubtful. Despite 
repeated assertions that EU free movement is ‘uncon-
trolled’, it is in fact subject to a number of  restrictions 
like any other freedom. EU citizens can be denied entry 
to another member state if  deemed a security threat 
and deported after six months – not unlike a non-EU 
tourist – should they fail to find work or have a realistic 
prospect for employment.
The Leave campaign also claimed they would 
introduce an Australian-styled points-based immigra-
tion system, but without noticing two key facts. First, 
Australia’s system was designed to increase immigration 
– which it did. Secondly, the UK launched a points-
based immigration system over a decade ago. The 
system is more something borrowed – to be extended 
to cover EU as well as non-EU citizens – than 
something new.
But these facts made little difference. Immigration 
has troubled successive governments since at least 
Tony Blair’s time as Prime Minister. Each has rolled 
out ever more immigration laws and rules – changing 
now almost daily – that few border agents can keep 
up with the current policies let alone the public. As 
net migration figures reached record highs, the public 
became increasingly disappointed with growing 
support for stronger measures.
The Labour Party has had real difficulties 
winning back public confidence, in part, because they 
were blamed for early migration growth as the EU 
expanded. While net migration figures have grown the 
most during the current government’s term in office, it 
has been Labour that has faced repeated criticism for 
opening the door that others have struggled to shut.
Much of  the criticisms that Labour faces has come 
from northern communities like the North East. While 
Labour holds nearly every constituency seat from Blyth 
Valley to Hartlepool, voters strongly supported Leave 
and immigration was the leading issue. 
A consequence is that Labour was at a disadvan-
tage when trying to win over new voters the more 
the debate centred on which side commanded greater 
public confidence on immigration. It did not help that 
Labour generally avoided discussion about immigration 
for much of  the campaign. Beyond criticising Leave’s 
position, Labour’s Remain supporters like Tom Watson 
did not float new policy ideas like restricting EU free 
movement as part of  a renegotiated ‘Remain’ until days 
before the vote.
Labour’s efforts are made more difficult by the 
fact that the areas most for Leave and stricter immigra-
tion controls have the lowest numbers of  foreign-born 
migrants in the country – there are more migrants 
in the Shetland Islands than there are in Redcar and 
Cleveland. Providing greater confidence that migration 
is controlled is crucial for Labour to rebuild public 
trust. The party’s concern for the future is that much 
of  their heartlands chose Leave – rejecting Labour’s 
campaign and perceived weakness on immigration.
The sad irony is that the foundations of  the 
current immigration system supported by all parties 
were built by Blair’s Labour government – from a 
points-based system, stricter English language require-
ments, tougher barriers to claiming asylum and policies 
like the Migration Impacts Fund that provided support 
to local communities to relief  pressures on public 
services due to migration. 
Despite having achieved so much, Labour has 
been rewarded very little for it. 
Nevertheless, the problems that immigration 
caused Labour during the EU Referendum are unlikely 
to go away unless there is some substantial new 
offering to the public. The issue is whether such an 
offer can be made that is agreeable to both their more 
Eurosceptic supporters as well as their more urban and 
aspirational voters.
86
About twenty minutes into the BBC’s live EU 
Referendum result show, David Dimbleby paused, 
touched his earpiece, and delivered the first big 
news of  the evening: “We’re hearing that Nigel 
Farage has conceded and has said that Remain 
has won”. This must have been pure music to 
the ear of  a broadcaster desperate for content to 
fill the chasm until the first declaration. And so, 
for the next twenty minutes, Farage’s comment 
was the main topic of  studio discussion. Then, 
Dimbleby touched his earpiece again. “We’re now 
hearing that Nigel Farage has unconceded – if  that’s 
a word”, as the camera cut to the UKIP leader 
addressing a crowd of  supporters and reporters, 
saying that he was revising his initial assessment. 
Minutes later, television coverage of  the most 
important British political event in at least a gen-
eration was still firmly focused on Farage. He was, 
as usual, playing the media like a fiddle. 
In light of  the referendum result, it is no 
exaggeration to rank Farage as one of  the most 
significant figures in modern British history. 
His has been an extraordinary rise. In 2006, two 
months after Farage assumed its leadership, David 
Cameron described UKIP as a bunch of  “fruit-
cakes, loonies and closet racists”. In the decade 
since, Farage has stamped his authority on his 
party, professionalised the outfit, and become a 
celebrity politician whose image as a supposed 
anti-establishment man of  the people is constant-
ly lapped up and spat out by a media with endless 
airtime to fill and a desperation for novelty in an 
era dominated by bland, career politicians. Even 
before the 2015 General Election, in which UKIP 
garnered nearly four million votes, Farage’s power 
was such that he had exploited Labour’s retreat 
from the working class, the dissolution of  the 
BNP, and the historic split on Europe in the Con-
servative Party: the latter forcing a feeble Prime 
Minister to promise a referendum he didn’t want 
but, in the event, never dreamt he’d lose. 
This epic misjudgement will cement 
Cameron’s reputation as a hugely inept and dis-
astrous leader. Farage, meanwhile, will be judged 
by history as a central character amid an increas-
ingly disorientated post-imperial British society. 
By channelling the insecurities about precarious 
working conditions, stagnant wages, and high 
rents, and focusing them on a specific target – the 
‘strain’ on the UK’s infrastructure from immigra-
tion for which he blames the EU, rather than on 
neoliberal austerity and Western foreign policy 
– Farage has taken his place among a wave of  
right-wing populist politicians across Europe (Le 
Pen, Wilders, Orban, Petry) and beyond (Trump) 
who inspire popular revolt by manipulating the 
media and appealing as much to emotion as to 
reason. To this, Cameron – with the full backing 
of  the British state, and the huge collective weight 
of  myriad establishment figures behind him – had 
no effective answer.
Ironically, until the ballot boxes closed, 
Farage had endured a hugely problematic referen-
dum campaign. With UKIP split along pro- and 
anti-immigration lines (with Douglas Carswell, its 
only MP, in the former faction), Farage’s Grass-
roots Out was usurped by the Johnson-Gove-
Carswell coalition Vote Leave as the designated 
official ‘out’ campaign. In response, Farage ran 
a parallel campaign with Leave.EU: one defined 
by increasingly provocative episodes. First, they 
released a video showing images of  riots across 
Europe voiced-over by Donald Trump reading 
a poem about a supposedly injured snake that 
bites and poisons the person who had rushed to 
help. Then they released a photo of  ISIS fighters 
accompanied by the message: “Act now before 
we see an Orlando-style atrocity…” in reference 
to the homophobic mass killing of  12 June. And 
then Farage thought it appropriate to be pho-
tographed in front of  the notorious ‘Breaking 
Point’ poster featuring refugees fleeing Syria, 
on what turned out to be the morning of  the 
heinous murder of  Jo Cox, MP. Under pressure, 
Farage later apologised for the timing but not the 
content of  the poster. For this, Farage was widely 
condemned; though he had yet to bottom out. On 
the morning of  June 24, in his ‘victory speech’, he 
wondered at the historical achievement of  Brexit 
occurring ‘without a shot being fired’ – forgetting 
(perhaps) the injuries to which the 41-year-old 
former Batley and Spen MP had succumbed. 
Despite realising his own dream, Farage 
may now find himself  personally vulnerable. 
He remains the ultimate ‘Marmite’ politician, 
repulsing as many as he attracts, and, though the 
media won’t leave him alone, his popularity with 
the public may have hit a ceiling. His hold over 
his party is becoming increasingly tenuous, and, 
indeed, the very raison d’être of  UKIP post-
Brexit is rather unclear. That said, as a figure that 
changed the course of  British politics, and as 
an icon that embodies the coarsening of  public 
discourse in the neoliberal era, Farage’s place in 
history is now secure. 
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The age of Nigel: Farage, the media, and Brexit
UKIP leader Nigel Farage and Kate Hoey on board a boat taking part in a Fishing for Leave pro-Brexit "flotilla" on the River 
Thames, London. Picture by: Stefan Rousseau / PA Wire/Press Association Images.
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Just as the 2015 General Election has been characterized 
as the first ‘digital election’ in Britain, so the 2016 EU 
Referendum could be characterized as the first ‘digital 
referendum’. Both the official Leave (‘Vote Leave’) and 
Remain (‘Britain Stronger in Europe’) campaigns utilized 
key aspects of  the successful Obama Model developed 
during the 2008 and 2012 US Presidential Elections 
– more specifically big data mining, data analytics, mi-
cro-targeting and social media – in an attempt to identify 
and then mobilize their respective supporters. 
Campaign strategists Dominic Cummings and 
Matthew Elliott (who successfully organized the 2004 
referendum campaign against a North East regional 
assembly and the 2011 referendum campaign against 
electoral reform respectively) directed the Leave 
campaign, while Stephen Gilbert and Craig Oliver 
(who were associated with the Conservatives’ suc-
cessful 2015 General Election campaign) headed the 
Remain campaign. With the exception of  the adverts 
that were placed in the Metro freesheet in the two days 
before the poll, both campaigns eschewed the tradi-
tional political advertising approach and blanket distri-
bution of  campaign materials, in favour of  a targeted 
and digital approach in their respective air and ground 
wars. The internet, social media and new political com-
munication technologies were utilized for the purposes 
of  voter registration; fundraising; intelligence gathering; 
and message dissemination.
In May 2016 Prime Minister David Cameron 
met with representatives from 30 leading technology 
companies – including Facebook, Instagram, The Lad 
Bible, Snap Fashion, Twitter and Uber – in an attempt 
to encourage voter registration. The key targets were young 
people who were less likely to be on the electoral register 
and who were more likely to vote to Remain. Research 
from the United States, and data pertaining to the 2015 
British General Election, suggests that digital voter 
registration operations are highly effective.
The official Leave and Remain campaigns 
obtained government grants of  £600,000 to fund their 
activities, and also received substantial donations from 
corporations and wealthy individuals. Moreover, they 
both used the internet and social media for fundraising 
purposes, specifically to elicit modest donations from 
activists and members of  the general public – as did 
the dozens of  other registered organizations that par-
ticipated in the referendum.
Utilizing big data mining – drawing upon canvass-
ing returns, social media traffic, voter records and other 
sources (e.g. consumer databases about newspaper read-
ership, shopping habits, etc.) – the Leave and Remain 
campaigns also used the internet and social media for 
intelligence gathering purposes to construct detailed and 
personalised voter profiles. Using analytics software – 
the Voter Identification and Contact System, developed 
in-house, in the case of  the Leave campaign and Nation-
Builder in the case of  the Remain campaign – with their 
in-built algorithms, the respective campaigns were able to 
assign each voter with scores (on a scale of  one-to-five) 
based on how likely they were to vote and how likely 
they were to vote to Leave or Remain. This data was 
then used to compile target lists for digital advertising, 
door knocking (e.g. Get Out the Vote operations) and 
telephone contacts. 
For the first time in British election history, the 
Leave campaign developed an interactive smartphone 
app that was downloaded by tens of  thousands of  
people. Encouraging subscribers to sign up their friends 
and family and asking permission for Vote Leave to 
be able to access their smartphone contacts, this app 
provided a further means of  harvesting valuable data 
about potential Brexit supporters and disseminating key 
campaign messages.
The Leave and Remain campaigns both used 
the internet and social media for message dissemination 
purposes. The key messages of  the Leave campaign 
were ‘Take Back Control’, particularly over immigration 
policy, while the key messages of  the Remain campaign 
were the economy and the risks associated with Brexit. 
The Leave campaign had 554,297 ‘likes’ on Facebook, 
while the Remain campaign had 561,277 ‘likes’. Both 
campaigns spent millions of  pounds on Facebook and 
online advertising. The head of  Labour In for Britain, a 
separate campaign to that deployed by Britain Stronger 
in Europe, confirmed that the Labour Party alone 
spent over £1 million on Facebook and online adver-
tising and successfully reached 13 million people in the 
process. Although excluded from the Leave campaign, 
UKIP, Nigel Farage and Leave.EU played a significant 
role in the quest for Brexit. While generally ignored by 
the mainstream media, which tended to focus on the 
Conservative ‘blue-on-blue’ attacks and debates, UKIP 
contracted Facebook to distribute speeches by Farage, 
plus campaign video footage - and such clips were 
watched by millions of  people.
In theory, the Remain campaign possessed a number 
of  advantages. Firstly, maintaining EU membership 
constituted the status quo option, while withdrawal 
represented the choice of  radical change. Secondly, much 
of  the Establishment, in Britain and internationally, 
supported Remain. Thirdly, until the official period of  
‘purdah’, Prime Minister David Cameron was able to 
deploy the political communication machinery of  the 
state in support of  Remain. Fourthly, although the Con-
servatives were officially neutral, the Remain campaign 
had the use of  at least some of  the party’s resources 
(e.g. activists, voter data, etc.), plus the official support 
of the Labour Party and its political communication 
machine. The Leave campaign, which lacked the support 
of  any political party and which was denied access to 
the resources of  the state, had to build its infrastructure 
largely from scratch. In terms of  political communica-
tion, both the Leave and Remain campaigns were fairly 
evenly matched – deploying similar digital approaches. 
The critical difference, however, was that the Leave 
campaign was much more successful at targeting than the 
Remain campaign. Although the result was close, that is 
the main reason why the Leave campaign was victorious.
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Throughout the EU Referendum campaign, Leave 
supporters had a more visible presence on Twitter. 
This balance shifted somewhat towards the end of  
the campaign with pro-Remain tweets becoming 
more frequent during the latter stages but the 
sentiment results always indicated a likely Leave 
result. Remain supporters mobilised on Twitter 
in the final stages, as they realised that Brexit was 
indeed possible and that the Leave campaign seemed 
to have the momentum but the volume of  people 
motivated to Tweet in favour of  Remain never 
achieved the level of  Leave. Remain sentiment 
reached an all time high on referendum day itself  
(up to 38.5% from a regular 3-5% in Aug 2015). 
Twitter picks up, and likely amplifies, the extremes 
of  debate so unsurprisingly the actual referendum 
results were less extreme than the proportions we 
were seeing in Twitter.
Our unique longitudinal data set allowed us 
to compare and contrast the way that the official 
campaign groups use Twitter as compared with 
the wider public in the Twitter stream and to begin 
tracking the trends in Twitter behaviour, including 
the use of  hashtags. Tweeters are typically highly 
motivated and perhaps those who see themselves as 
the underdogs in the debate. Salience, coherence and 
intensity are key to motivation.
The Leave campaign were faster out of  the gates 
on Twitter and dominated even when at a lower 
ebb in opinion polls. Leave continued to dominate 
in Twitter, throughout the campaign. This likely 
reflected the intensity of  motivation for those in 
favour of  Leave. Despite very public splits in the 
Leave camp, there has been an impassioned com-
mitment from Leave supporters to their cause, and 
a shared anti-establishment position, that is clearly 
deeply motivating and highly salient to those individ-
uals. It appears from the turn out that this cause had 
also motivated those who do not typically vote and 
often feel unheard in the current political system.
The Remain campaign got off  to a much slower 
start on Twitter and never really caught up. Despite 
the greatly improved presence of  the official @
StrongerIn campaign on Twitter, it never attained 
the degree of  impact on Twitter achieved by Leave. 
The picture is of  a much less motivated public. 
This may reflect the lack of  a positive cause to rally 
around. Early discussions around the renegotiation 
of  the UK’s deal with the EU inevitably focused on 
its current shortcomings.
The smaller proportion of  pro-Remain tweets 
compared with pro-Leave may be explained by this 
lack of  intense impassioned motivation to champion 
the cause of  EU membership. Early on, any bumps 
in Remain support were clearly event-related, for 
example in response to David Cameron’s letter 
to Donald Tusk on October 2015 and when the 
UK’s ‘new settlement’ with the EU was announced 
in February 2016. Although by the end of  the 
campaign we saw a solid 20-30% pro-Remain tweets. 
The late increase in pro-Remain tweeting appears to 
have reflected the greater pressure that Remainers 
felt under in the late stages of  the campaign and 
their increased motivation to vocalize support – with 
Twitter acting as the medium of  the underdog.
Examining patterns in the Twitter debate also 
tells us what topics those motivated to tweet are 
spontaneously associating with the debate on the 
EU referendum. We can also begin to break this 
down geographically, allowing us to examine how 
the different nations within the UK are tweeting 
about the EU referendum. Scotland, although 
strongly Remain in the final referendum vote, had a 
higher proportion of  Leave voters than many antici-
pated. This Leave presence was visible in the Twitter 
sentiment for Scotland. Meanwhile, two of  the top 
twenty hashtags used by those in Scotland motivated 
to tweet on the EU referendum were #indyref  and 
#indyref2. As Nicola Sturgeon confirmed in her 
statement the next morning from Bute House, the 
option of  a second independence referendum is 
now firmly on the table.
Twitter analysis has strengths and weaknesses. 
Twitter users are not representative of  the wider 
public – they are self-selected users not those 
chosen on the basis of  careful sampling by opinion 
pollsters. Twitter users tend to be highly motivated 
(with an axe to grind), younger than average (though 
not exclusively young) and are likely more often men 
when engaged in political debate. So any insights are 
partial. That said, Twitter is a reflection of  spon-
taneous, motivated behaviour – it helps us to see 
where those highly motivated individuals position 
themselves in relation to the debate, what appears 
to provoke peaks in motivated activity and also 
what the overall trends are in these vocal and active 
publics. Our unique collection method allows us to 
put the Twitter debate on the EU referendum into a 
more meaningful perspective.
In this case it has correctly echoed the results.
The results are in and the UK will #Brexit: what did 
social media tell us about the UK’s EU referendum?
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Figure 1: Pro-Leave and Pro-Remain Sentiment in Twitter June 2016
Figure 2: Top 20 Hashtags linked to EU referendum in Twitter in Scotland
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Automatic polling using Computational 
Linguistics: more reliable than traditional polling?
The outcome of  the 2016 EU referendum did not 
only spell disaster for the incumbent prime minister 
and the Remain campaign. It also amounted to 
a PR disaster for the commercial pollsters, with 
YouGov, Populus, ComRes, ORB Ipsos-Mori and 
Survation all failing to correctly predict the outcome. 
Of  the larger pollsters, only TNS correctly ‘called’ 
the outcome, although still underestimating the 
LEAVE vote.1 This follows hard on the heels of  
similar failures in both the 2010 and 2015 General 
Elections.2 Public faith in commercial polling has, in 
other words, taken another serious blow.
By contrast, automatic poll prediction sites 
using Computational Linguistics (CL) techniques 
to automatically extract information from social 
media (methods also known as Natural Language 
Processing, or text mining), by and large correctly 
predicted that LEAVE would prevail. Indeed, the 
final prediction produced on our own site, SENSE-
EU,3 estimated the vote correctly to within one-tenth 
of  a percentage point: 51.79% for LEAVE and 
48.21% for REMAIN. While every new methodol-
ogy is rightly treated with a degree of  suspicion and 
while it is premature to expect traditional polling to 
disappear, there are grounds for both campaigners 
and the media to take CL techniques seriously in the 
future.
How do sites using CL methods work? The 
characteristic common to all is that they analyse a 
massive numbers of  posts on social media websites 
such as Twitter or Facebook.4 The posts about 
topics of  interest are found (the simplest way to 
do this is by looking for tweets with a particular 
hashtag, such as #Brexit, although most CL sites use 
more sophisticated methods). What happens next 
depends on the site. The most popular approach 
is to use so-called sentiment analysis to classify the 
relevant posts according to their positive or negative 
sentiment towards that topic. By contrast our own 
site, SENSE-EU, uses a different method based on 
the assumption that posts on social media tend to be 
part of  a conversation: after classifying these posts 
as as favouring LEAVE or REMAIN, it classifies 
responses to these posts as being in agreement or 
disagreement with the statement in the post. These 
methods, of  course, are by no means perfect: they 
often incorrectly assess the sentiment of  a post, or 
whether the poster actually agrees or disagrees (e.g., 
when the poster is being ironic); nevertheless, the 
sheer volume of  data analysed means that by and 
large CL-based automatic poll prediction sites tend 
to be a pretty accurate gauge of  opinion towards a 
topic. 
In the aftermath of  the referendum, YouGov 
attributed the error in their predictions to higher 
turnout in LEAVE-oriented areas. Other pollsters 
will doubtless provide their own accounts of  the 
debacle that will be worth considering. In the 
meantime, we think that there may be three reasons 
why CL sites may produce more accurate predictions 
than traditional polling:
One reason is the sample size. Traditional polls 
typically interview at most 1,000 to 2,000 individuals. 
By contrast, CL-sites process a minimum of  200,000 
posts by tens of  thousands of  people per day and 
their predictions are generally based on at least 
800,000 posts. Aggregation of  this order produces 
compelling evidence.
Traditional polling asks for the people’s be-
havioural intentions or opinions, whereas CL-sites 
try to infer opinions that motivate behaviour. 
Modern cognitive science has established that direct 
questions about opinions and behavioural inten-
tions may produce unreliable and invalid responses. 
Asking subjects to fill questionnaires is only used 
when more indirect methods cannot be applied, 
such as measuring the time it takes to perform a 
task, or eye-tracking. CL represents just such an 
indirect method, since it focuses on opinions that 
are some distance from the behaviour.
CL sites may well cover posts coming from a 
wider range of  geographical locations.
These are just speculations and require further 
study. To date, neither polling organizations nor the 
media have paid much attention to CL methods, 
but the results of  this and previous elections 
suggest that these methods, with all their limitations, 
produce reliable forecasts. At the very least, cam-
paigners and the media alike should consider using 
CL methods to compare with the polls.
1. See the final predictions reported at: http://ukpollingreport.
co.uk/
2. Market Research Society, Report of the Inquiry into the 2015 
British general election opinion polls (London: MRS, 2016).
3. SENSE-EU was developed by the EU project SENSEI: http://
www.sensei-conversation.eu. The primary developers were Fabio 
Celli, Carmelo Ferrante and Giuseppe Riccardi for UNITN, and 
Marc Poch and Hugo Zaragoza for Websays.
4. See http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/25/business/brexit-
talk-on-social-media-heavily-favored-the-leave-side.html for an 
interesting analysis of the discussion about the referendum on 
social media.
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Impact of social media on the outcome of the 
EU referendum
When Prime Minister David Cameron announced 
his resignation this morning following Britain’s vote 
to leave the European Union, it was impossible not 
to notice the irony of  his situation. In his 2009 data 
speech, he described the Internet as an “amazing polli-
nator” that “turns lonely fights into mass campaigns; transforms 
moans into movements; excites the attention of  hundreds, 
thousands, millions of  people and stirs them to action.” This 
power has now been turned against him, as millions 
of  people were motivated, persuaded and mobilised 
through the Internet to vote for Brexit.
For several months, the Leave camp has been 
building momentum online and has been setting the 
tone of  the debate across all major social networking 
platforms. Our large-scale social media data analysis 
shows that not only did Brexit supporters have a more 
powerful and emotional message, but they were also 
more effective in the use of  social media. We find 
that the campaign to leave had routinely outmuscled 
its rival, with more vocal and active supporters across 
almost all social media platforms. This has led to the 
activation of  a greater number of  Leave supporters at 
grassroots level and enabled them to fully dominate 
platforms like Facebook, Twitter and Instagram, influ-
encing swathes of  undecided voters who simply didn’t 
know what to think. 
For example, we have captured 30 weeks of  data 
from Instagram, analysing over 18k users and 30k 
posts. This data indicates that not only were there twice 
as many Brexit supporters on Instagram, but they were 
also five times more active than Remain activists. The 
same pattern could be found on Twitter, where we 
found that the Leave camp outnumbers the Remain 
camp 7 to 1. The online momentum of  the Leave 
camp was equally evident in the support they received 
from the community. On average, Instagram posts 
from the members of  the Leave camp received 26% 
more likes and 20% more comments, while the most 
active users in the dataset were also all campaigning for 
a Leave vote. Furthermore, the top 3 most frequently 
used hashtags in the data come from the Leave camp 
and were well integrated into all networked conversa-
tions online: #Brexit, #Beleave and #VoteLeave. Using 
the Internet, the Leave camp was able to create the 
perception of  wide-ranging public support for their 
cause that acted like a self-fulfilling prophecy, attracting 
many more voters to back Brexit.
This can be explained by a combination of  factors. 
First, the main Leave camp message was much more 
intuitive and straightforward, which is particularly 
important for social media campaigning. Second, their 
message was also highly emotionally charged, which 
facilitated the viral spread of  Leave ideas. There is 
evidence to suggest that high arousal emotions such as 
anger and irritation spread faster than messages focusing 
on rational or economic arguments, particularly on social 
media. In this regard, we have observed many instances 
where people expressed utter confusion about the 
economic arguments on both sides. Considering that the 
reasons for Leaving were more emotional, and that the 
average Internet user was exposed to a deluge of  Brexit 
posts on a daily basis — both from friends and strangers 
online — we warned that a British exit vote could be a 
real possibility.
Remain lost the battle online long before it lost 
the political battle on the ground. The overwhelming 
Leave sentiment across all social networking platforms 
was consistent and undeniable, yet many Remain 
supporters chose to ignore the voice of  the Internet 
as something that has no connection with the real 
political world. They believed that Britain would never 
vote to leave the EU and discounted social media as a 
playground for trolls and teenagers.
Instead of  responding with more relatable 
emotional messages, the official Remain camp 
continued to rely on calculated rational arguments 
and a relentless tide of  economic forecasts. When 
#CatsAgainstBrexit started trending, we saw a glimmer 
of  hope for Remain, but sadly the whimsical power 
of  Internet cats was not enough to turn around the 
debate. In fact, the volume of  tweets that urged Britain 
to #VoteRemain was quickly dwarfed by the enormous 
turbulence caused by the trending #IVotedLeave 
hashtag on the day of  the referendum.
Following the results of  the referendum, 52% 
Leave and 48% Remain, the Internet public continued 
to be cataclysmically divided on this important issue 
and responded with a mixture of  surprise, frustration 
and dark humour. On the one hand, the Leave side 
euphorically celebrated this new British #Independ-
enceDay from the EU. On the other hand, the Remain 
side reacted with memes and pictures to voice their 
intense frustration and sorrow – channelled through 
the trending hashtag #NotMyVote. And once again, 
the Internet is being used to mobilise people to protest 
against the referendum results across the country, 
join “vigils for our country’s common sense”, sign a 
petition for a second referendum and even to make 
London an independent state and join the EU with 
#Londependence. 
Social media has changed the nature of  political 
campaigning and will continue to play a key role in 
future elections around the world. As more and more 
people spend a significant proportion of  their everyday 
lives online, social media is becoming a more powerful 
force to assist and influence the spread of  political 
ideas and messages. What the EU referendum has 
taught us is that this accelerating technology is open 
to all and can be used to shape the public agenda and 
drive social change — for better or for worse. 
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Talking past each other: the Twitter campaigns
Online campaigning has become an increasingly 
important part of  the modern political portfolio, as 
a way of  reaching supporters and communicating 
core messages without the filter of  the mass media. 
The EU referendum provided a good demonstration 
of  these new approaches, with both sides aiming 
to extend their reach as much as possible, given the 
unusual situation of  every vote having equal weight 
(unlike a General Election run under FPP).
This has been the key motive for following the 
social media campaigns of  those groups contesting 
the referendum, particularly on Twitter, to under-
stand better the messages that they are making, the 
way in which they frame and the extent to which 
their followers have been picking these up. Here we 
summarise our weekly analyses from the campaign 
period itself, to give the bigger picture, drawing on 
over 31,000 tweets from ten different groups.
Leave dominated online
Throughout the campaign, Leave groups have been 
both more visible and more popular than their 
Remain opponents. In terms of  followers, this is true 
whether we look at the two lead groups – Vote Leave 
and Stronger In – or the Conservative and Labour 
pairs, or indeed the camps as a whole. This reflect the 
much longer establishment of  eurosceptics online, 
plus the more visceral nature of  their campaigning. 
Indicative of  this is the dominance of  Leave.EU, 
which even without securing the official designation, 
has maintained a clear lead over any other group, with 
1.5 times as many Twitter followers as all the Remain 
groups in our sample.
If  we consider volumes of  output, then the 
disparity is smaller, although in only two weeks in 
our sample period have the Remain camp tweeted 
more than Leave. While the last three weeks saw 
a massive increase in tweeting by the two official 
groups, this still saw Leave produce more content. 
Incidentally, we should note the final week’s volumes 
were brought down by two days when almost no 
activity took place online, following Jo Cox’s murder.
The campaign only belatedly caught the 
public’s attention
Whatever might have been happening elsewhere, 
online there was only a very late uptick in public 
engagement with groups’ Twitter activity, be that 
increased numbers of  followers and improved rates 
of  retweeting groups’ content. Twitter follower 
growth did strengthened in the last few weeks, but it 
has not approached the rates seen around the time 
of  Cameron’s European Council deal. This suggests 
that the majority of  those who are deeply engaged 
with the issue have been so for a long time and that it 
remained a marginal issue for many voters, the high 
turnout on the day notwithstanding. This suggests 
campaigners on all sides might need to reconsider 
strategies for subsequent contests.
Likewise, when we consider our standardised 
measure for audience engagement – the average 
number of  retweets per tweet per follower – then 
there is no clear movement either for groups as a 
whole or for individual groups. If  there has been any 
pattern then it is that the more focused groups have a 
generally better rate of  engagement than the broader 
ones. Of  course, this measure masks the generally 
larger effect of  engagement by Leave, driven by the 
much larger follower base. In short, Remain might 
have been more efficient in their reach, but Leave 
dominated in simple volume.
Campaigns have become less positive over time, 
but negative campaigning doesn’t clearly work
Both camps become more negative in their framing 
of  content over time, as measured by the split 
between positive claims about their position or group, 
versus negative ones about the alternative or their 
opponents. This has also been true of  the three main 
groups: Stronger In, Vote Leave and Leave.EU.
While the TV debates in the last weeks did 
contribute to this substantially, given the scope for 
immediate critiquing of  opponents, the trend long 
predates these events. Our analysis does not yet offer 
up a convincing explanation for why this occurs, but 
one possibility is that there has been a shift from 
generic arguments to more specific reaction to events, 
which produces a similar type of  effect to that found 
with the TV debates.
If  there has been a growth in negative framing, 
then it has not been an unambiguous benefit to 
groups. Taking our sample as a whole, we do not find 
that negative framings clearly out-perform positive 
ones on our engagement measure (average number 
of  retweets/tweet/follower). Positive arguments and 
negative comments about other groups shown very 
similar rates , while negative arguments and positive 
mentions of  one’s own group trail a bit behind.
The campaigns have been (mostly) consistent in 
their approach to Twitter
Stronger In’s Twitter campaign was built primarily 
around business, trade and the economy, with spikes 
in other issues at certain times. For example, at the 
beginning of  June there is a significant jump in 
the number of  tweets related to domestic issues. 
Overall, the campaign has built its message around a 
core message on business and the economy and the 
actions of  the other campaign.
Vote Leave conducted a very different social 
media campaign to Stronger In, using Twitter to 
promote its own campaign efforts, rather than 
engaging the opposing campaign, or focusing on 
specific issues. Rather, the campaign has focused 
consistently on a range of  issues – politics; domestic 
issues; immigration; business, trade and the economy; 
security – but none of  these have come to dominate.
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Political memes and polemical discourse: 
the rise of #usepens
Memes are a useful site for understanding audiences 
and the relationships between politics and popular 
culture. Analysis of  the #usepens meme unveils a 
microcosm of  partisan politics and the impact of  
the divisive and antagonistic campaigning in the 
run-up to the referendum. It also underscores the 
emerging polemicisation of  internet discourse.
The #usepens hashtag first surfaced in a 
political context in reference to the Scottish 
referendum in 2014 reflecting a suspicion of  vote 
tampering. The conspiracy theory involved the Con-
servative government using MI5 to rub out penciled 
in ballot papers to change the vote, thereby rigging 
the referendum, with the support and cover-up of  
mainstream media outlets like the BBC. The meme 
emerged again on Twitter amid claims of  election 
rigging in Nigel Farage’s constituency of  South Thanet, 
the Eurovision Song Contest (with Russia as the 
conspirator), and the London Mayoral Election, and 
became synonymous with distrust of  the ruling elite.
It was unsurprising then to see the meme 
re-emerging before the EU referendum alongside 
the now common election day meme #dogsatpoll-
ingstations. There were three common ways in which 
the meme was used. Firstly, and the least frequent, 
was by promoters of  the conspiracy encouraging 
those voting leave to use pens. @danchamberlainx 
reminded voters: ‘Don’t forget your black pens 
tmoro people #usepens #voteleave’ followed by the 
strong arm and union jack emoticons.
Secondly, the meme was used to tag those who 
were supporting the conspiracy theory online to 
alert others to their tweets and to bring them in to 
the wider conversation. This was initiated on May 4th 
during the London Mayoral election by Twitter user 
@trewloy in response to a now removed tweet from 
UKIP activist @AnishUKIP: ‘if  you see an advocate 
of  using pens who believes the vote will otherwise 
be rigged please use the #usepens hashtag’.
The third, most common way in which the 
meme was used and spread, was as a way of  sati-
rising sympathisers of  the conspiracy theory. Some 
uses of  #usepens focused on the nationalism of  
those voting leave, such as @hrtbs tweeting: ‘Most 
of  our pens are made in the EU. No thanks I’m 
taking my own pen to the ballot box. #usepens’ 
accompanied with photo of  a Union Jack pen, while 
others implied racism, such as @cosmic_serf  to @
trewloy, ‘black pen’? for absolute certainty, use a 
Caucasian pen #usepens.’ A majority hinted at a 
lack of  intelligence of  those who believed in the 
conspiracy and were voting to leave: ‘@yakhunt, 
‘Never mind #usepens, to be completely certain 
that your vote to leave counts, use blood, arterial 
blood, your own, thank me later.’ , @shewolfmanc ‘I 
don’t think #usepens goes far enough. I’ve tattooed 
my vote to my arm & will be presenting myself  at 
the count tonight #inyourfaceMI5’, @claire-phi-
pps, ‘Baffled by #usepens. What if  evil returning 
officers burn your papers instead? Or eat them? 
#UseFlameRetardantInediblePaper
The widespread nature of  the belief  in a con-
spiracy was revealed in the run up to the referendum 
by a YouGov poll commissioned by LBC radio. The 
poll, based on field work between 15th and 16th June 
2016, found that 46% of  leave voters thought it 
was likely that the EU referendum would be rigged, 
while 28% thought that MI5 is working with the UK 
government to try and stop Britain leaving the EU. 
A third of  those surveyed (36%) believed that the 
BBC and ITN are also connected to the conspira-
cy. Yet the main narrative at play in the use of  the 
meme reveals a polemical mode of  discourse which 
overstates its opposition (nobody actually thinks 
voters will use inedible paper or tattoo their vote to 
their arm) and satirises Brexit voters, undermining 
their real concerns of  the establishment and refusing 
to truly listen to them.
Amid Project Hate and Project Fear, it has been 
all too easy for voters from either camp to caricature 
the concerns and opinions of  the other rather than 
to engage in meaningful active listening and dis-
cussion (Bickford, 1996). An analysis of  #usepens 
reveals a polemical mode of  discourse, enabled and 
necessitated by social media’s short attention span, 
which sits uneasily alongside the moderate, reasoned 
discussion of  principles and values that we have 
come to accept as a foundation of  democracy. 
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E-newsletters, persuasion and the referendum
The referendum campaign was persuasive, but not 
automatically linked to past partisan behaviour. 
Yet clearly the parties tried to use the campaign as 
a means of  talking to their supporters. This study 
focused on how three of  the parties supporting 
the Remain campaign sought to persuade using 
one channel. I looked at the e-newsletters of  three 
parties: Labour; Liberal Democrats; and Greens. 
This study looks not just at how the parties viewed 
the debate on this issue, but also how they clearly 
had in mind future elections.
Collectively these parties sent out 27 emails 
during the six-week campaign to those on their 
publicly available e-newsletter lists. The Liberal 
Democrats and Labour sent the most with 10 each 
and the Greens 7. One of  the cores to persuasive 
communication is the credibility of  the message 
sender, and there was a difference of  approach 
here. The Liberal Democrats were most likely to 
send their emails from an internal staff  member, 
the Labour Party were more likely to send it on 
behalf  of  the Leader, and the Greens a well-known 
politician. There were some interesting nuances on 
the source. On the eve of  polling Labour’s email 
including an emotive appeal in a short video from a 
World War two veteran. One email from the Greens 
took an interesting approach coming from the youth 
wing, and making an argument specifically about 
why the issue was important to young people.
The prime message projected by the e-news-
letters was to raise money with fourteen messages 
mentioning or being only about financial resources 
required, though none of  the Greens emails called 
for financial support (though the last one was an 
appeal to join). Thirteen messages aimed to mobilise 
people either to sign up for something or to attend 
an event. All seven of  the Greens e-newsletters 
sought to achieve this. As might be expected the 
financial appeals were earlier in the campaign and 
more of  the mobilising appeals were towards the 
end. There were also eleven messages that addressed 
the arguments why the receiver should vote a 
particular way, and again there was a party differ-
ence. Four of  Labour’s mentioned the arguments, 
seven of  the Greens and only one of  the Liberal 
Democrats. Both Labour and the Liberal Democrats 
conducted an opinion poll once to see how people 
expected to vote, presumably to tailor later emails. 
We can sum up the approach of  each party’s e-news-
letters to be:
• Labour – to explain why the issue is relevant to 
Labour voters;
• Liberal Democrats – we are doing more than 
everyone else, so please give us money;
• Greens – why the issue is important to the 
sustainable agenda.
The three parties appear to deliberately use a 
number of  persuasion techniques. One of  the most 
obvious is the car-salesman technique of  stressing 
scarcity, in this case how long we have to make a 
difference. So Tim Farron, leader of  the Liberal 
Democrats said “We have 45 days to shape and 
secure the future of  our country”. Such an approach 
also stresses the importance of  the issue, so 
referring to the campaign to get people to register; 
a Labour email said “This is the week that can make 
or break our campaign.” 
Probably the most common thread was to stress 
the importance of  the vote. For example, it was 
referred to as “by far the most important vote of  a 
generation.” Such appeals were aimed at those who 
had a high interest in the debate. Both the Labour 
Party and the Greens provided rationally based 
arguments tailored to the needs of  their supporters. 
Another key component in the messages was 
fear, that something bad would happen if  people did 
not vote. Thus a Liberal Democrat email said “last 
week the IMF said that Britain voting leave could 
range from ‘pretty bad to very, very bad.’” They also 
used fear messages within their fundraising efforts, 
stressing that “Nigel Farage is on track to outspend 
us over the coming weeks,” the hope being that 
this would prompt more donations. Indeed, the 
appeals for donations consistently demonstrate the 
use of  persuasion. The requests for donations often 
had specific amounts, explained what a particular 
donation value would allow the campaigners to do, 
and what the effect would be. 
This study was limited in terms of  sample and 
communication channel, though there are clear 
themes. Email was used to help these parties talk to 
their supporters, and so focusing more on mobi-
lising than changing opinion. Fear may have taken 
more of  a role than it might in General Elections, 
but this can be explained by the one-off  nature of  
the vote. All the parties seemed to have more than 
half  an eye on the future, and their long-term rela-
tionship with e-newsletter subscribers by encourag-
ing activity. 
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United by what divides us: 38 Degrees and the 
EU Referendum
“People. Power. Change.” These three words 
represent the organisational mantra of  the 
non-profit, political activist movement 38 Degrees. 
Over 3 million British citizens are affiliated to the 
group and use digital media to set its strategic pri-
orities. Those involved are not tied into one fixed 
ideology, but pick and choose those issues to which 
they relate. By providing choice over the conditions 
of  their participation the support behind each 
campaign tends to be fairly uniform. But what 
happens when an issue is so significant that it cuts 
across the interests of  the entire membership and 
the “people” don’t agree? 
The referendum on whether the United 
Kingdom should vote to remain in or leave the 
European Union divided friends, families, and 
communities. The group’s vast network of  sup-
porters reflected these splits. As is customary for 
38 Degrees, the leadership polled their members on 
how the movement should respond to the referen-
dum. Over 230,000 voted, with 59 per cent indicating 
that they wished to stay in the EU while a significant 
minority—28 per cent—would be backing leave. As 
a result, 38 Degrees did not pick a side during the 
referendum. However, there was evidence of  wide-
spread agreement on the role that the group should 
play within the referendum campaign, with 97 per 
cent outlining their support for neutral fact-check-
ing of  the claims made by the Remain and Leave 
campaigns. 
This campaign took a number of  different 
forms. The leadership coordinated a crowdfunding 
campaign for Full Fact, a non-partisan charity that 
checks the accuracy of  claims made by politicians, 
the media, and pressure groups: lobbying for 
corrections where necessary. Leaflets and beer mats 
were distributed alongside a series of  videos that 
outlined the findings of  their research. 38 Degrees 
also worked with Crowdpac to create a quiz to help 
citizens determine where they stand on the EU 
question. Rather than telling participants how to 
vote, the quiz compared their opinions against the 
main arguments from both sides of  the EU debate. 
Over 230,000 people took part.
Members also took an active role, with 30,000 
joining the “Fact Squad.” This group received live 
fact-checks over WhatsApp, with the intention of  
sharing this information with others. This tactic 
was both innovative and potentially impactful, as 
research showed that recommendations from family 
and friends were important sources of  information 
during the campaign period. Crucially, 38 Degrees 
focused on providing advice and guidance rather 
than actively persuading citizens how to vote.
This campaign illustrates some important 
characteristics of  38 Degrees. It shows that the 
movement is not a “hard-nosed, left-wing Labour-sup-
porting organisation.” Many of  its members possess 
a wide range of  views. When they are brought 
together en masse then conflicts between them can 
begin to emerge. During my research I organised a 
meeting with a group of  members. In this conven-
tional, face-to-face setting some of  the fundamental 
differences on key policy issues, like climate change, 
were abundantly clear. So what did unify these 
activists who were so divided?
We know from past research that tangible 
evidence of  policy change is a key factor for under-
standing why citizens engage with the movement. 
But this campaign did not allow for such a re-
al-world impact. Instead, we see the importance 
of  members seeing evidence of  their views being 
enacted upon by the leadership. 
This helps us to understand the enduring 
appeal of  this organisational form. The leader-led 
campaigns bring together the experience and 
judgment of  a handful of  political professionals 
with large groups of  loosely connected citizens, who 
use widely available technologies to set the overall 
priorities of  the movement. As a result, many of  the 
group’s successes are a result of  effective lobbying 
from those who may not actually agree with the 
position taken. I suspect this may have been the case 
in this campaign. But ultimately this is how the staff  
at 38 Degrees put “people power” into practice. By 
using digital technologies rank and file members 
are making the important decisions, not the staff  
based in London. Although the levers of  power may 
remain the same, those who operate them, and the 
means by which they do so, are unique.
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Boris, Brexit or bust
While social media’s influence upon voting trends 
remains unclear, their impact upon public debate 
among a growing demographic (that millennial 
generation whose political discourse is increasing-
ly enacted online) – and among media elites who 
interpret Twitter as what Anstead calls “a proxy for 
public opinion” – seems evident. Through inter-
views with bloggers on either side (Nick Cohen and 
Paul Staines), this report explores how one tabloid 
column sparked controversy online.
On 22 April, as Barack Obama predicted 
a Brexited Britain would be at “the back of  the 
queue” for American deals, Boris Johnson referred 
in The Sun to “the part-Kenyan President’s ancestral 
dislike of  the British Empire” as evidenced by 
his removal from the Oval Office of  a bust of  
Churchill. The following day that paper defended 
Johnson against the disapprobation of  “virtue-signal-
ling Twitter morons” (though Johnson had himself, 
according to the Mail on 19 February, been recruited 
to the cause by “a social media campaign”).
This skirmish, in what The Guardian had (on 
20 February) called the referendum’s “social media 
war”, was fuelled by traditional news institutions. On 
22 April Jonathan Freedland wrote in The Guardian 
of  Johnson’s “elastic relationship with principle”; on 1 
May Stewart Lee in The Observer noted Johnson had 
“changed from being merely a twat, into a full-blown 
c**t.” Both columns appeared in The Guardian’s 
blogging forum and were widely shared online. On 
22 April Nick Cohen’s Spectator blog described that 
publication’s former editor as “a braying charlatan, 
who […] uses the tactics of  the coward and the tricks of  
the fraudster to advance his worthless career.” Cohen’s 
blog proved popular on social media: Cohen tweeted 
on 22 April that it was “trending in United Kingdom.” 
The blogosphere was not entirely antagonistic 
towards Johnson. Paul Staines (aka Guido Fawkes) 
defended the accuracy of  Johnson’s Churchill bust 
remarks (against claims to the contrary by The 
Guardian): “Boris is proven right”. Staines argues that 
social media’s speed of  response “allows you to 
counter-spin. Anything that’s bullshit gets taken 
apart pretty quickly – for example the ‘back of  
the queue’ thing in Obama’s speech. You have an 
iterative process that constantly and quickly pulls 
apart inaccuracies – but you’ve got to separate that 
from the 90 per cent of  noise.”
Cohen similarly notes that social media 
generates “a vast amount” of  misinformation and 
that, by contrast, the trustedness of  broadcast media 
underpins their influence: “in this referendum, the 
most important thing will be television coverage.”
Staines, however, repeatedly challenged the 
“diplomatic” tone of  broadcasters’ scrutiny of  the 
Remain campaign in such outputs as the BBC’s 
online EU Referendum Reality Check, criticizing 
its “mysterious” toning down of  its critique of  
Remain campaign claims. The Independent noted on 28 
February that the BBC would “not be able to avoid 
social-media accusations of  bias” and Staines 
admits that “a common theme on our side of  the 
argument is that the BBC is biased. There’s a world 
view at the BBC that people who want to leave the 
EU are lunatics.”
Staines does not claim objectivity: “We are 
partisan. We deconstruct the Remain side more than 
the Leave side. I wouldn’t pretend to be the BBC 
and impartial – though I’m not sure the BBC is 
impartial!” In this sense, Staines echoes John Fiske’s 
1987 argument against journalism’s claim to objec-
tivity as a means to “increase its control”.
Cohen argues that old and new media outputs 
reach “different audiences” – and that online readers 
come “with fewer preconceptions.” The Independent 
asked on 17 February whether social media have 
“made us crude and dismissive in our judgements.” The 
Telegraph argued on 29 February that “social media 
have eroded the noble art of  taking your time to think 
it through” and spoke on 27 April of  the “corrosive 
influence of  social media.” But in contrast to what 
Leveson described as the “ethical vacuum” of  the 
internet, Cohen sees value online in being associ-
ated with a trusted organization: “people want the 
assurance that this is coming from a reputable news 
organization. That’s why personal blogs are dying 
out.”
Cohen suggests that “all journalists are es-
sentially online journalists. The main way people 
read you is via Facebook or Twitter links.” But 
institutional anchoring allows both bloggers to gain 
audience trust.
Yet did the phenomenon of  ‘Bregret’ reported 
in the wake of  the vote suggest the electorate were 
swayed by a rhetoric unprecedentedly econom-
ical with objectivity? Did the discursive bias of  
broadcast coverage of  the loveable underdog 
(“Boris”) against a distant authority (“Mr Cameron”) 
– trending even after the murder of  Jo Cox to 
normalize xenophobia (as Cohen suggested on 26 
June, a prioritising of  entertainment over expertise) 
– favour the odds of  Brexit? Was this because 
no one could see the result coming? Or did that 
outcome represent a fundamental rejection of  that 
institutional attempt to foster balance?
Voters
8
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A lot of  attention has been paid to the motivations 
of  people who voted leave. I want to turn the 
question around and ask what failed to motivate 
people to vote remain. 
On EU referendum election night, at ITV, we 
used a forecast of  leave and remain votes across 
each local counting area, using British Election Study 
(BES) data. Leave out-performed our expectations 
in the areas we expected to vote leave. Remain votes 
were broadly consistent with a 50:50 tie in areas we 
expected to vote remain. In Scotland, results were 
both less convincing than we expected for remain, 
and also in much fewer number in terms of  turnout. 
The same was true in London - though not to the 
same degree vis a vis turnout. Turnout was lower in 
general across the counting areas that voted remain, 
and higher in areas voting Leave. Why may that have 
been the case?
One simple answer is that change was more 
mobilising than the status quo. While many expected 
a status quo bias, the momentum was with Leave.
Another simple answer is Britain’s euro-scep-
ticism. Only 16% of  our British Election Study 
(pre referendum campaign wave) respondents saw 
themselves as strongly European. That figure was 
61% for those people seeing themselves as strongly 
British. These identities are predictors of  attitudes to 
the costs and benefits of  being in the EU. A majority 
(57%) of  our respondents thought free trade with 
the EU had been good for Britain. The proportions 
seeing other aspects as positive (worker’s rights, 
bringing people from different countries together) 
were below 40%. The proportions seeing the 
negatives (sovereignty, enlargement, red tape) were 
above 60%. Remain needed to win votes from many 
people who held a very negative view of  the EU. 
Another answer might be to conclude that voters 
are not motivated by fear, or were turned off  by 
project fear. 59% of  our BES respondents saw the 
Remain campaign as being about fear. The equivalent 
figure for the Leave campaign was 43%. However, to 
conclude that fear is not a motivator ignores the fact 
that fear of  immigration, change, of  a future Britain 
following the same trajectory of  one felt so far, was 
an underpinning of  a vote to leave. 
There is a bigger question for the Remain 
campaign. Given that the economy is sometimes 
thought of  as a super-issue that so commonly decides 
elections, why did risks to the economy fail to win the 
argument for Remain? 
The perceived economic costs of  leaving the EU 
were not large in contrast to the perceived ‘benefits’ 
of  reducing immigration. 31% of  our BES respond-
ents thought the general economic situation would 
get worse whereas 57% thought it would stay about 
the same. Contrast those figures with the 54% who 
thought immigration would get lower and the 27% 
who thought it would stay about the same. All of  the 
other consequences of  Brexit we asked about (higher 
unemployment, lower international trade, Britain’s 
voice in the world, worsening working conditions, 
the NHS) provided little net difference in opinions 
comparing the proportions who thought things would 
get worse and the proportions who thought things 
would get better. 
Second, if  people thought the general economy 
would get worse they were not all convinced that they 
themselves would feel the economic impact. Only 
18% thought their personal finances would get worse 
(before the campaign), in contrast to the 31% who 
thought the general economy would deteriorate. 
The third explanation builds on the above two. 
The BES conducted a pre-EU referendum wave and 
then a daily campaign wave, from 8th May til 22nd 
June. Preliminary analysis of  those data suggests there 
was no aggregate trend in public opinion about the 
costs or benefits of  Brexit on the economy – nor on 
reducing immigration levels. This was not a campaign 
that convinced a majority of  voters about the costs – 
or benefits – of  leaving. 
There is also the possibility that economic pre-
dictions were simply discounted. If  people had low 
trust in MPs, the proportion thinking the economy 
in general would get worse if  we left the EU was 
29% whereas that figure was 38% if  our BES survey 
respondents had trust in MPs. 
Each of  these explanations are general. There 
is a particular question, however, about Scotland. 
The Scots may have been less mobilised because 
of  repeated elections, but I think this explanation 
unlikely. The Scots may have been so sure they would 
vote to remain that they were less likely to turnout to 
help ensure the outcome. This explanation doesn’t 
explain why the Scots had much lower turnouts 
against expectations, whereas Londoners were only 
slightly less likely to turn out than we expected. It may 
be the case that SNP support has begun to un-wind, 
and erstwhile Labour supporters were not mobilised 
by Labour and the same was true for the other 
pro-Remain parties. But there is little evidence so far 
of  any substantial un-winding of  SNP support. It is a 
possibility – as yet untested – that the Scots voted less 
enthusiastically for Remain because of  the continued 
importance of  the nationalist cleavage in Scottish 
politics. A vote for Leave, or a decision to stay-at-
home, made it more likely that the UK would leave 
the European Union and Scotland would gain inde-
pendence. Or the benefits of  remaining in the EU 
were simply in conflict with the desire for Scotland 
to be independent. If  this is true, it is ironic that 
the SNP are courting EU membership and another 
referendum on Scottish independence on the strength 
of  Scottish votes for remain, when the absence of  
Scottish remain votes helped contribute to UK exit 
from the EU. 
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Since its announcement, the referendum result 
has been widely explained in terms of  social class, 
but during the campaign class was rarely explicitly 
discussed. Even the Labour party seemed to not 
to notice the likelihood of  a working class protest 
vote until late in the day, although polls showed 
this (and covariants such as education, newspaper 
readership and region) to be the only significant 
demographic difference between in and out voters 
other than age.
Although polling indicates that 63% of  
Labour supporters voted to remain in compari-
son with just 42% of  Tories (whose voters tend 
to be older, if  less working class), Labour have 
clearly failed to persuade many of  their traditional 
working class supporters of  the case for remain. 
Commentators such as Paul Mason and Owen 
Jones explain this as a rebellion by provincial 
working classes against a metropolitan elite who 
they believe despise their values and culture, and 
the reluctance of  the Labour shadow cabinet to 
address the issue of  immigration. 
The other traditional voice of  the working 
class, however, is the trade unions, who could be 
seen as closer to the shop floor, but also failed 
to connect culturally. Like the wider Remain 
campaign, the unions focused on the economy, and 
whilst the parties were recruiting the support of  
big business, the unions’ were initially seen backing 
employers’ warnings about job losses, likely 
fuelling the notion that EU membership principally 
benefits the elite. Interestingly, this suggests that 
many ‘working people’ didn’t accept the dominant 
media assumption that the interests of  big business 
are synonymous with the public interest because of  
their role as ‘wealth and jobs creators’, but neither 
did they accept the argument later put forward by 
union leaders in letters and comment pieces in the 
Mirror and Guardian – and picked up by Jeremy 
Corbyn and Sadiq Khan - that the EU protected 
workers rights and enabled unions to cooperate 
across border against employers that are increas-
ingly multinational. 
The Trade Union Congress (TUC) was the 
most prominent union voice, and its leader Frances 
O’Grady was sufficiently prominent to be given a 
place in the BBC televised debate, with the second 
audience question addressing employment and 
social rights. However, Loughborough University’s 
research indicates that in general employment issues 
constituted just 4% of  coverage, and unions made 
up just 0.4% of  sources on TV and 1% in the 
press. Unsurprisingly, the voice of  the unions has 
been largely absent in the conservative press and 
more prominent in the Guardian, 91% of  whose 
readers supported Remain, but even more so in 
the Mirror. However, it is not clear from polling 
how the latter’s readers stand on the issue, and it 
seems likely that many of  them voted - along class 
and age lines (41% of  readers being over 65) - to 
leave. Mirror columnist Kevin Maguire reflected 
that people voted “in good faith” on the basis of  a 
campaign of  misinformation and are likely to feel 
in time that they have been “conned” - a prediction 
given some anecdotal support hot on the heels of  
the result. 
Nonetheless, claims that propaganda from the 
Leave camp and their press cheerleaders created 
false consciousness are something of  an oversim-
plification, with newspapers typically reinforcing 
their readers’ existing views more than leading 
them - hence Murdoch papers were split along 
class lines between the Brexit-supporting Sun 
and Remain-backing Times. More significant is 
that many people apparently blamed the EU and 
immigration for the country’s ills rather than the 
government, and Cameron must bear some respon-
sibility for that.  
Simon Kellner’s analysis of  YouGov polling 
found that the most striking difference between the 
two camps in terms of  underlying beliefs was that 
Remain supporters blamed the banks, Conserv-
ative-led governments, and growing inequality 
whilst Leave voters blamed EU regulation, the 
previous Labour government, and immigrants 
willing to work for lower wages. This suggests 
that they accepted the Conservative rhetoric of  a 
fiscal rather than financial crisis that left them with 
no choice but to impose austerity measures, and 
that they attribute globalisation to governmental 
bodies rather than multinational corporations. 
What the left failed to do is to give a convincing 
alternative account for why poor communities were 
suffering and what they could do about it - such as 
investment in social housing and public services - 
because they made the mistake of  thinking the EU 
referendum vote would be about the EU. 
It is not clear whether workers were unaware 
of  the unions’ argument or unpersuaded by them, 
or simply felt it was a price worth paying for the 
chance to stem immigration, but the misdirected 
blame for austerity is the result of  public discourse 
over the long-term rather than the campaign itself, 
and symptomatic of  wider problems in our media 
and politics.
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On BBC1’s Question Time programme broadcast on 
15th June, an audience member pleaded that “I want 
my country back… we’re all just so frustrated”. Televised 
the day before the Brexit campaigns began, this 
single plea symbolised a referendum which has 
been dominated not by sober analysis and evi-
dence-based reason, but by hysteria, hatred, savage 
emotions, and the sinister monster of  exclusionary, 
ethnic nationalism.
The three phases of  Brexit – campaign, ref-
erendum, aftermath – have revealed three urgent 
problems. First, the lack of  public faith in establish-
ment politics. Second, the emotional deficit of  the 
EU. Third, the return of  a particularly ugly English 
nationalism. All of  these were intimately connected 
in a campaign whose nature was fundamentally 
emotional. While the EU is no longer an immediate 
priority for the next government, public lack of  
faith and the return of  national identity in England 
are urgent issues which a new government must 
carefully address.
First, the erosion of  political faith. An unfore-
seen consequence is that a campaign about Euro-
peanness has brought to the fore severe tensions 
within Britishness. The accusations made by Leave 
against the EU – that it is an undemocratic, elitist 
network sustained by corruption – were appropri-
ated by both cross-party campaigns as criticisms of  
the British establishment. In the aftermath of  Brexit 
a lack of  faith in the Referendum’s legitimacy, in the 
viability of  the UK as a collective union, in party 
leadership, and perhaps in the very system of  British 
Parliamentary politics, has manifested in the form of  
demands for another referendum, threats of  balka-
nisation, and a dual Conservative-Labour leadership 
crisis. Lack of  faith was not a sideshow restricted to 
conspiracy theories about ballot papers. It has un-
derpinned the entire campaign and will likely trigger 
a general election even more emotional, bitter and 
unpredictable than the elections and referenda of  
2010-2016. A probable election in later 2016 will 
require all factions to quickly restore public faith in 
parties, leaders, and the very system of  government. 
This will not be easy, and will likely result in major 
party infighting and parties moving much closer to 
populism for years to come. 
The second issue raised by Brexit is final proof  
that EU leaders and EU scholars must abandon 
the long-outdated assumptions of  neofunction-
alist spillover – the dominant, archaic belief  that 
ever-closer political and economic integration would 
result in stronger feelings of  ‘EU-ropeanness”. 
This has not happened. Euroscepticism is higher 
than ever. Upcoming French and German elections 
could see the same frustrations give birth to populist 
anti-EU governments in the Union’s keystones. 
Unless the EU, whose leaders have consistently 
failed to respond to an ever-louder Euroscepticism 
since 2007, act immediately to improve the EU’s 
image as a democratically accountable alliance rather 
than an out-of-touch clique, Britain could prove to 
be the first of  27 closely-spaced dominos to fall. 
Lack of  faith in the British and European 
establishment are deeply emotional issues, and are 
intimately connected with the third consequence 
of  Brexit – the rise of  an aggressive, angry, ethnic 
Englishness. All three stages of  Brexit have been 
characterised by contempt, anger and despair unseen 
in recent British politics. And these are issues with 
which the Remain campaign struggled to compete. 
The referendum was not fought on logical, sober, 
rational arguments. It was fought on raw emotion. 
No amount of  economic data and well-meaning 
appeals to cosmopolitanism can compete with 
the pull of  nostalgia and the primal savagery of  
resentment. This emotional surge was not most 
keenly felt in the nations or the capital but in those 
post-industrial provinces of  England which have 
spent forty years as backwaters; such places have 
not shared the same degree of  power and prosperity 
as the devolved nations and the metropolis. When 
asked to support the cause of  a government and 
parties which have either harmed or simply ignored 
the provinces (“the North” acting as the media’s 
poor synecdoche for England), the consequence was 
the unleashing of  English resentment traceable to 
the 1970s: resentment of  those who campaigned for 
Remain, accused of  being traitors; resentment of  
those who voted Leave, demonised as uneducated 
racists; resentment of  immigration, of  economic 
decline, of  the Westminster consensus and the 
Brussels establishment. Ultimately it is resentment 
which has created a bitterly divided Britain and 
triggered an assassination on a city street. 
Ultimately the Referendum was a test of  
Britain’s, and specifically England’s, faith and 
identity. Faith has been proven to be fallible, and 
identity has retreated into an ethnic nationalism, a 
yearning for a collective belonging which is given 
meaning not by appealing to a distant, nostalgic 
imagination but by appealing to a rejection of  the 
present. This present is symbolised by a multi-party 
establishment which may soon discover that, like in 
Scotland in 2014, once the genie of  nationalism has 
been released from its bottle, it turns on those who 
released it. And it cannot be easily put back. The 
next government faces the immense challenge of  
governing a severely divided society in which trust is 
weak, resentment is strong, and inevitable problems 
are blamed on a feet-dragging establishment. The 
next government must address English anger by 
focusing development and powers much more 
heavily in the overlooked English regions. This will 
be no easy task. But unless immediate and significant 
steps are taken to assuage the disillusionment and 
anger which the referendum has revealed, we must 
seriously question our future as a United Kingdom.
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The referendum frequently saw UK politicians and 
citizens expressing combinations of  fact and feelings. 
The way one feels about an entity like the EU is 
important as, theoretically, feelings are expressions 
of  the underlying attitudes likely to drive voting 
behaviour. In this article I offer a qualitative analysis 
of  the dominant tone, based on a systematic reading 
and coding of  the subject and discourse expressed in 
responses to posts to Facebook to the profile pages 
of  Vote Leave (a community of  517,326 members) 
and Britain Stronger In Europe (with 505,064 
community members), the official Leave and Remain 
campaigns within the final week of  the contest.  
Interestingly the tone of  Vote Leave was 
dominated by negativity towards the Remain 
campaigners with supporters frequently posting 
vitriol directed at the ‘assholes’ whose arguments 
are described as hypocritical and their performanc-
es ‘slippery’. This, however, was interspersed by 
messages of  hope demonstrating that, for some, the 
idea of  Brexit has strongly positive connotations. 
The campaign posted numerous videos featuring 
leading pro-Remain figures making their case and 
each of  these were met with a combination of  
derision and personal attacks. Hence the Leave 
community stoked the negativity constantly and, in 
doing so, were particularly focused on a group they 
referred to as the ‘Remainiacs’.  This amorphous 
‘other’ was described as ‘stupid’, easily-manipulated, 
cowardly and even ‘traitorous’. 
There was a counterbalance, however, with many 
active supporters promoting pro-Leave messages 
to justify Brexit such as the economic costs of  EU 
membership, the numbers of  migrants entering the 
UK from the EU, and figures for benefit payments to 
migrants. But the reasons why the Leave supporters 
appeared most passionate reflected a sense that they 
had long wanted the UK out of  the EU.  They had 
previously been frustrated that not everyone had 
agreed and because of  this their Brexit dream had 
gone unrealised- until now. Thus underlining the neg-
ativity and scare stories were hopeful messages from 
citizens who expressed their desire to create what 
they believed would be a freer country able to better 
determine its own destiny.
Many people posting in the Remain Facebook 
community expressed negativity towards the Vote 
Leave case as well as a dispassionate reiteration of  
the economic arguments for leaving the EU.   Some 
citizens promoted more positive arguments for 
Britain to not ‘pull up the drawbridge’ and thereby 
be isolated. While the majority of  content posted re-
packaged official arguments, some did make personal 
attacks on key pro-Brexit protagonists such as Nigel 
Farage and Boris Johnson as well as the credibility 
of  their key arguments. Predominantly the feelings 
expressed were ones of  uncertainty with citizens 
voicing their mistrust over the Conservative govern-
ment’s ability to negotiate a post-Brexit settlement. 
Where supportive comments were made in response 
to Facebook posts they tended to be reactions to 
messages from business leaders, such as Richard 
Branson. By contrast a general mistrust was shown 
towards statements by Cameron and Osborne. Few 
Labour figures featured at all, with the exception 
of  the late Jo Cox, the Labour MP whose murder 
in the penultimate week of  the campaign led to its 
brief  suspension. Ms Cox’s pro-Remain article for 
the PoliticsHome site was widely re-published and 
circulated following her death. The support for her 
argument may have resulted from the tragedy of  her 
murder, however it seems consistent with the general 
mood within a community that seemed to have only 
tacit support for the political leaders of  the campaign. 
Hence, in contrast to the passionate belligerence of  
Vote Leave, Remainers seemed largely to be more 
driven by the emotion of  fear than desire.
The feelings within the respective communities 
were reflected in the content posted and here there 
were similarities in how both campaigns used their 
Facebook profiles for posting videos, pictures or 
text to disseminate their own messages or portray 
opponents in a negative light. While Vote Leave sup-
porters reserved their attacks for opponents, Stronger 
In members also demonstrated distrust for Cameron 
and Osborne, thereby reinforcing a general anti-es-
tablishment mood. Members also tended to reflect 
the general mood of  each side with the Remain 
camp focused on the message of  economic uncer-
tainty and Leavers with figures showing the costs of  
immigration. Hope-filled messages tended to be more 
prevalent within the Vote Leave community, reflecting 
a dimension of  the official campaign. For Stronger 
In it appeared a minority were inventing their own 
positive communications that often countered the 
official, threat-filled messages and suggested there 
were better reasons to vote to Remain than those  
offered by Cameron.
The Remain and Leave Facebook commu-
nities represent a microcosm of  the UK popula-
tion, and indeed many of  the comments made on 
these platforms no doubt reflected many of  those 
expressed on buses and in pubs and cafes. They 
may therefore have been the dominant feelings of  
the electorates on each side. Here, the economic 
argument offered by a majority of  politicians, 
business leaders and economists appeared to have 
been ignored in favour of  a more nebulous but 
hopeful future. Whether this reflects the longstanding 
Euroscepticism consistently seen in the media and 
reflected by opinion polls since the late 1980s is a 
moot point. The result may also be a reflection of  a 
public disaffection for elites and the impression that 
the Remain campaign was hectoring citizens. What 
citizen interactions with the campaign suggests is that 
an anti-politics mood is an undercurrent among those 
who express their political views on social media. 
This mood is likely to remain a feature of  political 
discourse and so might have considerable ramifica-
tions for UK politics at a time of  great uncertainty.
Mixed feelings: how citizens expressed their 
attitudes towards the EU
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‘We want our country back’ – stop sneering, 
start listening
The post-mortem is now well under way and the 
general consensus seems to be that those who voted 
Leave were gullible fools led astray by a combina-
tion of  a partisan press and slick political operators 
selling a particularly potent brand of  snake oil, one 
part false promises, two parts undiluted bigotry. 
Notwithstanding the quality of  the overall political 
debate around Brexit (it was awful on both sides), 
such a view might make Remainers feel better about 
themselves but offers little in making sense of  what 
actually happened last Thursday and why. 
In the lead up to the vote, there were very few 
who actually got what this was about. John Harris of  
the Guardian was one of  them because he actually 
bothered to tour the country and talk to people in 
unglamorous places like Nuneaton (66% Leave), 
Barking (62% Leave) and Hartlepool (70% Leave). 
On Wednesday he wrote; 
Even those who understand that something 
seismic is afoot among predominantly working-class 
voters are still too keen on the idea that they are 
gullible enough to be led over a cliff  by people with 
whom they would actually disagree, if  only they 
knew the facts. But most people are not really being 
“led” by anyone. In my experience, (Nigel) Farage, 
Boris Johnson and Michael Gove et al are viewed by 
most people with as much cynicism as the people 
fronting the remain campaign.
What is now happening … in the UK under-
lines a tangle of  other stuff  – to do with culture, 
belonging and community – that is going to require 
a completely different level of  response.
I think Harris is right on all counts but it’s his 
nod to ‘culture, belonging and community’ that I 
want to briefly focus on here. For while the discon-
nect between ‘ordinary’ people, notably those in the 
former industrial heartlands that Labour used to 
consider its own, and politicians has been extensive-
ly discussed, this ‘tangle of  other stuff ’ has been 
somewhat neglected, often reduced to accusations 
of  racism and xenophobia. Now, of  course, this isn’t 
to condone physical or verbal attacks on the basis of  
skin colour, religion, accent or language but unless 
we understand what people are telling us about their 
own lives we aren’t going to get very far in changing 
things for the better.    
The point that needs to be made is that those 
voting Leave were not only railing against an elite 
that they considered to be distant and disinterested 
but also, in the process, reaffirming their commit-
ment to the nation and a national order of  things. 
For many on the Remain side, nationalism continues 
to be seen as a poisonous ideology largely associat-
ed with far-right politicians and football hooligans. 
Likewise, the European project is seen by them 
as an antidote to such expressions of  bigotry and 
violence. The problem with such a view is that in 
simply reducing nationalism to extremism, we risk 
overlooking why nations continue to matter to so 
many people, including a good number of  those 
who voted Leave.   Simply put, national frameworks 
continue to offer a point of  anchorage – a sense of  
identity, continuity, community, place and belonging 
– in an increasingly complex and threatening world. 
Similarly, for those who see themselves at the heart 
of  national culture and territory, the nation provides 
a sense of  status (I belong here) and power (I should 
be able to say what goes on here) where other forms 
(notably for men) have been increasingly eroded e.g. 
work, class, locality.   
The sociologist Jonathan Hearn has written that 
‘national identities, like all identities, are rendered 
salient when they seem to address personal issues 
of  power over one’s own life”. At the moment, 
people in Britain, but in England in particular, are 
feeling a loss of  control and a sense of  anxiety that 
is palpable. In response to this they are drawing on 
a form of  identity/community that, at least, gives 
them a way of  making their own lives meaning-
ful. We don’t have to like the fact that sometimes 
this leads to outbursts against migrants or boorish 
behaviour in the streets of  Marseilles. And, to 
repeat, trying to make sense of  such behaviour 
doesn’t mean condoning it. 
But if  we are really serious about trying to offer 
new political solutions and ways of  imagining and 
being in the world, it means first trying to engage 
with people and not simply sneering at them when 
they happen to make choices we don’t agree with. 
It also means getting a bunch of  better narratives 
about who we are and where we’re going than the 
current lot have been peddling for the last two 
decades. In Britain this not only means making the 
political system more responsive (ditching the First 
Pass The Post electoral system and moving towards 
genuine devolution for the regions and cities) but 
offering a narrative of  (national) community that is 
forward looking and acknowledges Britain’s current 
place in the world rather than continually banging 
on about the past. Britain is a small island in Europe. 
It once had an empire and its men and women 
(including those in the Commonwealth) made an 
important contribution to the overthrow of  fascism 
in the Twentieth Century. Now, it punches above its 
weight when it comes to culture and science, but the 
world has moved on, whether it comes to military 
power, economic output or (whisper it) football.  
Like the howls of  rage from across the Atlantic, 
the slogan ‘we want our country back’ is only too 
easy to dismiss if  you’re sitting (relatively) comforta-
bly in a sleek office or coffee shop in London, Paris 
or Oslo. Unfortunately, the ‘stuff  to do with culture, 
belonging and community’ is far too important to be 
left to the likes of  Farage, Johnson and Trump. 
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In recent years, the relationship between young 
people and British democracy has become increas-
ingly complex and fragile. In particular, Govern-
ment austerity policies introduced in 2010 placed 
a disproportionate burden on young people who 
have arguably suffered more than any other social 
grouping from deepening spending cuts in welfare 
and public services (Birch, Lodge and Gottfried 
2013). Perhaps not surprisingly, the perceived 
failings of  the political class to champion the 
interests of  young people has left today’s youth 
feeling especially ignored and marginalised, and has 
exposed a widening gap in aspirations between the 
generations. It has also translated into continued 
abstention from formal electoral politics (Henn and 
Oldfield, 2016). In the run-up to the 2016 EU Ref-
erendum, a key challenge for the political class was 
therefore to activate the youth vote in a contest 
that in time will almost certainly radically re-shape 
Britain’s relationship with itself  and the rest of  
continental Europe. 
Against this back-drop, we worked with young 
people to co-produce a project called ‘Me and 
EU’ to place accessible, timely and peer reviewed 
information in the hands of  young people with 
just one click. The digital platform connected users 
to research and events organised by contributors 
to the ESRC-funded “UK in a Changing Europe” 
project. Critically, ‘Me and EU’ was designed to 
better help young people in their decision-making 
on whether and how to vote. This was important 
for two critical reasons. Firstly, although they 
represented a huge potential voting bloc, the UK’s 
Electoral Commission identified that they were 
nonetheless massively under-represented on the 
electoral register in advance of  the EU Referen-
dum. Our project aimed to encourage young 
people to register to vote, and included a link that 
enabled them to do that.
Secondly, young people had a particular take 
on the EU Referendum and a vision on Britain’s 
relationship with Europe that were distinct 
from those of  their older contemporaries. For 
instance, using YouGov polling data collected 
in the months leading up to the Referendum, 
Fox (2016) tracked a strong correlation between 
attitudes to EU membership and age. The polls 
revealed that when compared with older age 
groups, young people were less hostile to the EU, 
more tolerant of  immigration, and more likely to 
feel that the EU had been successful in securing 
peace across the continent. Importantly, the data 
from YouGov’s May 2016 poll indicated that the 
under 25’s were overwhelmingly most likely to 
support the Remain option, while the over-60s 
backed leaving the EU. As Table 1 (opposite) 
demonstrates, this generational gap was ultimately 
reflected in the final vote, with 73 per cent of  18 
to 24 year olds voting to remain in the EU while 
the country at large voted to leave by a margin of  
51.9 per cent to 48.1 per cent.
In our ‘Me and EU’ research project, we 
asked respondents what underpinned their 
support to either remain in, or to leave, the 
European Union. Figure 1 summarises their 
responses. The majority of  young people pri-
oritised broadly “Remain” responses (shaded). 
The primary issue for this group was a concern 
that Brexit would have a negative impact on the 
economy, trade and employment. However, these 
young people also stressed the positive aspects of  
continued membership of  the EU, including the 
benefits to be gained by offering collective ap-
proaches to such matters as global environmental 
sustainability, security and human rights. By way 
of  contrast, a significant minority of  respond-
ents emphasised the benefits to be gained from 
leaving the EU in terms of  strengthening national 
political sovereignty, re-directing investment from 
the EU towards the UK, and greater control 
over immigration. However, a sizeable group of  
respondents (16 per cent) expressed a lack of  
certainty about the claims and counter-claims 
of  both the Leave and Remain campaigns. This 
supports previous research (Henn and Foard 2014) 
that young people found politics in general to be 
confusing and difficult to engage with. Typical 
responses (typed word-for-word by respondents) 
included: 
• I don’t know enough about the consequences of  
voting to stay in or leave Europe. I don’t think 
anyone truly knows the consequences... I don’t think 
anyone can trust what the newspapers are reporting 
on it because they all have their own agenda and are 
completely biased. 
• Nobody knows what will happen if  we do leave.
• I honestly have no clue on the benefits of  leaving the 
EU or staying in.
The decision of  the UK population to support 
the Brexit option at the 2016 EU Referendum 
will have significant economic, social, political 
and cultural consequences - and none more so 
than for the futures of  young people. However, 
the outcome would appear to be at odds with 
the instincts and preferences of  the majority of  
young people who have indicated their broad 
support for the European project and who voted 
overwhelmingly to remain in the EU. Conceivably, 
the growing inequalities between the generations 
provides a significant challenge of  our time. For 
a youth generation that has borne the brunt of  
recent austerity politics and which already feels 
poorly served by the political class, the Referen-
dum outcome may serve to deepen the ongoing 
dissatisfaction that young people feel in relation 
to democratic processes in the UK.
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Bonfires and Brexterity: what’s next for women?
We could have quite a serious fight coming up. 
Whatever comes next, women’s voices should not 
be so resoundingly drowned out as they were in the 
Referendum campaign. Women’s rights need to be 
articulated starkly, bluntly, and loudly, since they 
were inaudible in the male echo chamber of  pre-ref-
erendum debates.
According to Lord Ashcroft’s Referendum 
poll, based on 12 369 people, the leave/remain 
split between female voters was exactly the same as 
that for male voters – 52/48. That figure, like the 
preceding debates, does not reflect the gendered 
nature of  Brexit. 
In terms of  what comes next, Brexit is a 
feminist issue. During the debates, concerns over 
workplace rights were too often dismissed with 
a reference to the UK’s legislative track record, 
suggesting that we were doing very nicely without 
Europe, thank you. But this argument is rather 
shallow and misleading. In law, detail is paramount. 
Yes, the UK stumped up its own Equal Pay Act. But 
it did not cover things like pension rights – it was up 
to the European Court of  Justice to find that part 
time workers, more likely to be women, should be 
entitled to join occupational pension schemes. And it 
was the ECJ that found that women were entitled to 
equal pay for work of  equal value when no job eval-
uation study had been done. Yes, the UK created its 
own Sex Discrimination Act, but it was the ECJ that 
found that no sick-man comparator was required, 
contrary to UK law. And it was the ECJ that found 
that women should not be deprived of  their annual 
leave while on maternity leave. And it was the ECJ 
that insisted upon protection for a working mother 
from direct discrimination and harassment on the 
grounds of  her child’s disability. And it was the ECJ 
that lifted the cap that UK law had placed on com-
pensation in discrimination cases. In short, the ECJ 
has repeatedly corrected the ‘unprogressive tenden-
cies of  the domestic courts.’
Brexit raises the prospect of  a ‘bonfire of  
rights’. A number of  those in the Leave camp have 
made their distaste for gender equality provisions 
abundantly clear. Priti Patel cited research by Open 
Europe on the ‘100 most burdensome rules’ which 
included the part-time workers directive (which 
ensures equal rights for this group), the gender 
equality directive, and the parental leave directive. 
Martin Callanan  (then the chair of  the European 
Conservatives and Reformists Group) said he 
wanted to “scrap … the Pregnant Workers Directive 
and all of  the other barriers to actually employing 
people if  we really want to create jobs in Europe”. 
Boris Johnson – looking a contender to be the next 
Prime Minister, announced that he would scrap the 
entire social chapter of  the EU.
Workplace rights are not the only gendered 
aspect of  Brexit. Its attendant economic shock(s), 
may well be disproportionately borne by low-income 
women. Longer, and possibly deeper, austerity is 
predicted. The effects will not be shared out equally. 
Austerity policies have already discriminated dramat-
ically against women. House of  Commons research 
found that 73% of  the 2010 budget cuts in public 
expenditure fell on women. Some estimates put 
the proportion of  UK welfare cuts coming out of  
women’s pockets as high as 85% or over 90%. The 
National Institute for Economic and Social Research 
recently showed that post-Brexit welfare cuts would 
impact most heavily upon low income households, 
and particularly acutely upon working lone parent 
families. Lone parents are disproportionately (around 
90%) women. 
Whatever happens next, all parties must 
consider how to protect women’s rights. The possi-
bility of  switching to an EEA/EFTA-like agreement 
is being floated increasingly within the Leave camp. 
Again, the devil will be in the detail. If  we do move 
to EEA membership, then the UK would be bound 
by the key gender equality provisions. But we would 
lose access to the ECJ, being subject instead to the 
EFTA Court. If  we move to ‘something like’, but 
not exactly, EEA membership, then the differences 
must be examined keenly, in case negotiators seek 
to siphon women’s rights out of  the package. If  we 
move to something completely different, we must 
prevent the reckless incineration of  gender equality 
measures and priorities. The vote for Brexit is not 
a mandate for Brexterity. It could be claimed on the 
contrary that the vote was influenced heavily by sug-
gestions that there would be greater, not less, public 
sector spending. 
In navigating the unknown course ahead, 
women’s interests must be equally represented and 
expressed. Society cannot afford to backslide into 
anachronistic, patriarchal economic reasoning, 
in which gender equality measures are at best 
whimsical luxuries for when the sun is shining, and 
at worst obstacles to business interests –unthink-
ingly elided with ‘male’ interests. And single mums, 
already shouldering the austerity burden, cannot 
afford to fund our constitutional reshuffle.
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With the EU Referendum coming just thirteen 
months after a General Election in which the 
predictions were proven so dramatically wrong, 
pollsters were more cautious about publicis-
ing polls over the course of  the Referendum 
campaign. The final figures from YouGov (52-48), 
Populus (55-45) and Com Res (48-42) may have 
disagreed on the extent of  the victory, but in a 
binary choice they all had Remain comfortably 
across the line. With a recent history of  methodo-
logical miscalculations and disagreement between 
the polls on the exact lead for Remain perhaps 
we should have taken these findings with a pinch 
more salt. 
When the result was announced, YouGov 
stated that its miscalculation was due to a much 
higher turnout in those areas coming out in favour 
of  a Leave vote. And in the days following the 
vote, the media began to focus on how David 
Cameron and his team had been isolated in a Ref-
erendum bubble, supremely confident in their own 
success and oblivious to the way that the campaign 
was really going. There were reports of  premature 
celebrations among the Prime Minister and his 
Downing Street advisers that were quite unlike the 
2015 General Election when David Cameron had 
reportedly written and even practised a resignation 
speech. Cameron hadn’t felt the need to do the 
same on Referendum night. 
Predicting Referendum results is even more 
difficult than predicting General Election results, 
and estimating turnout is particularly complex. 
But if  we draw on political science, two things 
should have been clear:
1. We should have expected a higher turnout 
among Leave voters: those in favour of  change 
tend to be more likely to vote than those in favour 
of  maintaining the status quo. Polling in early 
2016 clearly demonstrated that those in favour of  
Brexit were more likely to say they would definitely 
vote. So the fact that an even larger number of  
those who supported the Leave campaign actually 
went to the polling station should not come as 
too much of  a surprise. 
2. There was less incentive for Remain voters 
to go out and vote: we know that voters see the 
process of  voting as collective action, but we 
also know from calculus models of  voting that 
there is more incentive for people to turnout 
if  they think that their own vote may actually 
make a difference to the outcome. Most of  the 
polls through the latter parts of  the campaign 
predicted that the outcome would be close. But 
polling gave a sense that the Remain campaign 
would be victorious. Polling commissioned by The 
Telegraph, for instance, showed the proportion 
of  voters who felt that Remain would win never 
dropped below 54% while the number who felt 
that Leave would win was never higher than 26%. 
This may possibly explain why Remain voters 
were less likely to go to polling stations. They may 
have perceived that their vote would make less of  
an impact on the overall result. It also explains 
why so many Leave voters expressed dismay at the 
result– they had more incentive to turn out, but 
they never actually expected to win. 
It seems then, that it wasn’t just Downing 
Street that was in a Referendum bubble. The 
pollsters, the media and the majority of  the public 
were too. And on Friday 24th June that bubble 
finally burst. But looking at polling on British 
attitudes towards the European Union is useful 
for other reasons. In fact, if  we consider polls 
from the last two Parliaments we can see two 
things which help to put the Referendum result 
into context:
1. The vote for Leave was not as strong as it 
has been in the past: YouGov polling specifically 
on EU membership since 2010 shows that the gap 
between those in favour of  leaving and those 
who would prefer to remain has been as large as 
23 points. This was in September 2012, in the 
middle of  the Greek bailout crisis. Since 2013 the 
gap between the two sides narrowed considera-
bly, with support for leave and remain regularly 
overlapping before the Referendum was formally 
announced. 
2. Although there has always been a lingering 
Euroscepticism, attitudes to the EU have his-
torically seen large swings. We can see this from 
polling data discussed above and we can also see 
it from the behaviour of  our parliamentarians. It 
changed in line with milestones in the develop-
ment and integration of  the European Union, the 
accession of  new member states, and changes in 
economic or political situations across Europe. 
It is likely then, that had the Remain side seen 
victory this week, attitudes towards the EU would 
have slowly picked up again. 
Perhaps we should have foreseen this polling 
mishap. As last year’s General Election result 
showed us, even the best polling can get the result 
- not just its magnitude - wrong. Those who rely 
on polling are always taking a gamble if  they don’t 
understand some of  its biggest limitations.
The ‘Referendum Bubble’: what can we learn 
from EU campaign polling?
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The Scottish Independence Referendum of  2014 
was for many a watershed moment in the ongoing 
debate about youth political engagement. Against 
a backdrop of  declining electoral turnout amongst 
young voters, and evidence that today’s young 
people are the most politically apathetic to have 
entered the electorate in the last century, the 85% 
turnout among 18-24 year olds in the Scottish 
Independence Referendum – and 75% turnout 
among newly enfranchised 16 and 17 year olds – 
became proof  that if  elections were based on issues 
that young people care about and can connect to, 
they will participate in politics. While it is still far 
too early to know whether the 2014 campaign led 
to a sustained increase in political interest amongst 
Scottish young people, there is little doubt that 
their political engagement was at least temporarily 
boosted. A reasonable expectation, therefore, is that 
we should see a similar boost in youth political en-
gagement as a result of  the EU Referendum, given 
that this, too, was on an issue which young people 
care passionately about – EU membership – and 
was a contest in which their votes could have been 
crucial in stopping a Leave victory as a result of  
high turnout among their more Eurosceptic elders.
We could reasonably expect, therefore, that 
young voters would be receptive to campaign efforts 
to mobilise them to vote in the EU Referendum, 
and that they may become more engaged with 
politics as a result. To explore this, we surveyed two 
groups of  voters about their attitudes towards the 
EU Referendum and their engagement with politics 
– one in March before the formal campaign began, 
and another around polling day – allowing us to 
see how the political engagement of  young voters 
changed throughout the course of  the Referendum 
campaign (for our methodology visit the project 
website). The data (summarised in Table 1) indicates 
that the under-30s’ interest in politics was boosted 
by the Referendum, and this translated into greater 
participation on polling day. 
Respondents to our survey were asked, for 
example, how interested they were in politics on a 
scale from 0-10 (with 10 meaning ‘very interested’). 
In March, 7% of  the under-30s said that they had 
no interest at all (i.e., gave a score of  0), while 40% 
were highly interested (i.e., gave a score of  at least 
8). By June, the proportion of  uninterested young 
people had fallen slightly to 5%, and the proportion 
with low interest in politics (giving a score of  1-3) 
also fell by 4%, while the proportion highly inter-
ested rose to 45%. While there is little indication 
that completely disengaged young people become 
interested in politics as a result of  the Referendum, 
there is evidence of  an increase in interest among 
those who were engaged to at least some extent. 
This boost in political interest also appears to have 
increased the chances of  many under-30s’ voting 
in the Referendum, with the proportion who were 
certain that they would vote rising from 48% in 
March to 71% by polling day. While voters have a 
tendency to over-estimate their chances of  voting 
in surveys, there is clearly a marked increase in the 
number of  young people expecting to vote, and the 
figure compares favourably with the fewer than 60% 
of  under-30s who said that they were certain to vote 
in the 2010 and 2015 general elections (according to 
the British Election Study). 
There are also indications that younger voters 
became more trusting of  the messages they heard 
from the Remain and Leave camps as the campaign 
progressed. In March, 44% of  under-30s said that 
they trusted one or both of  the campaigns to at least 
some degree, whereas by June this proportion had 
increased to 55%. This is perhaps surprising in light 
of  the effort the two campaigns spent attempting 
to smear and undermine the credibility of  their 
opponents. But it is nonetheless positive from the 
perspective of  youth engagement, as higher levels of  
trust are associated with greater political participa-
tion. 86% of  voters (and 81% of  under-30s) who 
had at least some trust in a campaign (either Leave 
or Remain) reported being certain to vote in the Ref-
erendum, compared with 73% of  voters (and 68% 
of  under-30s) who did not trust either campaign. 
There is little question, therefore, that the 
Referendum campaign, and the issue of  EU mem-
bership itself, has stimulated the political interest 
of  Britain’s young people to an extent not seen 
for some years. Whether this proves to be lasting 
remains to be seen, and will no doubt require a 
sustained effort from politicians and the media to 
keep young people interested despite the Referen-
dum result, particularly because the majority were 
not on the winning side when results came in – as 
was the case in Scotland. What also remains to be 
seen, however, and is beyond the scope of  this 
research to address, is whether there is any lasting 
effect on the faith of  these more engaged young 
voters in our political elite and democratic debate 
following the most negative, personal and hostile 
political campaign for many years.
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Campaign frames in the voters’ minds
Following a historic Referendum on 23 June 2016, 
British voters decided to exit the European Union 
by a 3.8 per cent margin. What made the Vote 
Leave campaign swing the voters to its side? 
Through an analysis of  YouGov data, 
Figure 1 (opposite) shows that the questions of  
sovereignty and immigration were much more 
important in the hearts and minds of  those who 
opted to leave the European Union compared to 
those who opted to remain. In contrast, economic 
considerations were at the heart of  the Remain 
vote. The difference is staggering: whereas 40 
per cent of  Remainers opted to stay having jobs, 
investments and growth in mind, the economy 
influenced the decision of  only 5 per cent of  the 
Brexiteers. Similarly, just over a quarter of  those 
who opted to leave did so in order to address 
the issue of  immigration versus only one percent 
who identified with Remain. And just over twice 
as many Brexiteers reported sovereignty and 
the UK’s right to act independently as the most 
important reason in deciding how to vote.
From a utilitarian cost-benefit analysis per-
spective, this choice is seemingly irrational. How 
is it that Brexiteers did not vote with their wallets 
in mind, and instead put sovereignty and immigra-
tion at the core of  their decision?
The question of  immigration is multidimen-
sional, and as such it can become a very powerful 
frame especially at times of  widespread insecurity 
and change as a result of  the European crisis. 
Immigration taps into a variety of  cross-cutting 
concerns. The first issue that arises is whether 
immigrants contribute to the national economy 
more than what they take out. Related to this is 
competition with non-natives for jobs and welfare 
provision. The second concern relates to security, 
i.e. whether the country has adequate border 
control and whether the free movement of  EU 
nationals into the UK is associated with higher 
levels of  crime. Lastly there is an obvious cultural 
component in immigration policy, as the entry of  
people from other cultures makes the social fabric 
of  the country more vulnerable to change. 
Both the official Vote Leave campaign and 
UKIP employed the immigration frame in their 
strategies. Although their campaigns primarily 
focused on immigration, they did so in a way 
that appeared also addressing other apparent-
ly related concerns. Multiple links were made: 
immigration and economy; immigration and 
security; and immigration and social change. 
This allowed them to successfully shift the 
debate to the question of  immigration and 
portray sovereignty as the main solution to these 
concerns. This was only way the British people 
could ‘take back control’ of  their country.
The Remain camp, on the other hand, put 
forward a one-dimensional campaign focusing on 
the economy. For those individuals who feel that 
the economy is not a stand-alone issue unrelated 
to immigration, this frame was not convincing. For 
others, this gave a signal that the Remain camp did 
not accept this was a legitimate concern among 
sections of  the population. By not addressing the 
question of  immigration, the Remain camp essen-
tially left a vacuum in its campaign strategy, which 
ultimately did not work in its favour.
So does this mean that the Brexit referendum 
is a case where identity trumps economics? Brex-
iteers did vote –at least partly– with their wallets 
in mind, but the economic solution to their 
problems was not to be found in market stability 
but in ‘taking back control’ of  immigration policy. 
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Figure 1: Most important issue in deciding how to vote 
Source: YouGov, Fieldwork 23 June 2016 
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The EU referendum debate has encompassed a 
bewildering array of  issues and views, with a strong 
emphasis on immigration, the economy and national 
sovereignty. More than anything, what both the 
Referendum campaign and its immediate aftermath 
have demonstrated is that Brexit has played out 
an emotional politics. The feelings that dominated 
the campaign were overwhelmingly negative, and 
highlight the divisive nature of  the debate.
Political theorists had long assumed that citizens’ 
electoral decision-making is based on rationality. 
However, over the past few decades, scholars from a 
variety of  fields have begun to query these assump-
tions, on the basis of  evidence which suggests an 
emotional engagement in politics: people participate 
because they care or feel passionately about an issue. 
Along those lines there is now a well-established 
research tradition at the intersection of  cognitive psy-
chology, political science and communication studies 
which looks at how emotional responses interact with 
cognition. As Drew Westen notes in his book The 
Political Brain, the “political brain is an emotional brain. It 
is not a dispassionate calculating machine, objective-
ly searching for the right facts, figures, and policies 
to make a reasoned decision.” Voters, though often 
well-informed and politically aware, think “with their 
guts,” he suggests. 
The ways in which the political is entwined with 
the emotional has been apparent in the Referendum 
campaign from the outset. Writing just before the 
campaign officially kicked off  in mid-April, the BBC’s 
chief  correspondent, Gavin Hewitt, described the 
debate as driven largely by emotional appeals:
“The Leave campaign has decided to base its 
pitch on the ideal of  control, of  regaining control of  
the British economy, of  borders (although the UK is 
not in Schengen) and of  sovereignty … It is an appeal 
to the gut, and the heart. The Remain campaign un-
derstands that passion as much as facts will determine 
the outcome.
The emotions that the campaign appealed to were 
overwhelmingly negative ones, with both sides were 
accused of  widespread scaremongering. 
But fear was not the only negative emotion at play 
in making up the minds of  the voters. Analysis of  the 
motivations of  Leave voters suggested that disaffection 
and anger of  working class and lower middle-class 
voters with the political establishment swung the vote. 
Groups who feel disenfranchised and alienated from 
political elites have long been the targets of  populist 
politics. But many scholars agree that the current his-
torical moment represents a particularly ripe one for 
populists. As John Cassidy wrote in the New Yorker 
on the day of  the Referendum, making comparisons 
between the populist successes of  Nigel Farage in the 
UK and Donald Trump in the United States:
Lacking grounds for optimism, and feeling remote 
from the levers of  power, the disappointed nurse their 
grievances—until along come politicians who tell them 
that they are right to be angry, that their resentments 
are justified, and that they should be mad not just at the 
winners but at immigrants, too. 
As scholars have long noted, anger is a powerful 
political emotion, because it enables the collective 
expression of  grievances that might otherwise remain 
personal and private. But it is also an emotion which 
has long been associated with irrationality, aggression 
and the potential for violence, and is therefore viewed 
as dangerous to democratic societies.
Once the result became apparent in the early 
hours of  Friday, June 24, anger and fear were supple-
mented by a new wave of  negative emotions. Remain 
voters went through the “Seven Stages of  Brexit 
Grief,” seeking to bargain against the result by signing a 
petition for a second referendum in their millions. But 
the grief  and anger were not contained to the losing 
camp. Media reported a spike in hate crimes and racist 
abuse across the country. Leave voters in their droves 
expressed regret at the outcome – a feeling so widely 
discussed that new phrases were coined to describe 
it, including “Bregret” and “Bregrexit.” High-pro-
file Brexit supporter and former Sun Editor, Kelvin 
MacKenzie, came out to voice his remorse and fear 
for the future, stating: “I have buyer’s remorse. A sense 
of  be careful what you wish for. To be truthful, I am 
fearful of  what lies ahead.” 
These emotions spilled over from public discourse 
into private lives. The vote caused bitter divisions and 
feelings of  betrayal in families split over the decision, 
particularly over a generational divide in voting. Sarah 
Vine, the Daily Mail columnist who is the wife of  Leave 
leader Michael Gove, wrote of  how the bitter recrim-
inations of  the losing camp had devastated her family 
life and mental health.
How can we make sense of  the outpouring of  
negative emotion that so dominated the EU referen-
dum? First, it is a serious wake-up call about the depths 
of  disaffection and division in society that will have to 
be addressed for constructive political debate to move 
forward. Secondly, the experience of  the campaign has 
shown us that even if  feeling and rationality may not be 
mutually exclusive, the overriding reliance on negative 
emotions has had a detrimental impact on political 
decision-making. Finally, although the Referendum 
outcome occasioned a range of  humorous viral memes 
and hashtags that enabled people to laugh as well as 
cry, emotions continue to be raw as the gravity of  
the decision gradually sinks in while the political and 
economic instability remain. The emotional politics at 
the centre of  the referendum cannot be ignored, and 
are unlikely to be overcome by reasoning and ration-
ality. Rather, the way forward is to open a space for a 
positive emotional politics – built on hope, tolerance, 
and empathy, to mention just a few possibilities. These 
positive emotions may have been largely absent from 
the debate but they have driven change for as long as 
political life has been around. 
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